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## DEVELOPMENT OF WARRANT OFFICERS AS JUNIOR COMMANDERS DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 9, Sep 77 signed to press 22 Aug 77  
pp 26-27

[Article by Lt Gen I. P. Repin, first deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces: "The Facets of Authority — Results of the Discussion of Warrant Officer (Praporshchik) I. Baranovskiy's Letter 'Proud Rank, Great Honor'"]

[Text] We live in great times. Our country is celebrating the 60th anniversary of Great October. The birth of our new USSR Constitution, which brilliantly reflects the outstanding achievements of the Soviet people and the path they have traveled in building a new society, gives the anniversary special solemnity.

In the decisions of the May Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the 6th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the draft of the new USSR Constitution our people and the fighting men of the Armed Forces see convincing evidence of new concern by our Leninist party for the flourishing of our socialist land, the bolstering of its might and reputation, and improving the well-being of Soviet people.

All this arouses enormous patriotic enthusiasm and the broad-based competition among millions of working people in our socialist land who are successfully carrying out the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress.

For us, people in the military, the point in the draft USSR Constitution which states that defense of the socialist fatherland is the work of all the people holds special meaning. The armed defenders of the country of Great October consider it a sacred duty to be in constant combat readiness that will insure the immediate repulsion of any aggressor.

Warrant officers [praporshchiki and michmany], the combat assistants of the officers, have a large part in the training and indoctrination of the soldiers, seamen, sergeants, and petty officers. In recent years this new category of commanders and military specialists has gone through its early development and become firmly established. Most of

our warrant officers are showing themselves to be experienced, knowledgeable specialists, demanding commanders, and good methodologists who put great effort into their assigned work. By their conscientious attitude toward the service they have gained a deserved reputation among all fighting men and enjoy their respect. But, of course, this does not mean that the indoctrination of the warrant officers themselves is a completed process and that we have no need to worry about instilling a profound understanding of patriotic and international duty and a feeling of personal responsibility for the defense of our native land in these servicemen.

Commanders, political agencies, and party organizations consider it their duty to constantly improve work with warrant officers, look after their ideological conditioning and improving their military-technical knowledge and methodological skills in training and indoctrinating personnel, and to see that they set an example for their subordinates in training and service. Therefore, reader interest in WO I. Baranovskiy's letter to the editors of ZNAMENOSETS, entitled "Proud Rank, Great Honor," in which he raises the questions of further improving the reputation of warrant officers, is entirely natural.

During the discussion of these timely issues practical ideas and proposals and interesting opinions which need thorough study and analysis have been expressed.

The author of the letter is certainly right when he says that those warrant officers who are rated "outstanding" in combat and political training, are masters of their work, and demonstrate flawless performance and readiness to sacrifice in the name of the fatherland win the love and respect of their fellow servicemen, authority among subordinates, and a fair evaluation by commanders and senior officers.

Subordinates see the warrant officer as a regular military man with substantial experience who is able to do any job elegantly and skillfully. They value education and competence at their true merit. WO V. Fedorovtsev observed very correctly that one cannot get along today without profound knowledge. This is particularly true because the young men coming into the subunits have good general educational backgrounds. They have curiosity and a desire to thoroughly master military knowledge and combat equipment and become good specialists. That is why, to meet today's requirements, the warrant officer must have profound, solid knowledge of his work and good general erudition.

Good conditions for comprehensive growth have been established in the army and navy. Warrant officers are covered by commander training. Those who did not manage to receive secondary education before the service have an opportunity to study in evening general educational schools. Study at civilian higher educational institutions is also authorized in areas close to the military specialization. Granting them an opportunity to take examinations in the military school curriculum as an external student is an important way to increase the military and specialized knowledge of the warrant officers.

True authority is inconceivable unless the warrant officer sets a personal example in discipline, is able to demand, and maintains a proper level of organization, discipline, and regulation order. During discussion of the article it was correctly observed that fighting men respect strict, demanding commanders who are also fair and able to mobilize subordinates to flawless performance of assigned tasks by their words and deeds. And it is useful to recall once again the statement in the Disciplinary Regulations which we all must know well and follow unconditionally: "Every commander (superior) must teach his subordinates in a spirit of absolute fulfillment of all the requirements of military discipline and develop and maintain in them a consciousness of military honor and military duty."

WO G. Yarovoy observed very correctly in his report entitled "The Right To Demand" that success in battle is not a matter of chance. Military "luck," the ability to achieve victory with little bloodshed, comes to those who are most self-controlled and flawless in performance, those who spare no effort in training and indoctrinating subordinates and instilling good fighting, moral-political, and psychological qualities in them.

Ideological-political maturity is a very important facet of authority. A majority of warrant officers are party and Komsomol activists and leading public workers. They are setting the tone in socialist competition for a worthy celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and taking a vital part in discussion of the draft of the new Constitution. In the subunits they are agitators and propagandists for the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the orders of the USSR Minister of Defense and make a worthy contribution to practical implementation of these demands in their work sectors. With warm love for their military vocations, warrant officers take pride in their rank, treasure their honor, and serve our native land with trust and truth, as Soviet patriots should. This is well demonstrated in Col V. Gorlenko's article "Irreproachability," in the reports "A Heart Open to the Men," by Sr Lt A. Kuznetsov and "Ambassadors of the Country of October" by WO I. Vovkotrub, in the remarks by WO M. Novozhilov under the title "Take a Hero for Your Model" and in other materials.

The readers who have appeared in the journal correctly emphasize that courage, bravery, and determination are key aspects of the military character. And these qualities are inconceivable without good political conditioning and profound conviction. Absolute devotion to the cause of the Communist Party and filial love for the native land are what give the military man invincible strength.

The current generation of defenders of our native land holds the revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions of our people sacred and is multiplying them. In addition to WO I. Baranovskiy, the standard bearer of a missile regiment, we could mention the names of many other true heroes of everyday training who have the excellent traits and best qualities of a fighting patriot. Foremost among them would be

WO G. Dem'yanenko and WO I. Chernyy, delegates to the 25th CPSU Congress, and many others.

While noting the positive qualities of warrant officers which reveal themselves in everyday military labor and remarking on their high level of military sophistication we must, unfortunately, also mention that there are among them men who do not sufficiently value their military rank. Some enter warrant officer school idly, not at their heart's command, following a beloved calling. Although they are isolated cases, as the readers' responses relate, cases of lack of discipline and a slack attitude toward work do occur among warrant officers.

In their letter about experienced navy men, Capt 2nd Rank R. Petreshen', WO P. Seredin, and WO (Res) V. Kovalev gave examples of selfless service to the homeland that are worthy of emulation. They mentioned the names of Warrant Officers N. Dunayev and N. Kazakov, leaders in the pre-October competition. A good word was also said about diver WO L. Zhurilenko, who has spent a total of 7,000 hours under water! The authors very straightforwardly condemned the behavior of WO B. Petrunin, who has committed violations of discipline. And they drew a correct conclusion: the insignia must be worn with honor! If a military man truly loves his vocation he will value his dignity and honor.

The odd position taken by WO M. Osin can find no support. Of all things, he is ashamed of his rank because he graduated from the extension division of a civilian higher educational institution, so he is applying to various command levels to receive an officer's rank. Well, certainly the desire to become an officer is praiseworthy and many warrant officers are so favored. But everyone knows that warrant officers who have demonstrated practical and service qualities, are thoroughly prepared to serve as officers, and are of the appropriate age can be submitted to acquire the rank of "lieutenant." But does this diminish the rank of warrant officer? Of course, it does not. The rank of warrant officer is an honorable one, but it also obligates the holder to a great deal.

Military affairs are not marking time these days and weapons and equipment are being steadily improved. To avoid falling behind, naturally, the warrant officer must keep up with the times, work constantly to develop himself, master methodological skills, and participate in improving physical facilities for training and in technical creative work.

A person who is content with old ways does not grow ideologically and morally. The person who does not raise his qualifications will sooner or later find himself falling behind. A person who has stopped studying has, figuratively speaking, stopped rowing into the waves. In that case the wind and current will carry him backward...

Disaster lies in wait for the person who is content with the "golden mean" and "memories" of good times in the past. And personal lack of discipline and amoral behavior are incompatible with the lofty title of Soviet fighting man and cannot possibly be tolerated. WO (Res)

A. Safarychev complained to the editors that the certification process was not objective. But when the letter was checked it was learned that Safarychev himself lost his authority, abused alcohol, allowed cases of failure to report, and was disrespectful to senior officers. One wonders what kind of certification he expected?

Some of the letters to the editors associated with the discussion of the timely issues raised by WO I. Baranovskiy set forth proposals to increase the authority of warrant officers. Specifically, WO A. Bravtsev considers it essential to take a stricter approach in selecting men for warrant officer school: "Before a young man submits his application, let him go through a one-year test. Check himself, and see if it is a correct choice." This seems like a good suggestion. During the years that warrant officer schools have existed a great deal of experience has been accumulated with selecting the most worthy regular-term and reserve fighting men for study at them. This experience must be employed and built up.

It would appear that the journal should run a more detailed story on selection practices so that the accumulated know-how can be passed on to all units.

Guards WO V. Gromyko correctly makes the issue of increasing the role of warrant officers his foundation. One cannot agree with him, however, when he suggests virtually equalizing the rights of officers and warrant officers. Warrant officers have substantial authority which insures successful performance of the tasks given to them. Nor is there any reason for changes in the uniform. The present uniform is complete and elegant. Needless to say, this does not mean that it cannot undergo any changes in the future. It is evident that we all, warrant officers included, should concentrate greater efforts on instilling a love of the uniform in the fighting men, teaching subordinates to take good care of clothing and footwear and clean it and store it every day as instructed by Article 140 of the Internal Service Regulations.

The best traits and qualities of the warrant officers, the officers' combat assistants, are zeal in work, valor, honor, and readiness for sacrifice. As already said above, the draft USSR Constitution states: "The defense of the socialist fatherland is the work of all the people." Needless to say, it is first of all the work of the loyal sons of the people, our fighting men. Among them are the warrant officers.

In conclusion let us observe that virtually all those who took part in discussion of the issues raised in WO I. Baranovskiy's letter "Proud Rank, High Honor" note that the last five years for warrant officers have been years of development and improvement as commanders, superiors, and specialists. There is no doubt that, steadily improving their military and political knowledge, methodological skills, and professional mastery, the warrant officers will continue to serve honorably in the lofty calling of combat assistants to the officer and devote all their efforts, knowledge, and energy to training and indoctrinating

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their subordinates, the skillful, courageous defenders of our great native land.

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## ACTIONS TAKEN ON COMPLAINTS FROM READERS

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 9, Sep 77 signed to press 22 Aug 77  
p 27

[Article: "Talk with Our Readers — Even Though the Letter Was Not Printed"]

[Text] WO [Praporshchik] V. Kovtun wrote the editors that upon completion of his term of obligation he was removed from the rolls, then a few days later he became eligible to receive a one-time monetary payment for continuous service which was not paid to him even though the discharge order had not yet been issued.

At the request of the editors this complaint was reviewed by Maj Gen Intend Serv D. Valerianov, chief of the financial service of the Red Banner Kiev Military District. He reported that Warrant Officer Kovtun was supposed to have been discharged into the reserve by the established procedure on the day of expiration of his obligatory term, but through the fault of unit officials the materials necessary for his discharge were not sent to the district personnel directorate until after the expiration of his term of service according to the obligation given earlier and as a result the warrant officer was not removed from the personnel records until one month after he became eligible for payment of the one-time monetary award.

In view of this it was suggested that the unit commander call to account those at fault for submitting Warrant Officer Kovtun's discharge papers late and demand that they avoid such cases in the future, while Comrade Kovtun is to be paid the monetary award for continuous service.

WO V. Bovol'skiy was not appointed to a position by a unit order, and as a result he did not receive a monetary allowance. He took the matter to the chain of command, but received no satisfaction and so he wrote the editors.

We sent his letter to the political directorate of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District. Speaking for them Major Shevchenko reported that the facts have been confirmed. The payment of the monetary allowance was held up through the fault of officer Ye. Kovalev.



This fact was reviewed at a meeting of unit officers and Ye. Kovalev was strictly reprimanded. Warrant Officer Bovol'skiy now receives his monetary allowance on time.

WO [Michman] (Res) L. Dmitriyev wrote the editors that he was discharged from active military duty without the right to wear the military uniform although he served the required number of years to have this right.

Capt 1st Rank A. Shebanin, chief of the personnel division of the Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet, responded to the editors' query by reporting that a mistake was made in discharging Warrant Officer Dmitriyev to the reserve. A correction has been made in the earlier order on his discharge and now Warrant Officer Dmitriyev is discharged into the reserve with the right to wear the military uniform. An extract of the order has been sent to the military commissariat in Comrade Dmitriyev's place of residence.

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## COMMAND TRAINING OF NCO'S DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 9, Sep 77 signed to press 22 Aug 77  
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[Article by Lt Gen G. Demidkov: "The Commander's Principal Duty"]

[Text] The commanders are the backbone of the Soviet Army; they bind its ranks together and make it a single combat organism. The commander is the bearer of our glorious combat traditions and fighting spirit, a model of discipline, organization, and order. The knowledge, experience, and organizational skills of Soviet generals and officers and their ability to train and indoctrinate soldiers and lead them in battle are generally recognized. The officers' closest assistants are the sergeants, the largest detachment of command cadres of the Soviet Army. They are the direct superiors and teachers of the soldiers and their role among the troops is exceptionally great and honorable.

The sergeants are always with the soldiers. With them they share all the hardships and joys of military life. More than anyone else they are able to exercise that necessary and beneficial influence on soldiers every day which ultimately leads to success in troop training and indoctrination and molding their lofty moral-fighting qualities. This is why officers rely on the sergeants and their practical activity and through them put into effect the orders and instructions that aim at raising combat readiness in units and subunits by every means and maintaining strong military discipline. Everyone knows that troop combat readiness ultimately depends on the level of training and discipline and the fighting qualities of the primary subunits: squads, teams, and crews, and they are led by sergeants. And in large part the combat training of each individual soldier and, consequently, the level of training of the subunit and unit overall, depend on the authority of the NCO's, their personal training and standards, and their ability to use their command authority and instill in subordinates such moral-fighting qualities as discipline, boldness, initiative, determination, physical endurance, and persistence in performing the assigned mission.

The sergeants of the Soviet Armed Forces, indoctrinated in the ideas of the Communist Party, are absolutely devoted to our native land and

disciplined and steadfast in overcoming the hardships of army life. They have good military training, know the weapons and equipment outstandingly, and are entirely capable of training and indoctrinating subordinates.

The high moral-fighting qualities of our sergeants were seen with special force during the Great Patriotic War. As commanders of squads, teams, and crews, and often taking the place of officers who were put out of action, they led their subordinates skillfully on the field of battle, boldly drew them forward, and succeeded in accomplishing the mission. I would like to give just one example from combat. The enemy threw dozens of tanks against one small sector of our defense at Kursk. The artillery battalion commander moved Sgt Petr Panov's team to this axis. The sergeant operated coolly and confidently. Approaching the tanks to effective fire range, the team knocked out two Tigers with its first rounds. A storm of enemy fire fell on the team's position. One of the blasts covered the team with earth. The sergeant was the first to get up and helped his comrades. The team opened fire again. They used armor-piercing ammunition against the tanks and fragmentation shells against the infantry. Three times chains of Nazis moved toward the gun and each time they had to retreat, leaving dozens of killed and wounded. When friendly tanks approached the battle area, the sergeant reported to the commander: "The gun and team are in good condition. We have wiped out 11 tanks, 6 of them Tigers."

The sergeant is the soldier's first teacher and guide on the difficult army trail. And no matter what he may become later, every serviceman always remembers his commander, his sergeant.

In my career it was Senior Sergeant Skabeyev, an attentive, demanding, and fair squad leader. Today, more than 30 years later, when you consider and evaluate his work in training and indoctrinating the men of the squad, you understand how right my first teacher and guide was in stubbornly insisting that we develop solid skills in handling the weapon, high discipline in carrying out orders and the schedule of the day, intelligent and enterprising actions at tactical training periods in the field, and endurance and agility in physical training periods. All of these qualities served us well later.

It is gratifying to see that we have many such sergeants in the units and subunits of the Soviet army. When you go to training periods and exercises they stand out immediately by the exemplary organization of training periods, successful performance of missions, the external appearance of the subordinates, the discipline in the squad and internal order in the barracks.

Sergeant Vladimir Savelov, deputy platoon leader and candidate for CPSU membership, was rated "outstanding" in combat and physical training in his first year of service. He passes on his knowledge to subordinates skillfully. His training periods are conducted by good techniques, with no indulgence or simplification, making use of every

minute of training time. Therefore, the personnel there study military affairs with great interest and vigor.

Pvt V. Kokin remembers his commander gratefully. Sgt V. Savelov helped him become an exemplary soldier and good specialist in his very first months. He is now a senior reconnaissance man, has mastered a related specialization, and wears a badge for military valor on his chest.

There are no violations of military discipline in the platoon where Sgt. V. Savelov serves and mass sports work is carried out well. Virtually all personnel have ratings for skiing, and a good deal of the credit for this belongs to the junior commander.

Similar success has been achieved by Sr Sgt V. Pohekuyev, Jr Sgt Yu. Poturayev, and others.

It is not easy to achieve good results in training subordinates. The commander has many subordinates, each one with his own character, inclinations, and habits. One comes from the city while another is a country boy. One has secondary education whereas another did not finish the 10th grade. And the sergeant must know every individual well and determine the most effective ways and techniques for indoctrinating him.

The experience of leading commanders illustrates that the most successful sergeants are those who strictly follow the requirements of the regulations obliging them to study their subordinates thoroughly. A knowledge of the information outlined in the regulations is not a formality. It is precisely this knowledge that builds the commander's ability to understand the men and makes it possible for him to solve problems of training and educating personnel and strengthening military discipline in a wise way.

What are the ways to study subordinates? Some sergeants believe that serving together in the same subunit and being in constant communication with the subordinates will by itself foster a study of the men. To some extent this is true, but such a passive method of learning takes a long time. In addition, many things may go unnoticed.

Practice shows that one of the most available and common methods of studying the men is conversations with them. A friendly heart-to-heart talk gives a fairly full picture of the individual soldier. The subordinate's actions and behavior subsequently will show the commander whether the sergeant drew correct conclusions from the conversation or not.

This is exactly what Sgt Sergey Klimenko, squad leader in a motorized rifle platoon, does. He constantly helps the platoon leader in training and indoctrination of subordinates.

Private Poshlyakov, mechanic-driver of an infantry combat vehicle, violated discipline in the service, performed his duties without initiative, did not always maintain his vehicle well, and did little to improve his skills.

Sergeant Klimenko talked with Poshlyakov frequently, skillfully and patiently explained the requirements of the regulations to him, taught him to carry them out unconditionally and exactly, and kept a constant watch on his behavior.

The opinion of the collective, which the squad leader used skillfully, also played an important part in the indoctrination of Private Poshlyakov. Poshlyakov has now changed his attitude toward the service, studies in a technical circle, and has earned the rank of PFC.

Before a sergeant can instill a correct attitude toward military service in a soldier he himself must be an example of zealous performance of his duties as defined by regulations and manuals, be demanding of himself above all, and set an example of irreproachable behavior in service, training, and domestic life. Such a commander is imitated; such a sergeant is considered a true officer's assistant in strengthening discipline because the sergeant's personal example has a prominent place in the entire system of political and military indoctrination. The personal example, thus, is one of the very important and irreplaceable factors in the method of persuasion which is the chief one in indoctrination work.

Sr Sgt Vladimir Grigor'yev, tank commander, has earned great respect among his subordinates. He is a specialist 1st class and has four badges for military valor.

His great love of work, outstanding military training, and exemplary behavior everywhere and in everything have made Senior Sergeant Grigor'yev's reputation untouchable. And it is no accident that his crew is in the vanguard of socialist competition to achieve full mutual replaceability and surpass performance standards.

When the crew was joined by new specialists mechanic-driver PFC M. Dvinyanin and loader Pvt V. Komnatov, the senior sergeant gave them special attention. He held additional training periods and drills for them, taking note of each success by his subordinates, and tried to see that they were able to do everything as well as he himself could. The commander's efforts were not in vain. PFC Dvinyanin became one of the best mechanic-drivers in the company. With the help of Senior Sergeant Grigor'yev loader Private Komnatov quickly mastered his specialization and earned an "outstanding" rating in combat and political training in his first year of service.

The commander's high standards are crucially important in maintaining strong discipline among the soldiers.

The commander must be demanding not only at training periods but also during free time. No violation of military discipline or deviation from military order should escape the sergeant's attention. As experience shows, almost every offense begins with small things which are sometimes "ignored." On one occasion, say, a subordinate fails to polish his shoes properly and the sergeant says nothing. Another time he is late to formation but the sergeant again does not take action. Finally, the third time, we find that the soldier is late returning from leave. And only then, when the violations have become systematic, does the sergeant begin taking steps, and sometimes they are already too late. Such errors are very dangerous.

The sergeant must be particularly intolerant of drinking. The sergeant has great opportunities to combat this evil. The main thing is not to go along, not to ignore any case of use of alcohol by subordinates. After all, in most cases the sergeant knows the intentions of his soldiers and therefore he is in a position to prevent drunkenness, which also means to prevent possible incidents.

Unfortunately, we still encounter disappointing cases where the sergeants themselves use alcoholic beverages. Perhaps the squad leader and his subordinate soldiers are going on leave and share a bottle together. This is precisely when the squad leader ceases to be a commander, even if he continues to hold the position of sergeant afterwards. Such a commander can no longer demand high standards of his subordinates as he did before; he will avert his eyes in shame when reprimanding his drinking companion of the day before.

The Soviet sergeant is a man of high morality and culture, a true son of his people, of his socialist state.

The sergeant must always remember that his subordinates see their commander as a forthright, courteous, and accessible person and, without being offended at fair demands by the commander, they expect concern and paternal attention from him. Therefore, he should see and know everything about the men under him, come to their assistance at the right time, and teach them to overcome difficulties.

There is one other matter on which I would like to dwell in concluding this discussion of the role of the sergeant in strengthening discipline. Nothing is so damaging to discipline as inconsistent standards. We still have some sergeants who ignore violations of discipline in everyday life, but apply high standards in the presence of superiors and before inspections. We can say to such a sergeant: "If you are only diligent in the presence of superiors, only demanding in front of the platoon leader or company commander, you are still not an adequately trained commander."

Each sergeant, officer, and general has been a soldier or a cadet. And for a long time, sometimes throughout life, each one remembers the strict and demanding commanders, those who did not play up to the men

to appear likeable but always spoke the truth straight out, those who did not fear taking on responsibility. Every Soviet citizen who has gone through army life always remembers gratefully those sergeants who did not become puffed up with their position and did not humiliate the soldiers, but rather respected them as people, comrades and fellow fighters for the great cause of defending our socialist homeland, those who, as loyal, just, and demanding friends, led them forward to combat skill and emotional maturity.

It is not easy to become a real sergeant. The desire, even the most sincere and ardent desire, is not enough. It takes painstaking, persistent, daily labor by the commander himself to improve and develop his knowledge and skills. It takes the constant, attentive concern of officers and the party and Komsomol organizations for the all around— combat moral, and physical — education of the NCO's and their acquiring of all those lofty qualities which make the sergeant a skillful teacher and guide. The officers, the commanders and political workers and unit and subunit party and Komsomol activists, must always remember that the sergeant, a graduate of a training subunit, has taken only the first step in his development and to become a true, reliable helper to them much more purposeful work in the unit will be needed.

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## PHYSICAL TRAINING OF AIRCRAFT CREWMEN DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 9, Sep 77 signed to press 22 Aug 77  
p 36

[Article by Lt Col B. Yestaf'yev, candidate of pedagogical sciences:  
"Strong in the Air! The Physical Training of Gunner-Radio Operators"]

[Text] The regular multihour enroute flight had ended. The pilots, navigators, aerial gunner-radio operators, and firing station commanders had demonstrated a high level of air training. After the difficult combat training session, however, not all of them were alert and ready for new trials because the airmen had different reactions to identical flight conditions.

Service in long-range and military transport aviation makes significant demands for the general and special training of flight crews, which include aerial gunner-radio operators and firing station commanders, who are usually warrant officers (praporshchiki) and extended servicemen.

Prolonged flying under varying meteorological conditions, especially when performing complex types of combat flight (flying in formation, at low elevation, refueling in the air, and the like), causes great nerve-emotional and physical strain and without adequate resistance to the flight factors may have a negative effect on the specialized work capability of the airmen.

One of the important ways to increase flight personnel's resistance to the unfavorable factors of prolonged flying is physical training. Rated specialists who combine a high level of professional skill with outstanding physical condition handle flight assignments better and more easily withstand the strains and overloads which occur in the complex conditions of combat training. During the process of physical training the necessary level of general and special traits, motor skills, and functional capabilities of the organism which insure personal combat readiness are molded. Warrant officers G. Bol'shakov, I. Kochemaykin, G. Tsarev, and others who fly in heavy bombers as well



as warrant officers F. Getmanov, Z. Yus'kiv, and G. Chkan who are crew members on the mighty Antey transports have been furrowing the air oceans for many years now, performing flight assignments effectively and well. They all engage in regular physical training and hold sports ratings for several types of sports.

The characteristic features of combat training for flight personnel demand a high level of organization; they must have physical training with general conditioning, specialized, and preventive purposes.

General drills are conducted during command training on the first day of the week in order to prepare the organism for the forthcoming work. These drills help increase general work capability and improve basic physical characteristics such as strength, speed, agility, and endurance.

Special drills are conducted on the days of preliminary preparation for flying. They promote purposeful training of gunner-radio operators for the upcoming flights and refine their professional, physical, and psychological qualities.

Preventive drills are necessary to diminish or prevent the negative effect of excessive flying loads and to get rid of nerve-emotional strain after the most difficult and important flights. The scheme of physical training being proposed has been tested in various flight units.

Training periods for all flight personnel were held together (except for ski training) and included exercises from different sections of the physical training program. The results of experimental work have demonstrated the effectiveness of such organization of physical training for all flight personnel.

#### Comprehensive Exercises for General Training

First training period: pulling up, ascending by turning over, and ascending straight on the horizontal bar — 12 minutes; accelerating for 30-50 meters, standing and running long jumps, canoe racing — 12 minutes; fast walking and jogging — 12-16 minutes.

Second training period: jumps over the horse and vaulting buck — 6 minutes; flexing and straightening the arms supported on the parallel bars, foot half lever, and flank dismount — 12 minutes; moving and sports games — 20-22 minutes.

Third training period: procedures of hand-to-hand combat — 15 minutes; swimming — 25 minutes. Where conditions for swimming are not available — sports games.

### Comprehensive Training Periods for Special Purposes

First Training Period: rotating on looping device — 12 minutes; exercising on gymnastic rings — 12 minutes; jogging 12-16 minutes.

Second Training Period: acrobatics and diving — 10 minutes; moving and sports games — 30 minutes.

Third Training Period: exercises on the trampoline and acrobatics — 12 minutes; speed swimming, diving into the water, dive under water, and swim with flippers — 28 minutes.

### Comprehensive Training Periods for Preventive Purposes

Study and practice of the set of exercises envisioned for performance on board the aircraft during prolonged flights — 5-10 minutes; moderately intense sports and moving games for emotional relaxation — 30-35 minutes.

All the comprehensive training periods must be conducted in sequence and repeated throughout the entire period of training. Organizing and conducting physical training in this sequence with due regard for the actual conditions of combat training activities insures the optimal level of general and special physical conditioning.

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## AMBUSH TRAINING EXERCISE FOR AIRBORNE PLATOON

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 11, Nov 77 signed to press 20 Oct 77 pp 12-13

[Article by Lt Col R. Salikhov: "Paratroopers in an Ambush"]

[Text] During World War II paratroopers skillfully used ambushes in various types of battles. Firing at point blank range always had a stunning effect on the enemy.

Ambushes still have not lost their significance today. Combat vehicles with their great firepower and considerable maneuverability provide numerous possibilities for squads and platoons.

For an example we will describe how the tactical training with field firing was organized and carried out on the subject of "Operations of an airborne platoon in ambush."

After an airborne assault at 0800 the 14th... into an area located 1.5 km north of the town of Dubino (see diagram), paratrooper subunits proceeded to carry out their mission of capturing and destroying an "enemy" command post in the Redkaya wooded area.

During the course of the battle an assignment was given to acting platoon commander Senior Sergeant G. Onishchenko, which contained information acquired through air reconnaissance that at 0830 an "enemy" column consisting of a motorized infantry company with tanks had begun to move in the direction of the town of Tulikovo. The platoon was ordered to set up an ambush along the "enemy" route of movement and not permit the column to reach the main assault force. Then the platoon was to proceed to the company assembly point in the Berezovaya woods (not on diagram) 2 km north of the town of Drozdovo.

The platoon had to carry out the operation separated from the company. After analyzing the situation guards Senior Sergeant Onishchenko correctly concluded that there was less than an hour before the column would be approaching the town of Doronino. There was a limited amount of time for setting up the ambush.

Thus he made the decision to move the platoon at maximum speed, as soon as possible, to the Dolgaya heights, where he would set up the ambush and destroy the moving "enemy" column with stationary fire. He decided to explain the combat assignments while moving to the heights.

At first the platoon commander wanted to set up the ambush on the western outskirts of the Khvoynyy forest. But after weighing all factors, the senior sergeant reached the correct conclusion that it was possible to move to the Dolgaya heights quickly and unnoticed, and from there have good fields of view and fire. There was a natural barrier in front of the heights -- the Zvonkiy stream with swampy banks, which would hinder any "enemy" maneuvering and advance towards the platoon's position. Finally, after completion of the assignment it was possible to proceed from the heights to the assembly point by the shortest route.

After approval of the commander's decision, the airborne assault platoon reached the Dolgaya heights at 0850, having taken all necessary precautions and using the terrain skillfully.

Here guards Senior Sergeant Onishchenko organized a lookout and local security, and laid out the direction of fire and positions to the squads. Situated at intervals of 200 meters, the combat vehicles were located behind the ridge of the heights, this making it possible to conceal and camouflage them from "enemy" sight and fire. The personnel dismounted and prepared for battle some 50 meters in front of the BMDs [Combat Assault Vehicle]. Losing no time the paratroopers proceeded to set up prone firing positions, while the driver-mechanics and gunners, having prepared the BMDs for laying fire, started to camouflage them.

The platoon commander's thinking was simple -- immediately prepare to lay fire in the direction of the road and be very well camouflaged. The site for the ambush was well selected. The distance to the road was 350 m. It was clearly visible and could be raked with fire.

The presence of various shrubs, hollows and rocks on the heights made it possible to completely camouflage the BMDs and achieve total surprise.

Meanwhile, having outlined the sequence of operations for the ambush, the platoon commander called together the squad commanders and issued an oral combat order:

"The reference points are: 1 -- the bridge; 2 -- the primary one, the projection of the forest; and 3 -- the fork in the road.

"The 'enemy' column of company strength with tanks will be approaching the fork in the road in about 15-20 minutes.

"Our company is waging its battle aimed at destroying the command post in the Redkaya wood.

"The 3d airborne assault platoon is to destroy the 'enemy' column from an ambush using stationary fire and not allow it to break out on the road to Doronino. Then the platoon is to proceed to the assembly point in the Berezovaya wood.

"The 1st squad is to occupy a position to the left of the bushes around the squad. The arc of fire is: on the right -- the bushes and the projecting forest; on the left -- rocks and reference point 2. An additional fire sector is on the right -- the bridge.

"The 2d squad is to occupy a position at spot height 80.6. The arc of fire is: on the right -- spot height 80.6 and reference point 1; on the left -- the bushes and the bend in the road. An additional fire sector is on the right -- Doronino.

"The 3d squad is to occupy a position at the 1.4 depression. The arc of fire is: on the right -- rocks and reference point 2; on the left -- the 1.4 depression and reference point 3. An additional fire sector is on the left -- a burial mound. And be ready to cover the withdrawal of the platoon.

"The target area for concentrated fire from the platoon is the bend in the road.


"The prescribed signals for radio use are: open fire -- '200'; concentration of platoon fire -- '300'; and withdrawal from positions -- '400.' My deputy is commander of the 2d squad, guards Sergeant Markov."

Then, the platoon commander specified the sequence of fire. Realizing that the column was mixed, the "enemy" tanks were to be hit first. Fire from the weapons of the 1st and 2d squad BMDs was to be aimed at the lead vehicle, while fire from the 3d squad's vehicles was to go at the last vehicle. Grenade launcher personnel were to fire at BTRs [Armored Personnel Carrier] within the arc of fire of the squads. And the infantry was to use small arms fire against troops as they dismounted.

The concentration of fire of two weapons against the lead tank was justified. This one, as a rule, is the commander's tank, and being able to hit it with the first salvos is of decisive importance.

The calculations made by the platoon commander in preparing the initial firing data deserve attention. He ordered fire against the "enemy" using sight setting "4". In addition, for the moving tanks and BTRs he decided to use a lead of a half-figure to the right, and aim off to the forward section in the middle of the target; while for moving infantry -- at the belt with lead of one figure.

The squad commanders were just able to communicate the sequence of fire to their personnel, when the "enemy" column arrived at the fork in the road at 0930. The tanks were at the front of the column.



# Key:

1. Tulikovo 26 km
2. Sosnovyy forest
3. Reference point 3, 500 m
4. Burial mound
5. Sosnovka
6. Reference point 2, 400 m
7. Zvonkiy stream
8. 3d squad
9. 3d airborne assault platoon
10. 1st squad
11. 2nd squad
12. Dolgaya heights
13. Reference point 1, 350 m
14. Doronino
15. North-south arrow
16. Drozdovo 5 km
17. Scout vehicle No 1
18. Airborne assault
19. Redkaya wood
20. 1st airborne assault company
21. Dubino 1 km
22. Communications center

Next the exercise continued with field fire. The "enemy" column was delineated with the movement of five tanks and three BTRs. For augmenting the situation and for indicating the dismounting of infantry from the stopped column, 22 snap targets, including 1 tank, 6 BTRs and 15 figure silhouettes were set out with the help of a RTK unit.

At the signal of the platoon commander the paratroopers prepared for battle, concealed themselves, and as the "enemy" column entered the arc of fire of the 1st squad, the command "200" came by radio. Almost simultaneously with this order a shot rang out from the commander's vehicle aimed at the lead tank. After that the other BMDs and grenade throwers opened fire. Shots continued one after the other at a rapid rate. With an ambush the main thing is not to give an opponent the chance to recover and to hit his tanks before they are able to return the fire.

The lead tank was knocked out with the first salvo. Looking over the field of battle, the platoon commander gave the timely order to switch the fire and two other tanks were destroyed.

The 3d squad acted with uncertainty in this action. Its commander, guards Junior Sergeant V. Bobrov, did a poor job of controlling the fire of his subordinates. Two BTRs moved into the squad's arc of fire. Grenade thrower Private G. Potanov hit the BTR which was last in the column with three grenades. Gunner Private N. Leutov hit a tank with two grenades from his gun. Junior Sergeant Bobrov, seeing that the targets were effectively destroyed, failed to give a timely order to shift his fire. Therefore, two targets -- a tank and BTR -- remained untouched, since the allocation of ammunition was completely exhausted.

Meanwhile, the situation grew more complicated. Having gone into battle formation the "enemy" began to return fire. Twenty-two targets were displayed, while at the same time six IM-100 and three smoke grenades were set off at the platoon position with the appearance of the silhouettes. Observation and conduct of fire under conditions where grenade explosions occurred one after another at the position, as well as smoke going up, was a very difficult matter. Nonetheless, the paratroopers performed confidently, displaying excellent psychological training and the will to win.

At the signal "300" from the platoon commander the fire from the BMD weapons and grenade-launchers was concentrated on the center of the battle formation -- on the tank and BTR, and the infantry was wiped out with small arms fire. Then the platoon departed for the assembly point.

The slogan of the guards troops is to continually improve field skills and military training, and to try to do the best job in carrying out each training assignment and combat test.

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## NCO TACTICAL TRAINING IN MOTORIZED RIFLE SUBUNIT

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 11, Nov 77 signed to press 20 Oct 77 pp 14-15

[Article by Col K. Titakov: "Commander Thinking in an NCO"]

[Text] The thunder of explosions, which made the ground shake and window glass fall out with a crash, broke the pre-dawn quiet.

"To your guns!" NCOIC of an outpost Ivan Parkhomenko ordered. Quickly the border troops leaped from their beds.

"Take up a defensive position!" was the next order given by Parkhomenko, who assumed command of the outpost before the arrival of the officers... Thus, a twenty-three year old youngster became the commander of a border garrison. And 24 Komsomol members blocked the path of the enemy.

"Sergeant Yukhimenko! Take up a position near the ravine! The arc of fire..." the NCOIC issued the instructions clearly. "Sergeant Gayday! Do not permit any enemy advance from the left flank!"

The men unflinchingly carried out the commands. Before them was a determined leader who knew his job...

This episode out of World War II was described to ncos at an instructional training session by the unit commander.

"What do you think, what qualities did NCOIC Parkhimenko display in this action?" the commander asked.

"Determination, fearlessness, and initiative."

"This is quite true, but let us remember the battle and analyze each of its episodes and you will see that there were such commander qualities as tactical thinking in combat, i.e. the ability to rapidly evaluate the situation and thereby clearly issue the necessary orders. In a combat situation each commander must cope with tasks which require a great deal of careful thought.



Some say that all this only applies to officers. The nco functions in accordance with the decisions of his direct superior, and any display of independent thought on his part is almost entirely ruled out. This, of course, is an entirely erroneous point of view.

Of course, the decision of the superior person represents the organizing and directional beginning of each battle. It focuses the collective efforts of enlisted men, ncos and officers toward achieving the assigned combat mission. It is necessary to carry out this decision without question and on time. But execution of the order of the senior commander does not rule out, but on the contrary, assumes aggressiveness, resourcefulness, and independence in one's performance.

In a combat order a commander gives specific assignments to subordinates. However, in order to be successful in most operations, frequently the people executing the order have to make decisions themselves. Let us just take the selection of firing positions at a platoon defended point. Here is it really impossible to show any initiative and quick thinking? It is possible to choose the positions based on utilizing the terrain features, and to ensure the best field of view and a good field of fire, while at the same time being hidden from the enemy and less vulnerable to air strikes and artillery fire. This type of situation occurred at one of our training exercises. The battle was in the "enemy" defense area. A motorized rifle subunit was attacking a defended point (see diagram). The 3d squad, which was commanded by Sergeant A. Vishnevskiy, was operating on the left flank of the platoon. Before long it encountered strong machine-gun fire and infantry elements from a pocket of resistance on the Grusha heights, and could not advance. At that moment the infantry began to move on the flank...

In this difficult situation the squad commander rapidly analyzed conditions and came up with the correct solution. Sergeant Vishnevskiy ordered machine-gunner PFC B. Gorel'ko to open fire on the infantry moving to the flank, and grenade thrower V. Okhotnikov to move forward and destroy a machine-gun. The advance of grenade thrower Private Okhotnikov to his new fire position was covered by the remaining squad personnel who held down "enemy" operations. With the destruction of the machine-gun the squad attacked the resistance center and seized the heights.

Aware of the actions of Sergeant Vishnevskiy, the subunit commander did not resort to book decisions. He believed in the tactical competency and independence of the commander. And the situation was getting tighter. A tank moving in the direction of the 3d squad's attack was knocked out and burned in the Zelenyy bushy area. The remaining tanks of the 1st and 2d squads were lagging behind after negotiating an antitank ditch and a "contaminated" zone formed from the explosion of "enemy" chemical mines, and were just beginning to move towards the Ogurets heights. An armored personnel carrier from the 3d squad was damaged. The driver corrected the problem. The adjacent unit on the left -- the 3d motorized rifle platoon, was involved in a battle for the Malaya heights, but was not able to advance.

Under these conditions it would seem advisable, while conducting a fire battle with the "enemy," to wait for the approach of the remaining tanks and motorized rifle squads, and then in a combined attack move on the pocket of resistance and seize the Grusha heights. In the beginning Sergeant Vishnevskiy considered doing this, but, after thinking it over, rejected this approach. And here is why. The company was advancing in the wake of a nuclear "strike" and was already approaching the area of the "burst." From the instructions of the senior commander Sergeant Vishnevskiy knew that the "enemy" was taking steps to fill the gap formed in its defenses. Therefore, any delay in the advance played into the hands of the "enemy." And time was necessary for the bringing up of the lagging subunits and for organizing a combined attack. The seizing of the Grusha heights would create favorable conditions for the 2d motorized rifle platoon and the tanks advancing with it for an attack on the "enemy" flank and rear protecting the Malaya heights, and would help increase the overall rate of advance and lead to more complete utilization of the results of the nuclear strike against the "enemy."

A thorough knowledge of the general situation and the ability to understand it permitted Sergeant Vishnevskiy to make a bold and daring decision and to fully implement it.

As for controlling the fire of the squad, Sergeant Vishnevskiy correctly analyzed the nature of the "enemy" targets along the front and on the flanks, skillfully selected the type of weapon for destroying them, clearly established the firing assignments, and issued the commands.

The ability to competently handle the tactical and firing assignments was the result of the excellent commander qualities possessed by Sergeant Vishnevskiy and most of all of his well-developed tactical mentality.

Another example. Sergeant P. Novak came to one of the subunits from a training unit. He immediately attracted attention: he shot all types of small arms with great skill and knew the regulations well. In training sessions all his work was marked with boldness and resourcefulness. It seemed that with all the good points much was expected of him.

Later the company went out on a tactical exercise. Sergeant Novak also participated in it. It must be said that on the whole he performed quite well. The squad commander worked hard to carry out the assigned task. However, it was apparent that even the simplest situation seemed difficult for him. A review of his performance showed, that, despite excellent preparation, he poorly analyzed the situation. Hence he had no basis for his decisions. And this was not because the sergeant was not trying to do a good job in carrying out his duties. His commander thinking simply had not reached the proper level of development. Several training sessions passed before Novak acquired the necessary skills in tactics.

Just what is inherent in the commander mentality?

First of all there is mobility, quickness, independence and flexibility. And then there is the depth, breadth and purposefulness of the commander viewpoint.

The sign of outstanding military capabilities in a commander has always been his mobility of thought. It is reflected in a commander's willingness to rapidly and fully concentrate his knowledge, good memory and experience in accomplishing his mission. Mobility or the lack of it in a commander becomes very clear in critical situations and in a dynamic complex battle setting.

...Suddenly counterattacking "enemy" tanks and infantry appeared. The situation was getting worse. It was necessary to prevent the "enemy" from opening fire at all costs. The commander of an advancing subunit decided to break up the counterattack with stationary fire. The motorized riflemen, as well as anti-tank grenade launchers attached to the company, began intensive fire, trying to make sure that each round, each shot reach the target. Only Sergeant A. Pashkevich's squad failed to respond at this time.

"I did not see the targets," Sergeant Pashkevich reported when queried by an officer.

When the discussion at the exercise critique got around to this case, it was determined that when the order was received to open fire on the "enemy," the squad was crossing a small depression. There it began combat operations, but the site was poorly selected.

"The squad commander acted with little initiative," an officer concluded. In each individual case he should not merely carry out the order automatically, but consider how best to execute it and display some independence, not wait to be told.


Of course, the practice of acting independently, plus the ability to imaginatively appraise a complex situation and make bold but sensible decisions, does not occur by itself. These qualities are acquired as a result of everyday service and strenuous combat work, and only in this case if the appropriate conditions are established during the exercises.

Thus, on one tactical exercise Senior Lieutenant Romanyuk decided to go out and check on how the squad commanders had understood him and what they had decided about an attack, after first making his assignments to the squads.

Sergeant Novak reported first. But his report was lacking. He did not mention the direction of the next advance, nor about how he would be working with the adjoining squad.

Of course, the officer could have then and there corrected the squad commander, but he responded differently.

"Comrade sergeant," the officer said. "You made several mistakes. Think over your decision and report it to me again."



Key:

- |  |                                |
|--|--------------------------------|
| 1. Mission of the 2d motorized rifle platoon | 8. Ogurets                     |
| 2. North-south arrow                         | 9. 3d motorized rifle platoon  |
| 3. Grusha                                    | 10. 2d motorized rifle platoon |
| 4. Malaya                                    | 11. 3d squad                   |
| 5. Group of infantry                         | 12. Contaminated zone          |
| 6. 1st motorized rifle platoon               | 13. 1st squad                  |
| 7. Zelenyy                                   | 14. 2d squad                   |

As we see, the method was simple, but it seems to us that the senior lieutenant acted properly. It would have been easier to say: "You made the wrong decision" -- and then tell him your decision. But it is just as easy to train subordinates to act with caution and in every situation wait for help. This runs counter to the standards used in training and educating our subordinates.

We know that modern warfare abounds with the most unexpected and complex situations. Battles are of short duration and dynamic. This all requires quick reactions on the part of the commander involving thinking, farsightedness and judgement. Under such conditions the time factor takes on great importance. A matter of minutes will be available to a commander for applying his decision.

Thus, the actual conditions of modern warfare dictate to the nco the length of time for considering a situation, which frequently is equal to the time needed for giving the order. Consequently, on a daily basis it is necessary to teach ncos to function in such a way, that in the midst of battle the decision of a squad commander will occur simultaneously with the command for carrying it out.

There always must be a coupling of the commander thinking of ncos and practical experience. No matter how great the significance of tactical decisions made prior to battle, their effectiveness and validity are verified in combat. Field training is the best school for developing the combat skills of ncos.

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## NEW WEAPONS FIRING TRAINING METHOD DESCRIBED

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[Article by candidates of technical sciences, Engr-Lt Cols A. Malyshev and S. S'yedin: "The Effect of the Stage Method"]

[Text] Not long ago the authors of this article had the opportunity of visiting a firing range. The new recruits were carrying out their regular drill with personal weapons. The results were varied. Some were excellent, others, frankly, were mediocre. The company NCOIC Warrant Officer A. Ivannikov sighed sadly and with a questioning look glanced at us. Then he said, "How do you explain such a mixed bag of results?"

For example, take privates S. Krashenninnikov and V. Gladilin. They trained together, both are intelligent, capable and diligent, but their marks were different: the first received a solid five on the drill, while the second got only a three. Why did this happen?

Is it really possible to explain it? We analyzed the results of the firing. It turned out that those receiving twos were unsure of the firing rules for personal weapons and were unable to quickly select the sight setting and aiming point. Some of them did not correct for the crosswind, or they "forgot" to correct their fire for distance and direction...

This has happened before. And in the conclusions we reached there was nothing new to us and the warrant officer. A. Ivannikov was convinced that a lack of knowledge of the rules of firing was a primary factor in the low scores of his men. He carefully prepared for training sessions on the subject "Rules of small arms firing," sought to uncover some new approach for carrying them out, and shared his observations with other warrant officers. Sometimes he held additional practice sessions, striving to develop solid skills in weapons' handling, and handed out additional problems. But the results were unproductive. The good marksmen were still the good marksmen, while the others held the company back.

How could the training process be made more effective?

Everyone knows the attention the party gives to the matter of increasing the quality and effectiveness of the work of the Soviet people in all fields of endeavor. L. I. Brezhnev in the review report of the Central Committee CPSU to the 25th CPSU Congress emphasized that the "practical implementation of new scientific ideas is no less important today than their development."

From this standpoint we have been approaching the analysis of the techniques used in training and the organization of the educational process. Many new innovations aimed at increasing the effectiveness of combat training have been developed by military scientists. The order of the day is the practical application of their recommendations.

Let us look at this matter as it applies to weapons training. What is the best way to go about developing small arms shooting skills in soldiers? First of all we must provide the trainees with the proper orientation and make an effort to see that they have a thorough knowledge of firing rules.

Here are some of the problems: a soldier responds well in class to hypothetical questions on the rules of firing, but in the field he lacks self-confidence. This actually happened with Private V. Gladilin. His sound knowledge of firing rules proved inadequate when he had to pass actual shooting requirements. It was necessary to supplement his knowledge with practical experience. But these skills are developed in various ways. Some acquire them quickly while others are slow to master them.

Just how and where do you find your way out of this situation?

In accordance with the combat training program for motorized rifle subunits under training, the basic rules for firing machine-guns, submachine-guns, and grenade launchers are described under subject No 7. The method for correcting fire is among the basic questions dealt with. What orientation information for correcting fire, say, for distance is contained in the Rules for firing small arms and grenade launchers? On page 7 we read the following: "For correcting the fire of small arms for distance one can make a change of setting or a change of aiming point (up or down). In the first instance, after obtaining the bullet deviation of 100 m from the target, the sight setting is adjusted one mark in the appropriate direction. When, due to firing conditions, it is impossible to measure the extent of the miss (short or long), the sight setting is adjusted to a figure which most nearly corresponds to the mean error for the determined distance..."

How does a trainee use this rule? If the target is not hit, then he first determines the nature of the ricochet (path of the bullet) from the target. In the case of a distance error (short or long) the soldier visually gages the size of the error. The next procedures depend on whether he can estimate the size of the error in meters. If he can, then the next steps will be determined by what the absolute size of the error is, if it is over 100 m or not. When it is impossible to estimate the error in meters, the soldier visually estimates the distance to the target, determines the mean distance error  $E_d$  as  $E_d = 10$  percent, and depending on the nature of the error changes the sight setting according to the  $E_d$  value.

All these features, which were graphically and clearly depicted, went into a structured-logical diagram of the rules of firing (see portion of diagram). This diagram was produced for trainees so that they could be guided in carrying out the procedures, if they are not able to memorize the essential rules. In the course of performing these operations the trainees unconsciously learn them. In psychology this takes on the title of a reference work base (OOD) diagram.

The diagram includes the following elements:


- a description of the operations in their proper sequence;
- a complete set of key points for the correct and comprehensible performance of each of these operations;
- a series of instructions, both for determining what order to use the key points and what method to employ for carrying out each operation.

The formation of this diagram represents a model of a mastered operation, the functional aspect of which in the end is determined by the results acquired through practical experience for converting the initial data into the end result of trainee action. Trainees have the opportunity of understanding the inherent logic behind the operation being acquired.

The completeness of the OOD diagram is determined by whether it allows someone to perform properly. If a trainee makes mistakes from the very start, then the OOD diagram provided him is inadequate and not all orientation information is in it. Therefore, it is necessary to add to it. In setting up the OOD diagram many things must be considered: the educational background of the soldier, the various knowledge and skills possessed by him in the subject being studied, etc. The problem is, that for one trainee the use of the broader instructions (key points) is enough for performing the operation, especially if he is familiar with those concepts contained in the OOD diagram, while for another man this information may not be adequate. In this case it is necessary to provide more detailed instruction on the use of the diagram's key points.

Thus, on the cited OOD diagram, if the specific training situation warrants it, it is possible to go into more detail concerning the general way of visually determining the distance to the target (deviation from the target) and taking into consideration other factors related to it, such as brightness of topographic features, backdrop of the terrain, weather conditions, and other situations. If this breakdown is still inadequate for a trainee, then it is necessary to provide certain preliminary knowledge and skills. In the case cited here trainees have already acquired such concepts and skills as:

- the concept of "mean error in determining distance;"
- the ability to visually determine the distance to the target (or deviation from the target);
- the ability to aim off and change the sight setting.





The training took place within the time limits authorized by the combat training program for motorized rifle subunits under training (section "Fire training," subject "Rules of firing").

Now about the methods employed in conducting the training lessons.

The training work consisted of resolving problems depicting any situation which arises in the course of firing a machine-gun and in carrying out the required operations on a small arms training apparatus.

We will cite two problems which were resolved by the men.

Problem No 1. "The target was not hit with the previous shot. The shot was high. The error was over 100 meters (visually determined). Report the correction for setting the sight."

Problem No 2. "The target was not hit with the previous shot. The shot was short. It is impossible to determine the amount of error visually. The distance to the target is  $D = 700$  meters. Report the sight setting for the next shot."

After receiving a training problem each soldier solves it independently using the OOD diagram. The trainee, after reading the first, second and subsequent questions (key points) on the diagram, locates the answer based on the conditions of the problem and, depending on the answer, follows through on the appropriate portion of the diagram. In addition, he comes across instructions and recommendations about how to carry out the operations, and in the end proceeds the very first time to solve the problem correctly.

Here is how the trainee solves problem No 1 (see portion of OOD diagram). The first question: "Was the target hit with the previous shot?" Under the conditions of the problem the trainee finds the answer -- "No." The next question on the diagram: "What is the ricochet error (path of bullet) relative to the target?" Again proceeding from the problem, the soldier finds the answer -- "Distance." This points him to the next step in resolving the problem: "Can the amount of error be determined visually?" Since in this case the answer is in the affirmative, the trainee is given the operational instructions "Determine the amount of error in meters" (he actually does not perform this operation, since the problem already contains the amount of error, but it is important that the operation is present in the overall logic for solving the problem). Next the trainee answers the question in the diagram "What is the error relative to the target?" and based on the initial data (the shot was long) he comes up with the answer to the question posed by the problem. In our example the answer is -- "Lower sight setting one mark." The problem is solved (once more we want to emphasize, by each man independently).

The training problems were selected in such a way, that trainees would be able to go through all possible patterns of the OOD diagram numerous times. This means that the problems encompass all actual situations involving

correcting fire, which a trainee might encounter in battle. Thus the ability to correct fire for any specific situation is being developed.

After this a trainee was switched to working without assistance from the OOD diagram. The diagram was gone, but each of its instructions was recited orally. This recitation was an involuntary one, as if the trainee remembered the instructions of the OOD diagram. Next the trainees performed all the operations together, as one unified action. This indicated that they had firmly acquired the skills.

The experimental training conducted by us with one platoon showed, that during a relative short time new recruits acquired real skills in fire correction and performed their firing drills with scores of "good" or higher by using this new method. To check their knowledge of the rules of firing, each man was given five problems to solve similar to problems No 1 and 2 cited here. At the same time a similar check was given to men of another platoon who were studying the rules of firing by the conventional method. Their scores were significantly lower than the ones made by the men of the first platoon.

By using the stage method warrant officers and everyone else who perform the job of training leaders have the opportunity of improving the training process and achieving better results in a shorter time.

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## CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING ACTIVITIES

### Medical Aid Team Training

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 23 Oct 77 p 3

[Article by R. Zarubina: "Contest of the Strongest"]

[Text] The first RSFSR Medical Aid Team Competitions in honor of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution and the 50th anniversary of medical aid teams, organized by the Central Committee of the RSFSR Red Cross Society, recently ended. The championship crystal cup was won by the representatives of the hero-city Moscow. The pennant for second place was awarded to the medical team from the hero-city of Leningrad. The representatives of the hero-city of Novorossiysk took third place. They were awarded a certificate of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Red Cross Society. Winners were also picked in the individual competition events.

Today it is difficult to imagine medical personnel activities pertaining to guarding the health of the toilers without the most active and direct assistance of members of medical aid teams, who have received training from the Soviet Red Cross. They participate extensively and on a daily basis in the performance of preventive sanitation and health improvement measures, in teaching the public good hygienic practices, in combating infectious diseases, in environmental protection, and in securing healthier working and living conditions. Medical aid teams also constitute nonmilitary civil defense units and render first aid in responding to natural disasters, accidents, publicly encourage blood donations and themselves participate actively in this patriotic movement.

"All our medical aid team members, for example, give blood and are indispensable assistants to regular medical personnel," stated Margarita Nikolayevna Abramova, medical aid team political instructor at the Arctic port of Pevek. "We earned the right to take part in the RSFSR competitions by winning the zone competitions."

There was energetic competition among the strongest teams from the very outset. And the best job was done by the town of Pevek in Magadanskaya Oblast. The medical aid team members demonstrated a genuine fighting spirit in spite of the fact that they were working under the most disadvantageous conditions. While other teams were able to get a real rest after the trip and regain their strength, the women from Magadan had no such opportunity. Another strongly influencing factor was the time zone difference (9 hours). In addition, team commander N. Nikolayeva was not feeling well.

But in spite of these adverse factors, the team nevertheless showed a high degree of theoretical, practical and moral-psychological proficiency. And this team did the best job in the drill segment of the competition.

...Up ahead there was a "nuclear stricken" zone. Demolished buildings, piles of rubble, scattered heaps of twisted reinforced concrete and smashed bricks. Fires blazed. The area was wreathed in thick clouds of dust and acrid smoke. Explosions boomed. Everything was as might occur in a combat situation following a nuclear strike....

The team from Pevek entered the "stricken area" at N. Nikolayeva's command. They examined literally every square meter of ground and the demolished structures. "Victims" were located on intact floor spans in buildings and under "rubble." G. Antonova bent over a "seriously injured victim." He was unconscious. The girl carefully wiped his face and then put a respirator on him. Before applying a splint to the site of a "fractured rib," Galya injected a pain killer and proceeded to apply the splint.

With the aid of fellow team members, the "injured person" was placed on a stretcher and carried to the collection area for the injured. The elements headed by V. Busygina and V. Belinskaya worked swiftly and smoothly. One could sense that these people possessed considerable practical performance skills. Very soon they had found all "injured" and "stricken" individuals. They were given first aid.

The medical aid team members also displayed excellent performance capability during the subsequent stages of competition. Although the judges were very demanding on performance, the team displayed intrepid preparedness to come to the assistance of any stricken individual suffering any injury.

Excellent training was demonstrated by the medical aid teams from Khabarovskiy Kray, Irkutskaya, Tambovskaya, Voronezhskaya, and Kostromskaya oblasts, as well as others. It is notable that almost all medical aid team members are members of DOSAAF. Many DOSAAF primary organization committees assisted the Red Cross committees in preparing medical aid teams for the competitions.

## Training in the Moscow Area

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 30 Nov 77 p 3

[Article by V. Zayvorodinskiy: "But the Rayon Committee Chairman Kept Silent"]

[Text] Among the 30 Moscow rayons, Gagarinskiy Rayon is in third place in civil defense. This is a considerable improvement over last year. Consistent, persistent efforts on the part of party organizations and the mobilizing role of Communists in accomplishing the tasks of combat training of nonmilitary units and training of the population at large had an effect.

This positive fact was noted at a meeting of rayon party activists dedicated to civil defense tasks for 1978. The speaker, rayon civil defense chief Ye. Glebov, chairman of the executive committee of the rayon soviet, as well as those who spoke during the discussion noted that facility civil defense chiefs, their staffs and command personnel had improved their skills in organizing and holding various exercises and had begun devoting more attention to practical methods of training the personnel of nonmilitary units and had stepped up dissemination of knowledge on civil defense.

The best-organized training of workers, employees, the nonworking population and students occurred at the Western Waterworks, Building Construction Combine No 3, at the Metrostroy Reinforced Concrete Structures Plant, at Housing Operation Office No 11, at Secondary School No 38, and elsewhere. Of course some credit for achievement of this success must go to DOSAAF primary organizations and their activists. This, however, is the minimum of what should have been accomplished.

Those present at the meeting concentrated their main attention on deficiencies and an analysis of their causes. The management and civil defense staffs of the Ochakovskiy Brick Plant, Mosstroy-1 Trust, the Glavenergoremont Central Design Office, and Construction and Installation Administration 151 were subjected to criticism.

"Combat training of nonmilitary units and training of workers and employees at these enterprises were conducted on a low level," emphasized the speaker. "Simplified conditions and departures from the requirements of the program were permitted at training exercises."

Organization of training of the nonworking population at housing operation offices and building management offices remains a weak link.

Of course the speaker could not cover all items. His report was supplemented by N. Slepchenko, T. Semenova, M. Shumov and other Communists, who spoke on ways to correct existing deficiencies.

It would be natural to see on the speaker's stand a representative of the rayon DOSAAF organization, which has the job of performing mass defense work among the population and of offering every assistance to civil defense measures. Unfortunately the DOSAAF rayon committee chairman, M. Shvetsov, chose not to speak, although it was expected that he would discuss the performance of the best DOSAAF local organizations, participation in improving training facilities and dissemination of knowledge of civil defense. It is particularly important to do this because the rayon contains passive committees which avoid civil defense and do a poor job of military patriotic and mass defense activities. This is the case at the Ochakovskiy Brick Plant, at Construction and Installation Administration 151, and the Mosstroy-1 Trust.

But the chairman of the DOSAAF rayon committee kept silent. This will scarcely help the cause of assisting civil defense. The presidium of the DOSAAF rayon committee should come up with measures implementation of which will help successfully accomplish tasks in the new year.

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## PROCEEDINGS AT HIGH LEVEL DOSAAF MEETING

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 13 Nov 77 p 1

Article: "At the DOSAAF Central Committee: Work in a Proper Manner in the Name of the Homeland"

Text A meeting of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium took place on 11 November with the participation of members of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and the USSR DOSAAF Central Inspection Commission; of officials from the Central Apparatus, the Central Clubs and the society's press agencies; and of defense activists from Moscow and Moskovskaya Oblast. The presidium discussed the issue "On the Results of the October 1977 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the Extraordinary Seventh Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Tasks for DOSAAF Organizations Stemming from the Reports and Speeches of L. I. Brezhnev--General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet--at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and at the Ceremony Dedicated to the 60th Anniversary of Great October."

V. A. Lepeshkin, deputy director of the CPSU Central Committee Department, and A. I. Golyakov, director of the CPSU Central Committee Department's Section, took part in the meeting.

Air Force Marshall A. I. Pokryshkin, chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee

and thrice Hero of the Soviet Union, gave a report at the meeting.

In his report, comrade Pokryshkin emphasized that the 80 million DOSAAF members, like all the Soviet people, approved the new USSR Constitution and they expressed their profound gratitude to the party, its Central Committee and to comrade L. I. Brezhnev personally for their concern in the Soviet man and in the future prosperity of our great homeland and the strengthening of its might.

Our country's workers and the members of the defense society welcome comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report as a long-term program for implementing the Constitution, for further strengthening the Soviet State's economic and defensive might, for developing democracy and for implementing the majestic tasks of creating communism.

In conclusion, the speaker--in the name of the meeting's participants--assured the Leninist Central Committee, the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee and comrade L. I. Brezhnev personally that the multi-million member defense society will sacredly observe the provisions of the new USSR Constitution; they will make a worthy contribution to the accomplishment of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and they will actively assist in strengthening the socialist homeland's economic and defensive might.

The report was discussed by: A. Pokal'chuk, chairman of the Ukrainian DOSAAF Central Committee; K. Plakunov, chairman of the Volgogradskiy DOSAAF Obkom; V. Savin, chairman of the Belorussian DOSAAF Central Committee; S. Arutyunyan, secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee; Yu. Raudsepp, chairman of the Estonian DOSAAF Central Committee; I. Akhmedov, chairman of the Azerbaijan DOSAAF Central Committee; D. Kuznetsov, chairman of the Moscow DOSAAF City Committee; A. Rozyyev, chairman of the Turkmen DOSAAF Central Committee; and N. Belous, chief editor of SOVETSKIY PATRIOT.

The decree which was adopted states that the multi-million member defense society welcomed the events of exceptional political significance and enormous historical importance with profound emotion--the October 1977 CPSU Central Committee Plenum; the report and speeches of comrade L. I. Brezhnev--general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet--at the extraordinary seventh session of the USSR Supreme Soviet; and the adoption of the new USSR Constitution. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report at the jubilee ceremony on 2 November in the Kremlin Palace of Con-



gresses was a remarkable political, ideological and theoretical document, a manual for all the Soviet people's practical activity.

The USSR Constitution is the legislative consolidation of a new historical frontier on the path to communism--the construction of a developed socialist society. It was the result--in condensed form--of the 60-year development of the Soviet State and the result of the enormous theoretical and practical activity of the Communist Party, its Central Committee, the CPSU Central Committee Politbureau and comrade L. I. Brezhnev personally--a true Leninist and a distinguished, contemporary political and state figure.

The role of the Communist Party is vividly and cogently revealed in the USSR Constitution--the leading and directing force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system and governmental and public organizations. The CPSU won a high level of prestige and universal love with its wholehearted service to the people's cause. The Soviet people are well aware: the party exists for the people and it serves the people; it stands out as the reliable guarantor of the development of socialist democracy and of the growth in the initiative and activity of the masses.

The USSR Constitution's provisions on the participation of public organizations--in accordance with their statutory tasks--in the administration of state and public affairs and in the resolution of political, economic, social and cultural problems is filled with a meaning which has an important significance for further improving DOSAAF activities.

The defense society members, like all the Soviet people, gave an enormous welcome to the provisions of the Basic Law which deal with the future safeguarding of the country's security and defense capability and the equipping of the Armed Forces with everything they need. The USSR Constitution points out that the socialist homeland's defense is a most important function of the state; it is the affair of all the people and the sacred duty of each citizen of the USSR. The Soviet Union is efficiently taking care of its defense, comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in his report at the jubilee ceremony. The growing significance of the tasks performed by the defense society--for actively assisting in the strengthening of the country's defense capability and in training workers for the homeland's defense--stem from this.

The national discussion of the draft Constitution has become a vivid manifestation of our system's democracy and a remark-

able school for the participation of the masses in the administration of public and state affairs. Defense society members displayed a high level of activity in this; they introduced over 51,000 comments and suggestions on the draft USSR Constitution.

DOSAAF members, like all the Soviet people, unanimously approved the new USSR Constitution and the enormous work of the Central Committee, the Politbureau and comrade L. I. Brezhnev personally--general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and chairman of the Constitutional Commission--on the development of this historic document. During the course of its discussion and adoption, they demonstrated their monolithic unity around the CPSU and their wholehearted support for its domestic and foreign policy.

Filled with a feeling of the greatest pride in their socialist homeland, DOSAAF members are expressing their endless love and wholehearted faith in their native party; they are declaring their determination to continue to increase their contribution to the national cause of strengthening the homeland's economic and defensive might and--with ever greater energy and steadfastness--to continue the struggle for fulfillment of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and for persistent observance of the USSR Constitution.

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium completely approved and adopted--for its steadfast guidance and execution--the decisions of the October 1977 CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the propositions and conclusions of the reports and speeches of comrade L. I. Brezhnev--general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium--at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the ceremony dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

In the decree which was adopted, the presidium recommended that the DOSAAF committees widely develop political, organizational and propaganda work which will guarantee the strict observance of the new USSR Constitution by all the defense society organizations and officials. Conduct this work on a planned, systematic and profound basis by drawing all DOSAAF sections into it and by including the different categories of defense society members in it. Promote a further increase in the activity of the masses and the successful performance of the tasks assigned by the 25th CPSU Congress in every way possible. Develop, discuss in DOSAAF committees and organizations and implement practical measures for defense society

activities which stem from comrade L. I. Brezhnev's reports "On the Draft Constitution (Basic Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Results of its National Discussion" and on the 60th anniversary of Great October.

The DOSAAF Central Committees of the union republics, kraykoms, obkoms, okruzhkoms, gorkoms, raykoms and educational and primary organizations must widely propagandize among society members the decisions of the October 1977 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report and speeches at the seventh session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the report at the jubilee ceremony and the USSR Constitution. Involve committee and organization management personnel and the society's propaganda activists in this work on a broad scale.

Ensure a high ideological and organizational level of lessons on the recommended topics in the students' political training system at educational organizations.

Direct the work to be conducted so that defense society members are well aware of and observe the USSR Constitution; put their rights and duties into practice; and actively participate in the accomplishment of the tasks facing the defense society.

In accordance with the tasks assigned by the Communist Party and the Soviet State and those stemming from the provisions of the USSR Basic Law on defense of the socialist homeland, DOSAAF committees and organizations must steadfastly strive for a further strengthening of the defense society and for improving the efficiency and quality of its work.

Ensure the improvement of organizational activity, the style and methods of work and the strictest observance of planning, financial, state and social discipline; develop initiative in every way possible; and increase the responsibility of each of the society's sections and workers for the affairs entrusted to them. Improve supervision and follow-up in administration.

While observing the provisions of the Basic Law on the rights of USSR citizens, join with public organizations and strive to create and actively work with DOSAAF primary organizations in all labor and educational collectives and strive to draw the majority of workers and students into the society.

Display a constant concern for the implementation of the right to criticism and self-criticism by all DOSAAF members and strive for a situation where this becomes the norm in the life of DOSAAF collectives. Create a businesslike atmosphere, high expectations and concentrate attention on unsolved problems at

plenums, activist meetings, presidium and bureau meetings and meetings and conferences.

Improve the management of socialist competition; study and disseminate the experience of leaders; constantly analyze competition results; and render effective assistance to laggardly collectives.

In accordance with the provisions of the USSR Constitution, the DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium demanded that the committees improve DOSAAF work in every way possible to actively assist in strengthening the country's defense capability and in training workers for the homeland's defense.

For these purposes, increase the level of military patriotic work and indoctrinate society members, mainly the young people, in a spirit of superior conscientiousness, civic responsibility, aspirations for high social goals, ideological conviction, a truly creative attitude toward work, wholehearted love for the homeland and Communist Party, loyalty to the older generations' heroic traditions and a readiness to defend the socialist homeland.

Together with trade union, Komsomol and other public organizations, more fully utilize the potential specified by the USSR Constitution to broadly attract workers and young people to the study of military affairs and participation in military patriotic measures.

Improve the training of youth for military service in every way possible; improve the training and indoctrination of students of DOSAAF educational organizations; instill in them profound respect for the USSR emblem, flag and hymn and for the power and grandeur of the first socialist state which they represent.

In the interests of observing the right of citizens of the USSR to choose their occupation, type of employment and work, study the needs better for bringing technology and military specialties within reach of society members and more fully satisfy these needs. Display more concern for expanding the network of societies, courses, TSC [technical sports clubs], public design bureaus, technical sports modeling laboratories and DTSSYP [DOSAAF Technical Sports Schools for Young People] and for improving their activity in every way possible.

Proceeding from the provisions of the USSR Constitution on the role and significance of physical training and sports in the life of our people, reinforce the work on developing the mass

nature of military technical sports and on improving the expertise of sportsmen.

In the work of DOSAAF organizations, more fully rely on the constitutional provisions on the duty of citizens of the USSR to struggle against misappropriation and waste of state and public property and take care of the people's property.

In accordance with the decisions of the October 1977 CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the instructions set forth in comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report and speeches at the seventh session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and for the purpose of implementing article 7 of the USSR Law "On the Procedure for Implementing the USSR Constitution (Basic Law)" of 7 October 1977, DOSAAF committees are ordered to thoroughly study and attentively review the critical comments and suggestions on the issues connected with defense society activity which were received during the course of the national discussion of the new draft USSR Constitution. Plan and implement measures for their realization.

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium assured the Communist Party, its Leninist Central Committee, the Central Committee Politbureau and comrade Leonid Ilich Brezhnev personally--general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium--that the multi-million member defense society will sacredly fulfill its constitutional duties; it will make its contribution to fulfilling the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and observing the USSR Constitution; it will, with even greater energy, assist in the strengthening of the country's defense capability and in the training of workers for the socialist homeland's defense; and it will steadfastly and efficiently strengthen the economic and defensive might of our great homeland.

The meeting's participants sent a letter of greeting to the CPSU Central Committee and to comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

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## DOSAAF FINANCIAL IRREGULARITIES REPORTED

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 16 Nov 77 p 3

[Article by D. Tsydenov, chief of the Accounting, Bookkeeping and Financial Control Administration of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee: "Accounting and Cost Accounting"]

[Text] Improving the management of the national economy is a task of paramount importance. A number of measures for improving management planning, economic methods of operations and the economic stimulation of management's organizational structure were projected in the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. Specifically, the plans call for increasing the influence of cost accounting, finance and credit in the efficient utilization of production resources and for decreasing production costs and increasing profits by eliminating non-productive expenditures and losses and by increasing the state's income.

Accounting is an inherent function of production management. It is impossible to manage the economy in a purposeful manner and to precisely plan its growth and development without reliable and timely accounting data.

It is only possible to manage successfully when all operations are taken into account in a precise, timely and reliable manner, when the results are summarized and distributed for the quarter, six-month period and for the year, when the degree of fulfillment of the state plan and of the defense society's plan is determined--if we are to talk in conformance with our tasks, it is the degree to which state and public property is preserved--and when the trends which are outlined in production, financial and economic activity are made known; on the basis of the latter, economically warranted conclusions and suggestions for improving all the activity of the enterprise, the club and the oblast or republican committee on the whole present themselves.

I must point out that the state of accounting work and management audits in DOSAAF organizations and committees on the whole meets the requirements levied on them. But, nevertheless, I want to dwell on some of our deficiencies in organizing and performing accounting tasks and management audits.

What are the causes of the deficiencies, waste and misappropriations of material goods and monetary resources which were discovered, for example, in the Altayskaya Kray and Astrakhan-skaya Oblast organizations? A lack of proper supervision over the activities of people responsible for material resources; confusion in accounting for material goods; and also not doing the work required for personnel selection and assignment. It must be recalled that the efficiency and results of management audits depend not just on the quantity of audits and inspections conducted, but also on the implementation of their findings: were measures taken to eliminate the deficiencies and violations which were uncovered; was the occurrence of similar violations prevented; were the channels for waste and misappropriation closed. Unfortunately, the implementation of auditing commissions' suggestions and conclusions is not being treated in a conscientious and efficient manner everywhere.

Here is an example: according to the 22 November 1976 auditing statement for the Astrakhan DOSAAF Committee's financial and economic activity--which was conducted by the oblast auditing commission--violations were uncovered for which the guilty parties should have been taken to court. But this wasn't done. After all, the statement showed that a large shortage of material goods was brought to light in the Astrakhan Motor Vehicle School. An illegal bonus fund was also formed here, and, consequently, it was illegally expended. Seven motor vehicles were also written off here--by evading all the rules and regulations. There was also this case: the chief of the Kirovskiy Rayon TSC Technical Sports Club, Semin, paid himself wages for 918 hours of teaching work instead of the 360 which were authorized.

Violations and deficiencies were also uncovered directly in the oblast committee itself: over a three-year period, overstocking in the warehouses doubled; no one is being made liable for the deficiencies; they are making overpayments in wages--the wage fund was wastefully expended on extra personnel.

In accordance with the 25 September 1972 decree of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium, the conduct of documentary audits of aviation sports clubs financial and economic activity is entrusted to the DOSAAF oblast committees. However, some committees are negligent in performing these duties and

they only conduct the audits after being reminded many times. As a result, financial management is lax in the aviation sports clubs and it is not surprising that gross violations of financial discipline, deficiencies and misappropriations have been uncovered there during the past years.

Thus, the chief of the Izhevsk Aviation Sports Club, E. Zabolotnyy--for the purpose of increasing official wages under the guise of holding more than one job within the organization--paid half a rifleman's wages to the cashier, half a mechanic's wages to four drivers, half a medical assistant's wages to a crane operator, a stoker, a mechanic and a laboratory assistant, etc. Altogether, he illegally paid out 6,100 roubles during 1975 and 1976.

In order to hide the overpayment from the wage fund, the educational organization's former senior accountant, P. Chuvakin, reduced the actual expenditures by 25,000 when he submitted the 1975 financial statement; as a result, the overpayment from the wage fund was hidden and a non-existent savings was even shown.

How did the chairman of the Udmurtskiy DOSAAF Obkom react to the commission's statement? It can be said that he didn't react: in the letter which accompanied the statements he only promised to review the audit results at a meeting of the obkom's presidium.

Work on the economic utilization of the wage fund is also being conducted poorly in the Orlovskiy DOSAAF Oblast Committee. An inspection disclosed unwarranted payments to outsiders based on labor contracts which were concluded by violating established procedures. According to current legislation, labor contracts with outsiders can be concluded for performance of work which cannot be done by staff personnel and of work which is not included in the scope of their duties. The contract is concluded in the name of the enterprise or organization only by its manager, whereupon the contract must include the amount of work to be performed, the period of its performance, the work procedures and the contracting parties addresses. This is a preliminary contract until the parties sign it and it must be studied in the enterprise's or organization's accounting department from the point of view of its legality, of the existence of uncommitted wage funds for excess (unlisted) personnel and also the competence of the parties concluding the contract. A labor contract should only be approved when the chief accountant has no objections. This procedure was not observed by the Orlovskiy Obkom: the labor contracts were not concluded by the committee chairman but by other people



who were not authorized to do this. The precise amount of work and the applicants' addresses were not indicated in the contracts and the contracts were not studied ahead of time nor approved by the committee's chief accountant.

Accounting and expenditure of material goods was also unsatisfactorily organized in the obkom; their preservation was not ensured. The central warehouse is located in a damp building which is not suitable for storing weapons, ammunition and other goods and materiel. Over 35,000 roubles worth of obsolete and old goods, materiel and printed material had accumulated in the warehouse.

Accounting does not always meet established requirements in this obkom which is confirmed by just the following example. With the authorization of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, the Orlov City TSC transferred a Moskvich-408 motor vehicle to the primary organization of DOSAAF Motor Vehicle Convoy /avtokolonna/ No 3 of SEECA /Southeast Energy Construction Administration/. However, it was noted in the letter of consignment for the vehicle's transfer that technical equipment was being transferred. As a result of this "mistake," the motor vehicle was not picked up on the primary organization's account and it was not used as intended.

Our defense society's organizations conduct all their activity at the expense of their own income. Therefore, the committee managers must conduct a steadfast struggle to improve the financial position of the organizations and to fulfill the revenue portion of the financial plans, to preserve materiel and monetary resources and to completely get rid of deficiencies, waste and misappropriations.

9001  
CSO: 1801

## DOSAAF AUTOMOTIVE SCHOOL TRAINING RESULTS

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 16 Nov 77 p 3

[Article by A. Glukhovskiy, deputy chairman, Kiyevskiy DOSAAF Obkom: "Outstanding Specialists for the National Economy: Borispol' Mechanics"]

[Excerpts] During the 9 months of the jubilee year, the DOSAAF organizations of the Soviet Ukraine trained 1.2 million specialists for the national economy. Drivers and tractor drivers, combine operators and electricians--graduates of DOSAAF educational organizations--selflessly toiled in the fields.

The Borispol' DOSAAF Motor Vehicle School made a substantial contribution to the common cause. The plan for training third class drivers was fulfilled by 105 percent. The plan called for training 90 tractor drivers--135 were trained. The plan specified that 500 drivers will raise their skill level within the school's walls--670 people became first and second class specialists. The plan for training motorcyclists was fulfilled by 150 percent.

This is the, so to speak, quantitative side of the business. But, how do things stand with quality?

"I believe universal training for mechanics is organized in an outstanding manner," says Oleg Vladimirovich Shcherbenko, the first secretary of the Borispol' Party Gorkom. "Our school's graduates possess in-depth knowledge and firm skills; the educational organization rightfully occupies first place in Kiyevskaya Oblast. It is also good that the school management doesn't forget about its graduates in the future. Thus, at the present time--before the harvest--the teachers and industrial training instructors have been conducting travelling consultation services directly at the sovkhoses. Attention was devoted mainly to equipment repair under field conditions and to driving tractor-trailers."

In conclusion, I want to direct your attention to this extremely important detail. The school trains several times more first, second and third class drivers than it does motor vehicle enthusiasts. At the same time, there is a marvelous simulator classroom for group C drivers, but we don't have the appropriate equipment for training the professional drivers. We understand that this is a complex problem and it can't be solved right away. However, time is short. The interests of the cause obligate us to be steadfastly concerned about improving the training facilities in which specialists for the national economy are trained.

9001

CSO: 1801

## DEFICIENCIES NOTED IN DOSAAF TECHNICAL SCHOOL

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 16 Nov 77 p 3

[Article by G. Konyakhin, SOVETSKIY PATRIOT correspondent, Barnaul: "Investigating a Letter: In a Hostile Situation"]

[Text] An unusual incident took place once at the Barnaul DOSAAF Technical School. The classrooms were empty for several days here. The teachers and shop instructors were bored with nothing to do: there wasn't anybody to teach. Having gone home for their day off, the students were late in returning to the educational organization.

True, perhaps the expression "unusual incident" does not accurately describe what took place. Such a turn of events could have been expected.

However, let's take things one at a time.

The Barnaul DOSAAF Technical School is located in the outskirts, far from the center of town. Buses very seldom run here. During the spring floods, the surrounding area is completely inundated. During this period, there is plenty of water in the educational organization itself; its building has been in need of capital repairs for a long time. Its officials are also not immune to the unpleasantness of winter. For example, at the beginning of this year, the pipes in the central heating system burst during a 40 below zero cold spell.

Naturally, all of this creates definite hardships. They are not retaining personnel here. But, not just because--as some people explain--the trip to work is long and inconvenient. The main reason is something else.

"It is hard to work in the school," says teacher I. Gagarin. "You constantly feel hostility directed at you. You can't count on friendly support. Rather, it's usually the reverse. For example, on the part of Danilov..."

"You can expect anything from Danilov. From gossip to insults," S. Oshchepkov echoes his colleague.

"He's being spiteful to me," disclaims A. Danilov, the senior instructor for industrial training. "It's just that I broke Oshchepkov's and Pushkin's bottle of vodka once while I was the school's acting deputy chief of industrial education."

"Ha, he broke it!" S. Oshchepkov reared up. "Do you remember who we began drinking with that evening? With you!"

These are the types of "memories" you can hear here; you only have to start a conversation about what is hindering the collective's harmonious work. They remember all sorts of things. Many of the educational organization's officials are obviously lacking in a businesslike, critical analysis of their activity.

This came to light especially clearly during an analysis of the letter sent to the editors by the teachers S. Oshchepkov, I. Gagarin, A. Pushkin and L. Shmurygin--who was fired. When you first meet them, you get the impression that the authors are sincerely trying to establish order in the school and to raise the quality of training for the future soldiers. However, a check-up revealed that those who are sounding the alarm about the disorder in the educational organization are not in fact concerned about eliminating the shortcomings.

Thus, S. Oshchepkov, while fighting for high ethical standards, at the same time believes it is permissible--during an argument with another teacher over whose group will win the volleyball game--to bet a pint of vodka in front of the students.

A. Pushkin's activities also don't help the school a lot. He has a poor knowledge of the subject he is teaching. It is not by accident that the students of his group sometimes retake the examinations several times.

Then what prompted these people to write the letter? The usual story. They decided to get even with the one who offended them. This is primarily how Shmurygin sees A. Danilov, as the one who is supposedly hindering the productive work of the others.

It is also necessary to say a few words about Danilov. When he was the senior instructor for industrial education, he treated all his comrades in a kindly manner. But, just let a person be designated as the school's acting deputy chief and a transformation takes place. The desire to "put pressure" on people and to "beleaguer" them with shouts began to appear

more frequently. At the same time, the educational process was allowed to drift on. The class schedules were not made up on time. The methods council met on a haphazard basis; there was no methods work. To make up for this, drinking bouts became more frequent. One of them ended with an accident.

Danilov also acted in his peculiar way in other instances. Thus, for example, he thinks that it is perfectly understandable to fill his private vehicle with gas from the organization's motor vehicle. There is also nothing criminal in the fact that the students clean, grease and wash his Pobeda. "This is useful for them. They will know the equipment better," he declares.

This is the sort of atmosphere that reigns here. Let's add that over 30 people were dismissed from the school just during the past year. If you take into account the fact that over 30 teachers and shop instructors received reprimands during the same period, then you can easily understand the "creative" situation here. As a result, the students' knowledge is poor, there are repeat examinations on the SAI [State Automobile Inspection] standards, etc.

What should be done? "Fire A. Danilov," the authors of the letter recommend. "Then the gossip and squabbles among school officials will stop. Everything will be okay."

Perhaps this is a necessary measure, but it will hardly solve the group of problems which face the educational organization. It is necessary to radically improve political and indoctrination work with the permanent staff. It must be said that the DOSAAF Kraykom--specifically, its deputy chairman, N. Kalugin--and the school chief, V. Kirichenko,--who was assigned to this position about a year ago--are expending a certain amount of effort to normalize the situation in the collective and to improve the work conditions.

But this is just the beginning. The main indoctrination work lies ahead. This last case attests to this. Industrial training instructor A. Korolev was dismissed from work for drunkenness and lack of discipline.

Right now the school needs concrete, businesslike help in establishing internal order and in normalizing interpersonal relations between the teachers and instructors. And the DOSAAF Kraykom should be the first to help.

9001

CSO: 1801

## GSFG COMMANDER ON BENEFITS OF PARTY INFLUENCE ON COMBAT READINESS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 77 signed to press  
20 Sep 77 pp 17-24

[Article by Army Gen Ye. Ivanovskiy, Commander-in-Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "The Force of Party Influence"]

[Text] Along with all the people and with all the troops of the Armed Forces, the personnel of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany warmly support and unanimously approve of the party policy, the decisions of the May (1977) CC CPSU Plenum, and the draft of the new USSR Constitution. Carrying out the important patriotic and international duty on the forward borders of the countries of socialist solidarity, the group's troops are putting forth all their energy to accomplish the missions assigned to the Armed Forces by the 25th CPSU Congress. They see their duty as being, as is noted in the draft of the USSR Fundamental Law, to reliably defend the socialist Fatherland and be in constant combat readiness which guarantees the immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

The personnel of the group, having supported the patriotic initiative of the motorized infantry regiment of the Samara-Ul'yanovsk Berdichev Iron Motorized Infantry Division, participate actively in the socialist competition for a fitting greeting for Great October's 60th anniversary. In the troop units, the movement involving the leading formation [soyedineniye] in the Armed Forces begun at the initiative of the troops of the Guards Taman' Motorized Infantry Division imeni M. I. Kalinin also received fervent support. Basic efforts in the socialist competition are concentrated on raising the effectiveness and quality of combat and political training lessons and achievement of the best results in the troops' professional training.

The high political enthusiasm of all servicemen finds specific embodiment in combat and political training results. At exercises which have been held and during inspections, the majority of subunits [podrazdeleniye] and units [chast'] demonstrated a rising level of tactical and firing mastery and the ability to skillfully conduct combat operations taking the requirements of modern combat into consideration.

Now, at the end of the training year, the troops of the group are bolstering and nurturing the achieved success. Commanders, political organs, and party organizations, based on instructions from USSR Minister of Defense Marshal

of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, intensified their attention on the field training of the troops, the quality of how exercises and lessons on firing and special training are conducted, driving of military vehicles, combat coordination of units and subunits, and more effective employment of equipment and weapons capabilities.

Communists are in the vanguard of the struggle to bring to fruition the decisions of the 25th Party Congress and the requirements levied by the USSR Minister of Defense concerning further bolstering of the troops' combat readiness and quality accomplishment of combat and political training plans. They are the true bulwark and reliable assistants to commanders in accomplishment of all missions. By word and personal example, party members and candidate members mobilize the troops to improve field, air, and special training during intense training at ranges, tank ranges, airfields, and in training areas. They provide vital assistance to commanders and sole commanders in the struggle to improve the quality of the training process, to bolster organization and discipline, and to form among the personnel the high moral-political and combat qualities required in modern combat. Communists everywhere emerge as the initiators of everything novel, they generalize and propagandize leading know-how, they decisively struggle against deficiencies which hinder improving and refining the training and indoctrinational process. The norm for the activities of communists is the immutable rule -- be on the spot where it is necessary to exert the most effort and energy, to assist others. They are guided by the tasking of the 25th CPSU Congress to be high-principled active fighting men of the party, the right-flank workers in the ranks of the builders of communism.

Bringing to fruition the requirements of the 25th CPSU Congress, October (1976) and May (1977) CC Plenums, and the recommendations of the scientific-practical conference of the leading workers from the political organs of the army and navy, the group's party organizations through their inherent work forms and methods are steadfastly struggling to raise vigilance and for complete and high-quality fulfillment of combat and political training plans and programs. They concern themselves with skillfully influencing the activities of the military collectives.

What primarily determines success here? The activeness, competence, and responsibility of communist leaders, their being deeply conscious of the importance and necessity of the sector entrusted to them, their readiness to put forth a complete effort, of course. Stemming from this, the group's military council and the party organizations of the staff and directorates are demonstrating daily concern for indoctrinating communist leaders in a spirit of adherence to party principles and are teaching them to correctly use the influence of party organizations and of all communists on the service, training, and discipline of personnel.

At one of its meetings this year, the military council discussed the state of and measures to further improve the selection, training, and indoctrination of officer cadres on the basis of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the October (1976) CC CPSU Plenum and the requirements levied by the USSR Minister of Defense. An exacting party discussion took place on the personal example of generals and officers in profound assimilation of Marxist-Leninist teachings



and the fundamentals of Soviet military science, mastery of the theory and the practice of military construction, and increasing military-technical knowledge and the professional training of cadres. Measures were pointed out for improving work on formation among officers of high moral-political and business-like qualities, organizational capabilities, ways to improve the indoctrination of people in a spirit of high responsibility for fulfillment of combat training plans and programs, and increasing the effectiveness of training and indoctrinating personnel.

Even now it can be stated that these measures are manifested positively in the growth of political maturity and consciousness, the increase in the professional qualification of cadres and, in the final analysis, on the level of the troops' combat readiness. It has become the rule for us to efficiently inform the communists of the group about the military council's requirements on the questions discussed. In their turn, the party organizations strive to see that these requirements are brought to fruition. The work of the party committee headed by Colonel V. Petrichenko can serve as an example. Upon receipt of the military council's action plan, the party committee at its meeting discussed ways to improve the indoctrination of communist officers and insure that they set the example in training and service.

Such approaches as theoretical and scientific-practical conferences and talks are held and reports delivered by comrades right in their own party collective are used for the purpose of increasing communists' personal responsibility. Work aimed at insuring communists set an example is analyzed monthly in the party organizations. Results from such an analysis are disseminated to the party members and candidate members at regular party meetings. This all has positive results. At a verification inspection, the officers demonstrated high personal training and the ability to train and indoctrinate subordinates.

"It is also necessary to further insure that every communist, regardless of where he works, regardless of the job or post he occupies, serves as an example of concentration and discipline, of a creative attitude to business, an example of a state approach to the accomplishment of large and small missions." These words from a speech by General Secretary of the CC CPSU comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the October (1976) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee enjoin us to place even greater attention to the vanguard role of communists in the struggle for achievement of great heights in combat training and to bolstering party influence on the life and training of the troops.

In the /Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces/ [in boldface], it states that a commander is obligated to rely upon party and Komsomol organizations in his activities and employ their influence in full measure for accomplishment of the missions with which the unit or subunit is tasked. Instructions to CPSU organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy charge every communist commander with relying in his work on the party organization and directing its activities toward successful fulfillment of combat missions and combat and political training plans and bolstering military discipline.

And, the main thing here, it seems to me, is the ability of a commander to continually take into consideration and correctly use the powerful force and the

influence of the party organization. "The communist leader," pointed out V. I. Lenin, "in that way and only in that way must prove his right to leadership, that he finds himself many, ever more and more assistants . . . that he is able to help them work, promote them, show and take into account their know-how."

These remarkable words of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin also directly relate to the activities of our command cadres. A commander granted the rights of a sole commander only then fulfills his role if in the interests of the common cause he employs the assistance, support, and initiative of the party collective. But, the ability to rely upon the party organization is only one side of the story. Another no less important responsibility is to guide its activities. This is primarily achieved by the fact that the sole commander orients the party organization in a timely manner on accomplishment of the missions with which the subunits and units are tasked, actively participates himself in its work, sets an example for all in carrying out orders, and regularly speaks to the communists on the most important questions of their multifaceted activities.

In their turn, the secretary of the party organization and other activists are regularly called upon also to efficiently inform the commander on the affairs and the mood of the personnel and on the troops' needs and requests. The secretary of the party organization should not await an invitation but should himself take his thoughts and proposals to the commander. We cannot devise harmonious coordinated operations without mutual information. Practice shows that authority is greater and work results better for those commanders who in full measure evaluate the significance of the party organization's daily work, rely on it fully and at all times, who actively put the force and influence of communists to use in the interests of personnel training and indoctrination. At the same time, the activities of the party organization are more fruitful when the party organization steadfastly fulfills the missions assigned by the commander, support his authority, and struggle for accurate accomplishment of orders and directives.

The majority of the commanders and party organizations in our group of forces operates in just this manner. They work harmoniously, they solve vital problems involving troop training and indoctrination and bolstering unit and subunit combat readiness on principle in the party way. Commanders proficiently assign specific missions to communists and specify the problem solutions upon which they should intensify their efforts, sensitively accept proposals from the communists themselves, and personally participate in preparation and conduct of party organization measures. The fact that more than 70 percent of the communist commanders were elected to party committees and bureaus gives witness to the high authority of CPSU member unit commanders in party collectives.

Coordinated work allows timely concentration of communists' efforts on those problems upon which success in fulfillment of pending missions primarily depends. The work of the party organization headed by Captain V. Kucherenko can serve as confirmation of these words. Every time you visit this unit you see noticeable and goal-oriented changes, a well-established training process, and compliance with internal regulations. Lieutenant Colonel V. Skovorodka, the unit commander, decisively struggles against any type of training indulgence, carefully monitors the progress of combat training lessons, and places a great deal

of attention on training facilities. Communists support his work involvement in the combat manner. Prior to the start of the training year, the commander and the party organization paid attention to the fact that some officers did not demonstrate the proper concern for a growth in the military-technical knowledge and thorough study of the equipment and weapons entrusted to them. The reasons were varied. Some comrades rode along on outstanding evaluations in school diplomas, others self-confidently nodded at class rating badges, as if to say that they are beyond that stage.

In accordance with the established tradition, the commander called upon the party aktiv for assistance as he approached the new cause. He proposed that it be explained to servicemen of all categories that military-technical efficiency is not simply the sum of the knowledge of equipment and skills in its operation. It is a broader concept. We are talking about the ability of getting the maximum that the equipment can give. Communists primarily asked themselves these questions. How do we appear ourselves? Are we all setting the example in the study of modern equipment, raising class ratings, and improving our technical knowledge? The party committee made a detailed study of how party members and candidate members are increasing their knowledge in technical, special, and tactical training, how they prepare and conduct planned lessons on the basic training subjects, how they organize the work of the technical hobby groups and participate in the propaganda of military-technical knowledge. Not only the positive aspects but deficiencies as well come to light here.

Based upon a party committee recommendation, the question of communists being the example in studying the equipment and increasing military-technical knowledge was discussed at subunit open party meetings, which commanders, staff officers, and chiefs of services helped prepare and conduct. The direct principled discussion at the meetings stimulated not only the communists, but the non-party troops as well. Implementing the decisions made, the party committee and the party organizations heard reports from communists on how they are studying the modern combat equipment. The party organizations tasked the party members and candidate members, the outstanding gunners and master vehicle operators, to assist their coworkers in assimilating the equipment and to help in the generalization and dissemination of leading know-how. At the communists' initiative and with their active participation, a technical and firing conference was held in the regiment, publishing of technical bulletins and photo and radio newspapers was organized, and competitions between specialists on maintenance of the equipment were regularly held.

Directing the party organization's work, Lieutenant Colonel V. Skovorodka works closely with Lieutenant Colonel M. Mudragelov, his deputy for political affairs. The commander is completely correct in seeing that the political worker, along with the party committee, organizes the party work in the unit and bears personal responsibility for its condition.

Our command and political cadres well understand the necessity to subordinate all types of combat training to the interests of tactics and to continually follow the rule "to teach the troops that which is required in war." This requirement is dictated by the special features of modern combat, which is characterized by the suddenness and swiftness of strikes, rapid changes in the

situation, skillful combination of fire and maneuver, employment of new types of weapons, and forestalling the enemy from inflicting strikes and building up forces. Know-how from the Great Patriotic War teaches that, in actual combat, achievement of victory primarily requires superiority over the enemy in tactics. And people capable of snatching the initiative away from the enemy and anticipating him in operations achieve this. Tactical training by its very nature is linked with firing and technical training and is in direct dependence upon the capabilities of weapons and equipment with which the troops are supplied, upon the degree to which the means of struggle present in the inventory are assimilated.

Commanders, staffs, and party organizations constantly concern themselves with seeing that all tactical drills are worked out in organic unity with firing, technical, and other types of combat training. The exchange of opinions between various categories of officers is organized and assistance is provided to young officers to meet these goals. Those comrades who permit indulgences and simplification when lessons are conducted, who do not take into consideration fully those processes occurring in military affairs, who do not avoid trite habits and views in the methodology for conducting exercises are being subjected to principled criticism.

For example, take the party organization where Captain V. Kurash is one of the members of the party committee. Characteristic of its activities is to create in the collective that type of atmosphere which facilitates the development of independence, growth in the professional maturity of commanders and political workers, their methodological efficiency, the development of the ability in a short period of time to organize the battle and make decisions proficiently and with justification.

It should be noted that, solving these problems, the party organization does not copy the approach taken by commanders, does not duplicate them. It primarily exerts its influence on raising combat training quality through the active measures of conviction and the communists' personal example. The party organization attentively monitors the training of each party member and candidate member. It has become the rule here for the commander to sum up the combat and political training monthly and the party committee interests itself especially in the commander's evaluation of the communists' training in the basic training subjects. This permits timely discovery and correction of deficiencies.

At the beginning of the training year in the tank company commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. Krivonos, senior comrades noted that some lessons, especially those involving tactical and firing training, were being conducted at a low level. Several officers were very hasty in working out the training missions and the norms, made little use of the element of competition, and firing training missions were not always worked out on a tactical background.

The reasons for the extant deficiencies were discussed at a party committee meeting and measures established for raising the quality of the training process, especially the conduct of tank gunnery practical training and firing and tactical training lessons. Experienced gunners and methodologists from

among the communists on the staff were charged by the party committee to assist the young officers. The commander did not have to resort to disciplinary action. The principled party discussion and specific comradely assistance provided good results. Communist V. Krivonos's company demonstrated high tactical and firing training during an inspection and earned the title outstanding.

Now, on the eve of an outstanding event -- the 60th anniversary of Great October -- throughout the group just as throughout all the Armed Forces socialist competition has acquired an even greater scale. It has become an integral part of the training process, a mighty means of indoctrination, of raising the activeness of the troops, mobilizing them to achieve better results in comradely labor.

Speaking to the personnel of the Guards Tank Ural-L'vov Division in our group, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov underscored the importance of the struggle for the best formation in the USSR Armed Forces, quality fulfillment of the socialist pledges made, and especially the personal example set by communists and Komsomol members in this.

That is why political organs and party organizations must continually indoctrinate personnel with high responsibility for full accomplishment of pledges, see that communists set an example in competition, and use in doing so all the multifaceted forms and methods of party work, guided by the CC CPSU decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution."

Commanders and party organizations are concentrating their main efforts to skillfully employ the patriotic desire on the part of personnel to thank the Motherland during this jubilee year with new successes in comradely labor. Let's take the regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Maksimishin. The personnel of the unit are successfully fulfilling the pledges made. One of the basic components of this success was the intricate organizational work of the commander and the party organization, the timely discovery and elimination of shortcomings. During the spring, having analyzed the progress of socialist competition, the regiment's command and party committee discovered that, in some subunits, the struggle to fulfill pledges had weakened. Some soldiers and sergeants were satisfied with mediocre results and the officers did not immediately make high demands upon them, did not self-critically evaluate the level of training that had been achieved.

What did the commander do? He primarily took measures which depended upon him alone. He met with subunit commanders and political workers and demanded that they eliminate extant deficiencies. He told the officers and sergeants about leading know-how in organizing competition during combat training lessons and met with the officers to sum up their fulfillment of the socialist pledges they had made. At the same time, he directed the party aktiv's attention to the necessity for raising the demands made upon communists to fulfill pledges.

The party committee also acted viably. At its suggestion, the progress communists were making on pledge fulfillment was examined in the primary party organizations and at a seminar with the secretaries of party organizations and party group organizers. At a meeting of CPSU member subunit commanders, an

exchange of know-how on organization and guidance of competition took place. The party committee at its meeting and party organizations at theirs heard reports by several communists on how they are supporting and developing among their personnel enthusiasm, initiative, and a spirit of creativity elicited by the preparations for the October jubilee and discussion of the draft of the USSR Constitution. The regimental commander, his deputy for political affairs, and staff officers actively participated in all measures taken by the party committee.

One cannot say that everything changed for the better immediately after these measures were taken. It required painstaking work by commanders and political workers and the intense labor of all communists to eliminate extant shortcomings. But the main goal was achieved. The responsibility on the part of the personnel for fulfillment of pledges made was increased.

Comprehensive bolstering of military discipline is among the many problems which party organizations actively help the commander solve. This is a complicated task. It requires that each communist in the sector entrusted to him set an example as he carries out his assigned responsibilities, actively participate in the political and military indoctrination of personnel, be intolerant to any breach in compliance with regulations, himself understand and bring to the deep consciousness of the troops that discipline is the most important condition of high combat readiness.

Party organizations exert their effect on solution of problems involving the further strengthening of military discipline by indoctrinating each serviceman with a sense of personal responsibility for strict and accurate fulfillment of the order and rules established by laws and by military regulations. They do not copy the procedures involving the service activities of commanders and chiefs, but operate with their inherent methods. They continually explain to soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers [praporshchik], and officers Lenin's instructions on the necessity to maintain in the army discipline carried to the highest limits and the requirements levied by the CC CPSU and the USSR Minister of Defense for discipline under contemporary conditions. They convince the troops of the necessity to always carry out orders received accurately and on time, to demonstrate initiative and steadfastness.

/High demands are made on every communist/ [in boldface] and doubly so on leaders. As pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congress, in every sector the leader must be sensitive towards people and to their needs and desires, must serve as an example at work and off the job. This demand of the congress fully applies to military cadres. Nothing is more disillusioning in a military collective than the lack of discipline on the part of a communist leader, the incongruity of his actions with the requirements of the oath and military regulations. The Leninist principle of one-man command assumes high ideological and party principles on the part of every commander, the ability to base all his actions on CPSU policy, to rely on the force and influence of party organizations and army society. In their turn, political organs and party organizations are required to actively inject a spirit of party principles into the work of the organs of military control and constantly concern themselves with raising the authority of the commander.

An absolute majority of one-man commanders relate to fulfillment of the responsibilities assigned to them with a sense of high party obligation and justify

with honor the high title of communist leader. The practical activities of officer G. Moiseyev, CPSU member, will serve as a good example in this regard. Possessing rich know-how in training and indoctrinating subordinates, he places a great deal of attention on raising the quality and effectiveness of the training process and introduction of the requirements of combined-arms regulations into daily life. Faultless execution, zealous adherence to Soviet laws and to the military oath which form the norms and rules of morale, and a high sense of duty and responsibility for fulfillment of service and party obligations are attributes that set him apart. Moiseyev skillfully combines his strict demands on adherence to regulations with a constant concern for his subordinates and respect for their human dignity.

Unfortunately, we continue to encounter those commanders and chiefs who approach their assigned tasks without the requisite responsibility and, in doing so, undermine their authority in the eyes of their subordinates. Similar facts are, of course, the exception but this does not reduce their harm. It is proper to recall Lenin's words that the improper conduct of even one communist casts a shadow over the party and harms its authority.

Taking into consideration certain omissions and things left undone in the struggle for strong compliance with regulations as a whole, the military council and group of forces political directorate are also faced with further improving the means for a political approach to further bolstering military discipline and accomplishing, as required by the CC CPSU decree on the Orsha gorkom of the CPSU, integrated solution of problems involving ideological-indoctrinational work. We also see the necessity for a more substantiated scientifically-based analysis of the processes and phenomena occurring in military collectives and a more complete consideration of the new trends, the objective laws of the development of military affairs, and the qualitative changes in personnel, weapons, and methods for conducting combat operations.

It is difficult to overestimate the role of criticism and self-criticism in the struggle against shortcomings, regardless of where they are found. It should be stated that communists now more strictly and self-critically approach the evaluation of the results of their labor and the activities of coworkers and they are demonstrating impatience with any blunders and shortcomings. I had an opportunity not long ago to participate in the work of a party meeting held at a motorized infantry regiment. One has to be pleased with the fact that the meeting was business-like and conducted in a military manner. With great anxiety the communists spoke of unaccomplished missions and unused capacities for increasing combat readiness, improving the quality of the training process, and bolstering military discipline. They frankly pointed out each other's shortcomings and errors in service and in personal conduct, while making practical suggestions on strengthening party influence on all aspects of unit life.

But nonetheless, the method of criticism and self-criticism still has not deeply been established in the work of several party collectives. Criticism sometimes flows only downwards and mistakes by those comrades occupying higher posts are timidly criticized. And that is a shame. It states in the Instructions to CPSU Organizations that "at party meetings communists have the right to criticize and party member and candidate member, regardless of the position that he

occupies. Criticism of the orders and instructions of commanders and chiefs is not permitted."

It goes without saying that every communist must fully understand that criticism is necessary not for the sake of criticism. It was pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congress that the value of criticism is in its truthfulness, in the social significance of the questions raised. The value of self-criticism is determined by its sincerity, by a readiness to immediately work to correct mistakes and shortcomings.

Commanders, political organs, and party organizations have the same tasks and their desires and efforts are directed towards the same goal. And our party, demonstrating continual concern for the Armed Forces, teaches commanders, political workers, and party organizations to work harmoniously, in coordination, in close unity, through joint efforts to raise the quality of combat and political training, and to strengthen discipline and organization in units and sub-units.

Now the most intense stage of the jubilee training year in the troop units is to conclude the summer training period during which important and responsible missions involving field, air, tactical, and special training of our personnel are being accomplished. Commanders, political organs, and party organizations in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany will in the future as well place primary attention on bolstering party influence on all aspects of the life and activities of the troops and steadfastly labor to carry out the instructions of the 25th CPSU Congress that the Armed Forces always stand guard over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and be a bulwark of universal peace.

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## POLITICAL TRAINING IN KIEV MILITARY DISTRICT

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 77 signed to press  
20 Sep 77 pp 25-31

[Article by Lt Gen V. Dement'yev, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate, Red Banner Kiev Military District: "Mobilizing the Efforts of the Troops"]

[Text] The troops of our district like all the troops of the Soviet Armed Forces are striving to properly greet Great October's 60th anniversary, raise combat readiness even higher, and insure that the socialist Fatherland is reliably defended. They recognize that the danger of war remains a striking reality in our time. As underscored in the party CC decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," aggressive imperialist forces are spurring on the arms race, creating a serious threat to the cause of peace and security of peoples, and are attempting in every way to impede the relaxation of tensions. Under these conditions, the interests of defending the Soviet state oblige our commanders, political workers, party, and Komsomol organizations to demonstrate more vitality and practicality in their work involving a further increase in vigilance and the combat mastery of the troops, to see that they master modern weapons and equipment and improve their field and air training.

And it should be said that their joint efforts are obtaining good results, as evidenced by the progress of combat training. The socialist competition in honor of Great October's 60th anniversary, unfurled at the initiative of the motorized infantry regiment from the Motorized Infantry Samara-Ul'yanovsk, Berdichev Iron Thrice Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy Division of the Carpathian Military District, is playing an important role in the struggle for training quality. The patriotic movement for the leading formation [soyedineniye] begun at the initiative of the troops of the Guards Taman' Division is exerting a beneficial influence on the troops' life and training. A majority of the units [chast'] and subunits [podrazdeleniye] of our district is successfully fulfilling their pledges. In the troop units, the number of otlichniks, class-rated specialists, masters of military affairs, and outstanding squads, crews, and subunits increased.

The initiators of socialist competition in the district -- the troops of Unit "X" -- are setting the example in all of this, just as they ought to be. Every second man here is an otlichnik in combat and political training and in

excess of 60 percent of the personnel are first- and second-class specialists. The tankers demonstrated their growing combat mastery at a recently held tactical exercise. Their comradely labor received a high rating.

The mood of our troops is somewhat special during these concluding days of the summer training period. They received the decisions of the May (1977) CC CPSU Plenum, comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report at that Plenum, and the draft of the USSR Constitution published in the press for national discussion with a sense of enormous pride in the great Soviet Motherland. The draft of the new USSR Constitution, developed under the guidance of comrade L. I. Brezhnev in accordance with instructions from the 25th CPSU Congress, is a document of enormous inspirational force, the remarkable result of the 60-year history of the world's first socialist power. Each article in the draft is permeated with Lenin's ideas and embodies Lenin's behests on the ways to develop the Soviet state.

The approaching glorious jubilee is exerting a mobilizing influence on the defenders of the Motherland and calls forth political and labor enthusiasm. And we are striving to bolster the troops' enthusiasm through goal-oriented organizational and indoctrinational work. Commanders, political organs, party organizations, and all communists understand that a worthy greeting for the jubilee, mobilization of servicemen for successful accomplishment of all missions with which the district's troops are tasked depend greatly upon the level of the ideological-indoctrinational and agitational-propagandistic work. You see, high patriotic enthusiasm and the vitality of the troops in training and in service, in fulfillment of socialist pledges are inseparably linked with their political consciousness. Party requirements to deeply and comprehensively bring to light the world historical significance of the Great October socialist revolution, the principles and conclusions contained in the works of V. I. Lenin, in the documents of the CPSU and the international communist movement, in the reports and speeches of comrade L. I. Brezhnev, CC CPSU General Secretary, have become the basic practical activities of our commanders, political organs, and party organizations.

Work undertaken in the troops units in connection with the national discussion of the draft of the Basic Law is organically tied in with preparations to celebrate Great October's 60th anniversary. We are steadfastly striving to insure the broadest, freest, and really business-like discussion of the draft USSR Constitution, which will increase the political and creative activeness of the troops, a sense of responsibility on the part of each one of them for the job entrusted to them -- defense of the conquests of Great October.

All of this work in the Guards Motorized Infantry Sinel'nikovo-Budapest Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy Division imeni V. I. Chapayev is distinguished for its goal-oriented nature and viability. At the initiative of the communists here, Lenin readings, thematic evenings, and meetings with old Bolsheviks, labor veterans, and veterans of the Great Patriotic War are regularly held in the units and subunits. Members of agitational-propagandistic collectives and groups present lectures and reports on the heroic paths of our party and its founder V. I. Lenin, on the successes of the Soviet people in fulfilling the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the plans of the Tenth Five-Year Plan, about the requirement for the armed defense of the conquests of Great October, about why they must always be vigilant and prepared to rebuff any aggressor.

It is characteristic for party organizations to strive to conduct ideological work in an integrated manner, insuring close unity of ideological-political, military, and moral indoctrination. This can be confirmed through profound content, careful consistency, and strict periodicity of ideological-indoctrinational and agitational-propagandistic work. Thus, the troops are informed about the Soviet way of life at political lessons, political information sessions, in lectures and reports, conversations, radio reports, in speeches by participants at thematic evenings and matinees, and other measures. The uninterrupted approach and the high viability of the ideological influence on the troops are insured in this manner. And, as a result of this, their political and labor activeness grows and they are responding with specific deeds to the party's appeal to greet Great October's jubilee in a fitting manner.

Great attention is placed on propaganda of the glorious combat traditions. The preparations for the 60th anniversary of the socialist revolution raised the interest of the soldiers, sergeants, and officers in the heroic past of the Soviet Motherland and her valiant Armed Forces even more. And communists are doing everything to fully satisfy this interest. Moreover, the formation has enormous capabilities for doing so. It bears the name of the legendary division commander and Civil War hero V. I. Chapayev, bears an honorific title, and has been awarded three orders. Many fighting men and commanders from the division have covered their names with undying glory during the Civil and the Great Patriotic Wars. For example, the platoon commanded by Guards Lieutenant P. Shironin performed an immortal feat in the battles against the fascist occupiers. For this feat, every member of the platoon was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Active propaganda of the combat traditions brings forth from the soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers [praporshchik], and officers the desire to be worthy continuers of the heroic traditions of those front line former unit members, which is bolstered through persistent training.

It is characteristic that everything interesting and positive that crops up in the units and subunits as preparations continue for the notable jubilee is inseparably linked with initiative on the part of communists. Useful in this regard is know-how in the work of the party organization where Major V. Gerus is a member of the bureau. Preparations for the jubilee here were underway long before the publication of the CC CPSU decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution." After it appeared, the organizational and indoctrinational work on a fitting greeting for the jubilee were significantly vitalized. The plans were supplemented and corrected, which made them even more specific and goal-oriented and meeting the requirements for an integrated approach to establishment of all matters involving indoctrination of the personnel.

Presentations by members of agitational-propagandistic groups, thematic evenings, interesting meetings, and other measures were closely integrated with each other and with combat and political training plans. But, the main thing is that all these measures carefully envisioned a desire to elevate even higher the political activeness of the people, to aid each of them to develop an active vital position and a conscious attitude towards military duty, to mobilize their efforts for successful fulfillment of training plans and programs and of socialist pledges. Communists see as their basic task bringing to the mind and the

heart of every serviceman the historic significance of Great October and the enormity of the tasks specified by the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. Their basic concern is not to permit formalism, to see that every presentation, every measure leaves a profound trace in peoples' consciousness and impels them to labor with doubled energy.

Regularly, once per week, the radio newspaper "The Country of Soviets on the Eve of the Jubilee" is presented at the initiative of the party bureau here. They use the local radio to inform the servicemen about the successes of the Soviet people in fulfillment of the plans for the second year of the Tenth Five-Year Plan and about achievements in socialist competition with which the workers of our Motherland are greeting the glorious jubilee. Interesting facts are presented on new construction projects, plants, and kolkhozes, on the comradely workdays of the unit's soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers, and officers, on those things which have specifically been done by them for a worthy greeting for Great October's 60th anniversary, who is in the lead in socialist competition, who is lagging behind. The well thought out selection of facts and the reasoned analysis of them seems to bring the radio listeners to the question that is the key one as far as you are concerned: how are you, the armed defenders of the Fatherland, fulfilling your military duty, how are you preparing for the jubilee, what is your contribution to fulfillment of pledges?

We chose the radio newspaper as our example purposely. This is a measure that is wide-spread, normal, and common. We could discuss other, more significant, measures. However, it is not a matter of scale but of the viability of any work form. They became convinced in the leading unit on the basis of their own experience that even the ordinary radio newspaper, if approached with sincerity and diligently prepared, can have a great indoctrinational influence on personnel. They do not categorize measures here as important and secondary. Instead, each is carefully thought through, skillfully prepared, and steadfastly exploited. In so doing close attention is paid to seeing that the measures are closely linked with life and with the missions which the military collective is accomplishing, that these ties are organic and assist the individual in being imbued with pride for his Motherland, for her successes, with a desire to carry out his sacred duty in a model fashion.

Thematic matinees entitled "My Motherland -- the USSR," a unique simulated excursion through the union republics and new construction projects in the Country of Soviets, acquired wide popularity in the subunits of the Chapayev division. Well planned and carefully prepared, the matinees elicit from the defenders of the Fatherland a torrent of energy and enthusiasm. One such matinee, for example, was devoted to the republic in which the troops are serving, the Soviet Ukraine. During the matinee, they talked about the republic's achievements in economics, science, and culture, fulfillment of the plans of the Tenth Five-Year Plan, the fraternal ties the republic has with other socialist republics of the multinational Soviet Union, ties which are being bolstered year after year, and about the valor and heroism of troops of all nationalities in the liberation of the Ukraine from the fascist occupiers during the Great Patriotic War.

Mention of the fraternal friendship of the peoples of the USSR was not fortuitous. The formation bears the honorific Sinel'nikovo. And it, the honorific,

was won here in fierce battles against the fascist occupiers. Now the troops of various nationalities are serving where, 35 years ago, their fathers and grandfathers fought, serving beneath combat banners bathed in glory. The matinee developed into a convincing demonstration of the unbreakable friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union, elicited from all participants a sense of pride in their socialist Motherland and for the unit in which they serve, and impelled them to multiply the heroic traditions of those who served before them.

The growing activeness of the troops in competition also demonstrates the viability of similar measures. Thus, in the subunit where Lieutenant V. Zabudskiy is the secretary of the party organization, the troops are successfully coping with training plans and programs and are steadfastly achieving the intended goals, beneficially expressed in the growth of their combat training. This is given witness to by the fact that every second soldier here is an otlichnik in training. There is no doubt that, by the jubilee of Great October, the achievements of this harmonious and coordinated collective will be even higher.

Commanders and political organs are concentrating special attention on the activeness and vitality of party collectives. For the more vital the party organization is, the more active is its influence on the state of affairs in the unit and subunit, the greater their successes in accomplishing their assigned missions, in fulfilling socialist pledges. Such influence is guaranteed by realization of the principle of unity of word and deed, by an unceasing quest for reserves, through comprehensive support of new and progressive inputs, by decisive elimination of deficiencies.

To what has been said we should add the following. The more vital the party organization as a whole, the more active every communist is. This is exactly how the communists of the tank regiment, the first in our district to support the initiative of the Carpathianites, understand their role. The tankers are true to their word. And, during the summer combat training period, the regiment stands in the front rank of those competing for a worthy greeting for October's jubilee.

The high activeness of communists in combat training and in fulfillment of jubilee pledges is a result of the constant supervision by the commander, the staff, and the party organization, by their strict demandingness, by the principled nature of the evaluation of the tankers' successes. Captain V. Mitsenko, secretary of the party committee, and other committee members maintain close ties with commanders and secretaries of subunit party organizations, interest themselves in how communists are assimilating military and political knowledge, how they are improving combat mastery, and if they are well informed of the state of affairs in their collective. They steadfastly develop in the party members and candidate members a desire to assist coworkers in assimilating combat specialties, weapons, and equipment, to insure that technical hobby groups operate in every subunit, that competitions for the title of best driver-mechanic, gun layer, tank commander, and so on are systematically held, that technical bulletins are regularly published, and that technical information is provided to officers and warrant officers [praporshchik]. The party committee shows special concern for the viability of party-political work at tactical exercises, tank ranges, and firing ranges -- in those locations where combat mastery is forged.

The goal-oriented activities of the party committee provide positive results in the struggle for highly effective combat training. Everyone in the unit who is eligible has already become a class-rated specialist. Approximately 65 percent of this number has an increased class rating. Every second tank commander can replace the driver-mechanic. The Travelling Red Banner of the oblast party committee has been awarded to the regiment for high indicators in combat and political training.

But the regiment's commanders, political workers, party, and Komsomol organizations look upon that which has been achieved as a foundation from which to conquer new horizons in combat training. Here they well remember V. I. Lenin's instructions that the best way to celebrate the anniversary of the Great October socialist revolution is to concentrate your attention on unaccomplished tasks. Therefore, they critically approach the evaluation of their indicators, attentively analyze the reasons for deficiencies, and strive to quickly eliminate them. And, deficiencies do still exist. Analysis of the training process brought to light weaknesses in the methodological training of several lesson leaders, officer V. Semenenko for one. He does not always make skillful use of training facilities when training tankers. After consulting with the commander, party committee members decided to call a regular meeting and invite communist V. Semenenko and several other comrades. They all gave reports. A useful exchange of opinions then ensued. Along with critical comments, the party committee members made a number of valuable suggestions and recommendations, which were reflected in the decision made at the meeting. It specified measures aimed at providing assistance to the commander in improving the methodological training of officers, warrant officers, and sergeants and raising lesson quality, as well as insuring rational use of training facilities and improving them further. Questions concerning tactical, firing, and special training were not overlooked. The party committee continued generalization and dissemination of leading know-how. This business-like style is characteristic of the majority of the party organizations in the district's troop units, which facilitates their achieving good and excellent results in combat and political training and in military discipline.

Experience confirms that success accompanies primarily those military collectives where party organizations achieved the goal of having communists set a personal example in fulfilling the service and party duty, where their word is accompanied by deeds. Here is confirmation of this point. The motorized infantry battalion commanded by Captain P. Sen' bears the title outstanding for the third year. Battalion personnel pledged to achieve new, more significant results in combat refinement prior to the 60th anniversary of Great October. Progress during summer training affirms that the subunit deservedly retains the title outstanding. You can be sure that the troops of the battalion will attain the desired goals prior to the jubilee.

The battalion's high stable indicators are explained by the fact that the party organization guaranteed the personal example of all communists without exception. Almost all of them are otlichniki in combat and political training, are serving as a model in training, service, and discipline, and are actively participating in social work.

The same can be said about our other leading units and subunits as well. The fighting spirit of party organizations and consequently their mobilizing influence on the troops also are inextricably linked with monitoring and checking on how they are carrying out the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the decrees of our party's Central Committee, the requirements of the USSR Minister of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and their own decisions. In the CC CPSU Accountability Report to the 25th CPSU Congress, comrade L. I. Brezhnev underscored the following. "Monitoring and checking accomplishment of decisions made is a vital part of organization work. This is the business of every party and economic leader, every party organ, every primary party organization." Following the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee, party organizations in the district's troop units considerably improved the monitoring and checking function, seeing in this a way to move ahead unswervingly.

Along with this, it should be noted that certain party organizations still are slow to adjust the style of their work. Therefore, cases are encountered where business-like decisions are not bolstered by organizational work, where there is no supervision over how the intended measures are brought to fruition. Only the appearance of activeness comes through overall. In essence, the peoples' efforts are for naught. This was the case, for example, in the party organization where Captain M. Chabanenko is a bureau member. At first glance, it worked actively. Seemingly important questions were discussed at bureau meetings. The question of the requirement to strengthen party influence on lesson quality and effectiveness, in particular regarding special training, was discussed many times. The corresponding decisions were also made. The unfortunate part is that they soon forgot about these decisions and did not check to see if they had been brought to fruition. In a word, real monitoring and checking on execution were absent. Therefore, several troops, including communists as well, demonstrated only a satisfactory knowledge at special training lessons.

Although similar instances are rare, political organs give them a principled evaluation and are doing everything to see that such shortcomings are not repeated. For the strength of party work lies in its viability. Correctly determining and discussing urgent questions and making good decisions falls far short if party work is to exert the requisite influence on the state of affairs in a military collective or on the progress of the entire training process. This work must be accomplished proficiently and steadfastly.

An important role in organization and accomplishment of execution monitoring and checking falls to staffs. The district political directorate maintains the activities of staff party organizations in its field of view at all times and achieves a bolstering of their influence on the refinement of forms and methods of execution monitoring and checking. All of these questions are thoroughly examined at seminars attended by the secretaries of staff and directorate party organizations held regularly by the political directorate and by formation political organs. Naturally, there are also conversations at these seminars on how to strengthen the influence of staff communists on the growth of the troops' political activeness and on what can and must be done by staff party organizations to mobilize personnel for a worthy greeting for Great October's jubilee.

Komsomol organizations make a great contribution to insuring fulfillment of

socialist pledges. The size of this contribution primarily depends upon party guidance which is accomplished through the direct participation of party members and candidate members in the work of Komsomol organizations. Through communists elected to Komsomol organs, political organs and party organizations direct the indoctrinational work among the youth, mobilizing their forces for accomplishment of the tasks assigned to units and subunits. Young communists which form the party nucleus in the Komsomol provide the requisite tone in the youth collectives and are models of moral substance, steadfastness, and high principles. We are not satisfied with this and strive to insure that all communists without exception deeply understand, with a sense of high responsibility fulfill their pledges to indoctrinate the youth of the army.

Our assertions are based on concrete facts when we discuss the political and labor activeness of soldiers, cadets, sergeants, warrant officers, and officers, the patriotic enthusiasm in units, schools, institutions, and construction projects. The growing political and labor activeness of the troops is not an abstract concept. It is tangible and embodied in concrete deeds and actions. The troops' successes in the field during the summer training period give vivid witness to this. Personnel from the district's troop units persistently refine the combat training at the training areas, tank ranges, firing ranges, and airfields and are assimilating the science of winning which is forged in combat.

Each lesson, exercise, and flight is distinguished by high stress and a competitive spirit. The struggle is underway to accomplish combat training missions and overfulfill norms in a model manner. The majority of units demonstrates growing field and flying training, military mastery, and combat coordination.

In addition, commanders, political organs, and staffs are concentrating their attention on unresolved problems and shortcomings. Moreover, there are still instances of uneven training of units and subunits operating under identical conditions. The struggle for effective use of every minute of training time is weak in some areas and viable supervision of the combat training process is not being accomplished everywhere. We are decisively struggling against all of these deficiencies.

We understand what the personnel of our district's troop units need to learn in this jubilee year, what goals in combat mastery to achieve. The personnel will report to the Motherland, the Communist Party, and the Soviet people on the eve of Great October's 60th anniversary. And, we are doing everything to insure that their report is worthy of the glorious jubilee. The goal-oriented activities of commanders, political organs, and party organizations facilitate this. By personal example and inspiring words, communists mobilize the troops for selfless comradely labor. Their high activeness in training and service, their disciplined nature is a guarantee that the intended goals during the jubilee year will be achieved and socialist pledges will be fulfilled completely.

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## EFFECTS OF MORAL FACTOR ON COMBAT READINESS DISCUSSED

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[Article by Maj Gen S. Il'in, Candidate of Historical Sciences: "The Moral Factor and Combat Readiness"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The Soviet Armed Forces have been defending the conquests of Great October for almost six decades. They now present to the entire world a military organization of a country of developed socialism, a true guardian of the creative labor of our people, a mighty bulwark of peace and progress on earth.

Our party looked upon and looks upon strengthening the Armed Forces as one of the main tasks involving provision of favorable international conditions for communist construction in the USSR. This was reflected in full measure in the documents of the 25th CPSU Congress.

The combat might of our army and navy is determined by a series of components of a material and a spiritual nature. The decisive indicator of their might is combat readiness, without which the accomplishment of their high purpose is unthinkable. The given situation will be bolstered in the Fundamental Law of the USSR. As stated in Article 31 of the draft of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: "The duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people is to reliably defend the socialist Fatherland, to be in constant combat readiness which guarantees an immediate rebuff to any aggressor."

Increasing the party's attention on the combat readiness of the army and navy is a completely legitimate phenomenon. Now, when the threat of war has still not been eliminated and the more aggressive circles of imperialism continue to plot a surprise nuclear attack on the USSR and the other fraternal countries of socialism, our country's security and the matter of construction of socialism and communism depend to an immeasurably greater degree than in the past on the level of combat readiness of the Armed Forces. It is from this very point of view that all the components of combat readiness, including the role and the place of the moral factor in it, are being evaluated.

### I

It is known that the moral factor relative to the military sphere is the ideological and psychological components of the spiritual forces of society that

are brought to bear for victory over the enemy. Consequently, the moral factor is that category of peoples' spiritual state which more completely manifests itself under the conditions of war. This, it goes without saying, does not signify that it is neutral regarding the daily combat readiness which penetrates all aspects of the life and activities of the army and navy. High combat readiness of the troops is a vital means of thwarting an aggressor's surprise attack and immutable condition for successful operations to destroy him. Therefore, unity in the training of the troops and maintaining them in a state of combat readiness is now one of the main principles of functioning of formations [soyedineniye], units [chast'], and ships. Combat duty, which has as its purpose being equatable to accomplishment of a combat mission, exists to insure the constant combat readiness of the troops. And, all of this requires special efforts on the part of personnel.

In our time, the criteria for evaluation of people for the conduct of the armed struggle and for the maintenance of combat readiness under peaceful conditions significantly drew together. Guaranteeing constant combat readiness requires much greater expenditures of spiritual efforts by personnel than were required in the past.

Combat readiness as a specific state of the Armed Forces is a complex and deep concept. In it, points out comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "like in focus are concentrated the enormous efforts and physical inputs of the people to equip the army, consciousness, combat training and discipline of all servicemen, the art of command personnel in managing the troops, and many other things. This, in the final analysis, is the crown of the troops' combat mastery in peacetime and the key to victory in war" ("Leninskim kursom" [Following Lenin's Course], Vol 2, p 49).

Combat readiness of the army depends upon the material and spiritual forces of the entire Soviet society. The Soviet peoples' intense labor to create and supply the troops with modern forms of weapons and equipment has especially important significance. Under peaceful conditions, this mission is accomplished in the general course of fulfilling national economic plans. The high moral-political tuning of the Soviet people, the multifaceted activities of the party involving the ideological-political indoctrination of the masses, mobilizing them to accomplish the tasks of the Tenth Five-Year Plan -- all of this also facilitates stepping up their efforts to provide the army with everything that is required to accomplish the missions with which it is tasked.

When the discussion centers on increasing the role of the moral factor in the maintenance of troop combat readiness, we have in mind that aspect of it which characterizes the morale of the personnel of the Armed Forces. The moral state of servicemen and of military collectives is one of the vital components of combat readiness and at the same time exerts a universal effect on its other components.

## II

Maintaining troops in readiness at all times for operations under conditions of armed struggle was linked to a great degree with the peoples' moral state.

Now this dependency has acquired special significance. The troops of all services and branches of troops equipped with the newest technology must be in a state of readiness for immediate combat operations. And, this presupposes a high moral-political complete mobilization and maintenance of a rhythm of life dictated by the situation and of the daily activities of the personnel.

One also must consider that, in the event of war if the aggressor makes this a fact, the change of peoples' consciousness to a military mode will be done in a very different manner. In the past, this took a more or less prolonged time. When Hitlerite Germany made the surprise attack on our country, in essence it was only the troops from the border military districts that went into battle immediately. As far as the majority of the troops was concerned, their conversion to the conduct of combat operations took a significant amount of time.

Peaceful life can be transformed in just minutes given contemporary means of combat. Consequently, personnel must possess constant moral-psychological readiness for actual combat operations. This applies especially to persons performing combat duty.

The significance of morale as one of the elements of combat readiness grew also because servicemen must possess the requisite moral-political and the psychological qualities that meet /the requirements of modern war./ If a new war bursts upon us at the fault of imperialism's aggressive forces, it unavoidably will be a nuclear missile war. And our troops must even in peacetime be spiritually steadfast and ready under any conditions at any price to fulfill the duty to the Motherland in order to successfully function in such a war.

It is known that, in the wars of the past, including the Great Patriotic War which lasted almost 4 years, there were widespread possibilities to develop the morale of personnel and supplement the omissions of prewar years. In a nuclear missile war should one arise, conditions will undoubtedly be less favorable for accomplishing this. It is therefore entirely legitimate in daily practice to proceed from the fact that /the center of efforts now in troop training, including the moral-psychological tempering of the troops, is radically shifting to peacetime./ Taking all of this into consideration, goal-oriented moral-political and psychological training is underway in units and aboard ships. As it progresses, the troops achieve an in-depth understanding of the requirement for and importance of constant combat readiness which insures the security of the Motherland, a responsible attitude towards surmounting the difficulties that accrue thereto, and fulfillment of complicated obligations.

The degree of awareness by each fighting man of the personal responsibility for the combat readiness of the unit, ship, and subunit, his ability under compressed suspenses to place all technical systems and combat weapons complexes in operation, the readiness of personnel to selflessly fight any aggressor -- this is the determinant of the moral-political and psychological complete mobilization of the troops and fleet forces.

The state of the moral factor, as is known, is predicated primarily by the nature of the social structure and the special features of a given military organization. In the capitalist countries the process of bolstering this state is

fraught with a deep contradiction between the desire on the part of the ruling circles to bolster the army's spiritual foundations and purpose and goals of the war for which the army is preparing itself, a purpose and goals which are alien to the workers. The morale of the army in the USSR has a firm foundation -- the ideological-political unity of the Soviet society which cements the guiding and directing activities of the Communist Party. A new historical community of peoples, the Soviet people, has been formed in our country over the past 60 years. The Armed Forces personify these fundamental social changes.

The multifaceted ideological work of the party, its indoctrination of the Soviet people as ardent patriots and internationalists is of enormous significance in the formation of high moral-political qualities on the part of personnel. The daily practical activities of commanders, political organs, and party organizations to bolster the troops' morale place central emphasis on development of high ideological conviction in them. This is the foundation of the spiritual stimuli in the maintenance of constant combat readiness. Communist high mindedness stipulates solidness in the troops' consciousness of the all-victorious ideals of communism, a sense of limitless dedication to their Motherland, and fidelity to military duty. It serves at the same time as the spiritual foundation of the psychological preparedness of personnel and attaches a social orientation to a person's feelings. High moral substance beneficially influences the psychological cohesion of the members of crews and subunits.

Assimilation of Marxism-Leninism is a main link in the formation of the troops' communist conviction. This assists them in correctly evaluating the class essence of unfolding events, the advantages of socialism over capitalism, and bolsters their trust in the glory of communism's affairs, in victory over any aggressor. Propaganda of the concepts of Marxism-Leninism lies at the foundation of all this work. A special place in this work is taken up by in-depth study by personnel of the materials of the 25th CPSU Congress and the speeches of comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in which Marxist-Leninist theory received further creative development. It provided a scientific substantiation of the party's foreign and domestic policy, of questions concerning the armed defense of our Motherland and the cause of communism. All of this enriches /that foundation upon which the development of communist consciousness and formation of a high morale on the part of Armed Forces personnel are based./

Development of a patriotic and international consciousness is very basic in the entire process of confirming the troops' moral-political qualities. This task is accomplished through widespread propaganda of the achievements of the Soviet people and the workers of the fraternal countries in socialist and communist construction, propaganda of the victories of our state and its Armed Forces in the struggle against aggressors. It is difficult in this regard to overestimate celebration of notable dates in the history of our Motherland. Work done to celebrate them makes it possible to vividly depict the path covered by the country, to provide a bright convincing picture of the successes achieved by the people under the guidance of the CPSU in construction of a new society and its armed defense. Now, preparations are underway with high patriotic fervor under this slogan for the 60th anniversary of the Great October socialist revolution and the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Passage of the new USSR Constitution, the draft of which received the unanimous

support of the workers during the national discussion, will have an enormous effect on the consciousness of the troops, just as it will on all the Soviet people. This is a document of world historical significance which bolsters the peoples' great conquests en route to the construction of communism and elicits from the troops a feeling of pride in the socialist structure, in the multinational Motherland, the party of communists which is the guiding and directing force of Soviet society. It bolsters their spiritual readiness to reliably defend the peaceful labor of the builders of communism.

Formation in the troops of a correct understanding of the contemporary conflict between the two contrary systems is of important significance for development and strengthening of their morale. One of its determinant features is the fact that, as a result of the changing correlation of forces in the favor of socialism due to the active foreign policy of the USSR and the fraternal countries of socialism, the relaxation of tensions is paving the way in the world. At the same time, the more aggressive imperialist circles are steadfastly following the line of disrupting this relaxation and are increasing military preparations.

All of this is taken into consideration in work devoted to formation among the servicemen of a highly aware attitude towards maintenance of constant and unrelaxed troop combat readiness. Commanders, political organs, party, and Kom-somol organizations argumentatively explain to soldiers, sergeants, sailors, petty officers, warrant officers [praporshchik i michman], and officers the conclusion reached by the 25th CPSU Congress on imperialism retaining its aggressive nature and reveal the imperialist's specific preparations for war.

The leadership in Peking operates hand-in-glove with reactionaries of all types. It is attempting to scuttle detente and strain to the limit the world situation.

The intensification of the conflict in the ideological sphere in the world arena finds reflection in the indoctrinational process which forms the stable moral spirit of personnel. This is stipulated by a whole series of circumstances, but primarily by the intensification and complication of the class struggle between the two systems. The imperialists are making far-reaching calculations directed towards destroying the moral bastions of the Soviet people, primarily the young people. The writer Grigoriy Konovalov expressed these treacherous thoughts well. "The old world deep down in its bones strives to see that it is sparrows rather than eaglets that our fathers breed in eagles' nests."

Our ideological enemies are also accomplishing special measures to undermine the morale of Soviet troops. And, if corresponding work is not done, then the influence of bourgeois ideology on individuals can weaken their efforts to maintain troop combat readiness. It is also characteristic that imperialist ideologues stepped up their efforts under the conditions of detente. "The positive shifts in the peace policy, detente," L. I. Brezhnev said at the 25th CPSU Congress, "are creating favorable possibilities for widespread dissemination of the principles of socialism. But, on the other hand, the ideological conflict between the two systems is becoming more active and imperialist propaganda more subtle."

The imperialists are making wider use of ideological diversions in the struggle against the USSR. They are employing any means to undermine the ideological

foundations of our society and introduce bourgeois views and norms of conduct into the consciousness of immature people. Here, imperialist propaganda is acquiring an ever more subversive character. This point is especially given witness, in particular, by the malevolent campaign concerning the so-called "violation of human rights in the USSR." It is characteristic that the ideological machinations of the imperialists are now and then linked with intelligence activities.

These facts are directly related to the questions we are examining concerning increasing the combat readiness of units, ships, and subunits. We are talking about the fact that in the forefront of insuring the security of our Motherland is a stable ideological steadfastness on the part of the people, an irreconcilable attitude towards any manifestations of hostile ideology.

An immutable aspect of personnel forming morale is indoctrinating them with high political vigilance. The slightest manifestation of gentleness and irresponsibility in this regard can have negative consequences for combat readiness. Political vigilance and class acuteness in evaluation of certain manifestations of life must be combined with the strictest protection of military and state secrets. Also of material significance is that all personnel, officers especially, understand the term vigilance in the contemporary meaning of the word. The imperialists are employing the latest technical achievements in their subversive spy activities against the USSR. They are widely employing satellites, refined listening devices, and so on. Employing the measures required to counteract those techniques means to avert possible harm to the combat readiness of subunits, units, and ships.

Thus, the morale of personnel is one of the components of troop combat readiness, the significance of which is continually growing. Commanders, political workers, party, and Komsomol organizations are directing their efforts towards further strengthening it.

### III

The combat readiness of the troops and fleet forces depends to an enormous degree on the state of the personnel's combat training. The entire process of combat and operational training is subordinated in essence to accomplishment of this task. The struggle for high indicators in training and for masterful assimilation of combat equipment and weapons is an indispensable condition of the readiness of units, ships, and formations to repel sudden aggression.

Primary significance in troop training is attached to tactical, firing, technical, and special training. Here, the level of the personnel's combat training is directly dependent upon their consciousness and their understanding of their sacred duty to the Motherland. This has always been the case, but it is even more important in our time.

There is the fact that the contemporary process of training the troops and the fleet forces requires a much greater concentration of spiritual and physical forces of troops of varied specialities. This is caused by a number of circumstances and primarily by the saturation of the army and navy with the newest combat equipment and weapons and the complexity in assimilation of the methods for their employment. The combat equipment in all the services of the Armed

Forces in recent years has gotten immeasurably complicated and, along with this, new, significantly compressed periods for studying the equipment were determined, which required great proficiency in the process of maintaining extant systems and devices. It is known, for example, that during the past three decades the number of instruments in an aircraft cockpit increased by a factor of almost 30, but the time required to carry out each operation involving engine controls and other equipment decreased by a factor of 6-7 due to increased speed of flight and changes in equipment operating conditions. Our submariners are now involved with nuclear engines and missiles aboard the ships. The equipment they maintain must be assimilated well in the shortest period of time. The training process in the Ground Forces has also gotten complicated. New types of training for the specialists have appeared, like driving tanks under water, and so on. Moreover, this relates to the Strategic Rocket Forces and Air Defense of the Homeland. Masterful assimilation of the ever more complex equipment naturally assumes the uninterrupted growth in the moral forces of personnel.

The might and combat readiness of the Armed Forces depend to an enormous degree on how successfully achievements from the military-technical revolution are combined with the advantages of our military organization, the army of a new type, the army of developed socialism. One of the routes leading to achievement of this goal is /comprehensive development by the troops of a deeply aware attitude to assimilation of contemporary combat equipment and weapons./ For this very reason therefore, struggling for high combat readiness, commanders, political workers, and party organizations keep solution of the given task in the center of their attention. The strengthened morale of servicemen manifests itself in the broad scale of socialist competition, which has as its slogan /further increasing combat readiness, improving the quality of combat training, and steadfast assimilation of new combat equipment and weapons./

Completion of the training year gives witness to the fact that goal-oriented work in this sphere provides positive results. A majority of the troops, sub-units, units, and ships fulfilled the socialist pledges they made in honor of Great October's 60th anniversary and, in doing so, made their contribution to the cause of raising the combat readiness of the army and navy.

Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense, emphasized at a scientific-practical conference of the supervisory political staff the significance of morale for combat training. He said that all troops need to be indoctrinated with a conscious attitude towards surmounting the real complexities of combat training, having in mind the immutable truth that the more difficult in training, the easier in combat. Implementation of this instruction is especially important in connection with the fact that the troops, in the process of working out training missions, are being trained for combat operations with employment of nuclear weapons, as well as employment of considerably improved conventional means.

At the present time, the principle "Teach the troops that which is required in war", proven through many years of practice, fully retains its significance. However, bringing it to fruition places requirements higher than those of the past on the spiritual forces of personnel. This applies especially to field, air, and naval training. The troops accomplish many new, more complex missions during tactical lessons and exercises involving employment of new means of struggle. They must operate at higher tempos, skillfully make use of "nuclear strikes"

by their own troops, surmount the consequences of "enemy nuclear strikes," and zones of "radioactive contamination," and so on.

Commanders, political organs, and staffs have to take into consideration an objectively real contradiction in the daily practice of tactical training. On the one hand, troop training must be conducted under conditions that closely resemble real situations, combat situations, while on the other hand, nuclear missiles can't be used for training purposes. This contradiction can only be solved completely during an armed struggle. But, a great deal is being done in this regard during the peacetime training process. Here, a deeply conscious desire on the part of servicemen, officers especially, to improve their training in a situation which simulates actual combat to the maximum has primary significance. /High training effectiveness is unthinkable without such a conscious attitude to lessons and unremitting high standards in all links./

At the same time, lessons conducted under the conditions stated beneficially affect the psychological tempering of the troops and the formation in them of the requisite moral-combat qualities, primarily under conditions whereby specific measures along these lines are worked out ahead of time.

Exercises "Dnepr," "Yug," "Dvina," "Okean," "Sever," "Karpaty," and others were conducted in recent years in just this way. Characteristic of these exercises was the fact that the situation established during them was very complex and approximated combat operations. Long marches were made during the exercises, large offensive and defensive operations were conducted with assault landings and assault crossing of large water obstacles. Aircraft, artillery, and tanks conducted field firing, mine fields and contaminated areas were surmounted, etc. Units advanced right behind detonating shells or during firing over the heads of the troops. Operations involving employment of nuclear weapons were worked out during several exercises. All of this exerted a deep impression on the psyche of the troops and facilitated the formation in them of steadfastness, courage, and the readiness to surmount any difficulties in the combat situation in order to achieve victory over the enemy. The remarkable spiritual qualities of the personnel and their desire to accomplish combat training missions with the best possible results were manifested here in full measure.

An important place is allotted to military discipline in the strong alloy of components which go to make up the combat readiness of our army and navy. V. I. Lenin pointed out in his day that the existence of an army is unthinkable without discipline. A special role is allotted to discipline in our day. The objective law of dependence of the importance of military discipline on the complexity of combat equipment and weapons exists. This law now stipulates the requirement for the training of servicemen and military collectives to be directed towards their great responsibility, accuracy, and operational coordination. Performing combat duty requires discipline of the highest order. Since this type of service equates to the accomplishment of combat missions, then discipline must be elevated to such a level.

Maintenance of discipline which corresponds to modern missions assumes more exertion of moral forces than before and the psychological tempering of the people. This primarily involves the /growing responsibility of the troops for fulfilling the requirements of regulations and the orders of commanders and



chiefs./ Under contemporary conditions, maximum diligence is mandatory in all actions for the slightest inaccuracy, or worse yet non-performance, can seriously impact upon combat readiness. This is particularly applicable to combat duty.

A sharp reduction in time parameters for accomplishment of service tasks has materially increased the load on peoples' spiritual state. Now, the period of time for accomplishment of an order or an instruction is calculated in minutes and even seconds. An order often acquires the form of a command, accomplishment of which takes place immediately every time. All of this also requires an increase in the expenditure of personnel's spiritual energy.

Now the activities of an individual troop depend on the collective to a greater degree than in the past, and vice versa. Success in the accomplishment of the most complex and responsible missions depends upon how the activities of each person are coordinated with other persons. In its own turn, this stipulates the requirement to bolster work concerned with rallying military collectives and indoctrinating people with a spirit of military comradeship.

When evaluating the mutual ties between morale and discipline as an important element of combat readiness, one must also keep in mind those requirements that contemporary war levies upon it. Even in peacetime, there must exist the discipline capable of insuring the transformation of the troops onto a wartime footing and successful combat operations with employment of the newest means of struggle. In accordance with this, a constant influence is exerted upon the servicemen's consciousness. In our time as never before, high effectiveness of the entire process which forms moral-combat and psychological qualities is important, and the disciplined nature of personnel is the quality most important of all. An entire complex of tasks which is being consistently brought to fruition was determined in the 21 January 1967 CC CPSU decree "On Measures to Improve Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy." In the decree it especially underscores that "not a single serviceman can remain outside continual political influence." The aforementioned Party Central Committee directive considers the growing role of discipline and the social responsibility of every serviceman for troop combat readiness and, consequently, for the security of the socialist Motherland. Commanders, political organs, and party organizations are unswervingly guided by these party requirements in everyday work. The moral-psychological climate being created in subunits, units, and aboard ships is such that inner combat readiness determines the multifaceted activities of every troop.

Raising the effectiveness of personnel training and indoctrination assumes an improvement in the forms and methods of troop training and the quest for new ways to accomplish it in a more qualified manner. A scientifically based professional selection which permits a fuller consideration of the personal features of people facilitates this to a great degree. Numerous examples from troop practice and from military educational institutions gives witness to this. Thus, psychological selection in several military schools for pilots reduces wash-outs during training by a factor of 2-2.5. It aids the troops of all the services of the Armed Forces to successfully assimilate a specialty, acquire a class rating, eliminate errors linked with assimilation of new equipment.

High combat readiness assumes firm, uninterrupted, and flexible troop command

and control. Without it, insuring the realization of the combat capabilities of units, ships, and formations is unthinkable. Many examples taken from the history of past wars, including recent local wars, speak to this. The significance of command and control grows even more in a war where nuclear missiles are employed, this stipulated by the growing power and range of the new means of struggle, complexity of calculations, and rapidly developing events which commanders and staffs must take into consideration.

Troop command and control under peacetime conditions has changed a great deal. Implementation of the principle of teaching the troops that which is required in contemporary war, maintaining them in readiness at any moment to shift from peacetime training to combat operations to destroy an aggressor assumes also raising all command and control components in all links to a higher level.

All of this in aggregate greatly expands and makes more profound the question of the spiritual forces of commanders, chiefs, and officers from staffs and political organs. The role of ideological-theoretical and methodological arming of cadres and their assimilation of military-scientific knowledge grows. Only under such conditions is it possible to profoundly and scientifically embrace and in mutuality evaluate the entire spectrum of varied phenomena both on your own as well as on the opposite side. Proper troop command and control is unthinkable without doing so. The significance of officers' psychological tempering and their capability of bearing any effect of the contemporary factors of the combat situation on the psyche also increases.

As stated in the Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces, the commander bears personal responsibility to the Communist Party and to the Soviet government for the constant combat and mobilizing readiness of the unit (sub-unit) entrusted to him. That assumes that the unit, ship, or formation that he controls is capable at the first signal to immediately and in a highly organized manner successfully accomplish combat missions of any complexity. It is very important here that the commander's high moral strength be combined with a broad range of military-scientific and military-technical knowledge. An officer's well-founded erudition is a true prerequisite for his skillful actions in guiding his subordinates during combat and operational training, especially during a variety of exercises. One must not forget that, given the rising volume of information, the commander is called upon in more compressed time frames to correctly evaluate the situation and make a reasoned decision which adequately reflects the situation.

Command and control organs are now equipped with contemporary means of mechanization and automation. This circumstance certainly does not reduce the role of the commander. On the contrary, it requires of him even higher spiritual qualities -- mental flexibility, great knowledge and skills, and a truly creative approach to guiding the troops.

When evaluating the role of morale in troop command and control, one cannot but take into consideration the /growing complexity/ of controlling people. Just as in the process of maintaining combat readiness, an important portion of the administrative activities during combat operations is their moral-psychological aspect. Following the principle of dialectic unity of man and equipment is required in this sphere as never before.

The commander in our Armed Forces controls units, ships, and formations. Relying on political organs and party organizations, he also influences the spiritual processes in the requisite direction. Organizing combat and operational training, he assigns specific missions in the field of political work too. He specially examines questions linked with accomplishment of psychological training, especially when conducting exercises, cruises, and flights.

Employment of electronic computers to determine the correlation of forces in the spiritual sphere is a very important problem for commanders, political organs, and staffs. Here, one must consider the unusual complexity of evaluating the moral-political and psychological training level and the level of personnel training using mathematical methods. This problem finds its reflection in scientific recommendations. As is known, the character and political goals of the troops have a determining significance for the state of morale. They stipulate that situation in which people either work wonders and achieve success or, in spite of the availability of equipment in an enormous quantity and the corresponding level of personnel training as was recently the case with the Americans in Vietnam, they suffer a crushing defeat. Having this in mind, it can be stated that the given aspect of troop morale given the contemporary level of knowledge cannot be evaluated only by computer without risking serious miscalculations which can disorient a commander or chief when making a decision. Traditional forms and methods which have proved themselves must also be used along with use of computers for evaluation of the state of troop morale, especially its ideological-political component. Military cadres learn this in peacetime.

It follows from what has been said that maintaining the troops and fleet forces in a state of constant combat readiness in its contemporary meaning stipulates a growth of the role of the moral factor in the equation. Taking this into account, attention has been intensified on increasing the spiritual forces of personnel. The given task is solved in the entire process of personnel training. Party-political work occupies a special place in this training.

The spiritual readiness of personnel for successful operations in a contemporary war is formed mainly during moral-political and psychological training. It is accomplished by means of the party-political, primarily ideological, influence which has a broader purpose -- to exert an influence on all aspects of the life of the army and navy. Party-political work, and primarily the troops' ideological tempering, insures that troop morale is bolstered. Effective use of the varied means and methods of indoctrinational influence beneficially affects combat training and military discipline. It affects the psychological tempering of personnel, especially when the established task is to mobilize officers and all troops to surmount conventionality and indulgences in combat training.

Party-political work plays an ever-growing role in improving troop command and control. During this work, the responsibility of generals and officers for accomplishment of complicated obligations increases and their methodological preparedness and creative approach to business are being developed. The party organizations in command and control organs occupy a special place in accomplishment of these missions. Their activities include an accumulation of a great deal of positive know-how and varied forms and methods are employed. Thus, a very useful theoretical conference on "Ways and Methods of Improving the Staff

Proficiency and Work Style of the Staff" was held at the headquarters of the Southern Group of Forces. It is characteristic that, along with a report on the given theme, conference participants heard a co-report "Problems of the Methodology and Party Principles in the Work of Staff Officers. The Role of Staff Party Organizations in the Formation of High Party Qualities in Officers." Measures of this type assist officers to more profoundly think through their obligations and develop competency in administrative activities.

Raising combat readiness is the core mission upon which commander, political organs, and party organizations concentrate their efforts. Proper understanding of the role of the moral factor in its accomplishment, its continual bolstering and development is an immutable condition for the USSR Armed Forces to henceforth fittingly fulfill their purpose -- to insure the peace and security of our Motherland and reliably defend the great cause of socialism and communism.

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## YEPISHEV ON PARTY LEADERSHIP OF ARMED FORCES

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[Article by Army Gen A. Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "With a Leninist Course, on the Path of October"]

[Text] The Soviet Nation celebrates an important anniversary, the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, at a time when its forces are flourishing. Liberating the enormous creative energy of the working masses the new, socialist social structure has transformed our homeland within a historically brief period. The homeland has become the world's first nation of developed socialism, a mighty power with a progressive economy, science and culture. And each of the outstanding victories was achieved by the Soviet people under the wise leadership of the Communist Party.

Embodying the best qualities of the most progressive class of modern times, the working class, Lenin's party has truly become the mind, the honor and the conscience of the era. The new Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which was adopted this month at the special, 7th session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 9th convocation, states: "Armed with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the Communist Party determines the general long-term lines of development for society and the line taken in the foreign and domestic policy of the USSR, directs the great creative work of the Soviet people and imparts a planned, scientifically based quality to their struggle for the victory of communism."\*

From the pinnacle of the six decades spent on the glorious path of the Great October Socialist Revolution it is especially clear that the world's first socialist revolution, which achieved victory under the guidance of the Communist Party, marked that historic point at which the renaissance of human society

\*"Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik. Proyekt" [Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Draft)], Moscow, 1977, p. 8, Article 6.

on a socialist basis began. Time has confirmed the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist thesis on the worldwide, historical mission of the working class as the creator of a new society and on the creative nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat, that most important tool for building socialism and defending its conquests.

Development of the new society in our nation was complicated and incredibly difficult. Military intervention, an economic blockade, ideological diversions -- what didn't the class enemy resort to in order to halt the development of socialism in our nation? The Soviet people, however, led by the Communist Party, successfully overcame the difficulties and within a historically brief period implemented Lenin's plan for building socialism. Socialist industrialization of the nation, collectivization of agriculture, the cultural revolution and the wise resolution of the nationalities question furthered our homeland's transformation into a mighty socialist power. During the years of the Great Patriotic War the party organized the Soviet people and the fighting men of the army and navy to rout the enemy and inspired them to accomplish a feat the equal of which mankind had never known. Becoming a militant party it directed the struggle against the German fascist invaders. Our people and its Armed Forces headed by the VKP(b) [All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] were able not only to defend their own freedom and independence and the conquests of the Great October Socialist Revolution but also to make the decisive contribution to the cause of saving European and world civilizations from destruction by fascism.

The achievements of the homeland of the Great October Socialist Revolution during its six decades are convincing proof of the fact that socialism provides unprecedented rates of development of all aspects of public life. More specifically, the national income of the USSR in 1977 was 68 times that of 1913 and industrial output grew 145-fold during that period.\* The Soviet Union has long since moved into the front ranks in the world with respect to volume of industrial production and passed the U.S.A., the world's most developed capitalist nation, in steel and iron smelting, in the production of diesel and electric locomotives and wool fabrics, in the extraction of coal and iron ore and in many other areas. The USSR today accounts for 20 percent of the world's industrial production.

Basic advances have been made in the social and spiritual life of society. Socialism gave the working man enormous material and social advantages and placed all cultural values at the service of the people. The Soviet state structure is helping to strengthen the social uniformity of society, to erase existing differences between urban and rural life, between intellectual and physical work, and is contributing to the continued flourishing and meeting of all nations and ethnic groups of the USSR, among which there are no longer any "advanced" and "backward" groups. All of our fraternal republics have achieved enormous successes in their development. Such social curses as hunger and poverty, unemployment and illiteracy, social and national oppression, which are inherent in capitalism, have been destroyed once and for all in the socialist state.

\*PRAVDA, 26 July 1977

The political result of the party's work during the past 10 years evokes valid pride in each Soviet person. As a result of the heroic labor performed by millions of workers, kolkhoz workers and the intelligentsia and under the leadership of the CPSU the Soviet Nation has reached new frontiers in its development. Our homeland's economic strength, created during the preceding half century, has practically doubled in a single decade. The implementation of enormous, comprehensive programs aimed at transforming vast areas of the nation has been launched on a broad front. These include programs for development of the Nonchernozem zone of Russia and Western Siberia and the industrial development of Eastern Siberia in the region of the Baykal-Amur Trunk Line.

During the years of the Ninth Five-Year Plan alone an important new step was taken in the creation of the material and technical base for communism, in the improvement of the people's standard of living and in the achievement of national security. More than any previous five-year period, that period witnessed greater rates of growth of industrial output, capital investments and state allocations for conducting new measures aimed at improving the people's welfare. The list of important types of products, in the production of which our nation moved up to first place in the world, became even more impressive.

The nation's history has never witnessed such a broad social program as the one which the party created and successfully fulfilled in the past decade. Fundamental advances have been made in the living conditions of the workers, in the entire Soviet way of life.

The growth of the nation's material and spiritual wealth most convincingly attests the profoundly humanistic nature of the Leninist party's policy, its organic bond with the masses of builders of the new society. Our nation's social and economic achievements are especially revealing in light of the crisis which is presently shaking the capitalist world and creating a heavy burden on the workers.

Our party has no goals and no concerns other than concern for the welfare of the people. This fact is also embodied in the foreign policy work of the CPSU, which reflects and has always reflected the profound concern of the Soviet people for universal peace and social progress for mankind.

The Decree on Peace, adopted immediately after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and signed by V.I. Lenin, is rightly considered the first program of struggle for a just, democratic, universal peace. The Communist Party and the Soviet Government consistently and persistently pursue Lenin's policy of peace and actively promote the strengthening of the security of nations and broad international cooperation.

The most important result of the herculean work of the CPSU and the selfless labor of the people has been the building of a society of developed socialism in the USSR. At this stage socialism is revealing its humanistic nature more completely. The party course, outlined at its 25th Congress, is making it possible to accomplish the tasks of building the material and technical base for communism, further improving the workers' welfare and strengthening the nation's power in an integrated manner.

The outstanding successes achieved by our people in the building of a communist society were thoroughly reflected in the new Constitution of the USSR and in the report by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev at the May (1977) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. These extremely important political documents became a powerful force motivating the Soviet people to successfully fulfill the tasks involved in building communism.

The general laws of capitalism's transition to socialism, which are recognized by the party, found practical embodiment in the building of a new society in our nation. The social experience of many peoples which have taken the path of socialist creation has disproved the fabrications of bourgeois ideologists and revisionists about the "national exclusiveness" of the October Revolution. The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution contributed to the success of revolutions in a number of nations, to the emergence and development of the world socialist system and intensification of the international workers' movement and to the achievements of the national liberation struggle.

The experience of the USSR and other nations which have taken a socialist path of development has proven that the laws on which the building of a new society is based, revealed in Marxist-Leninist theory, are essentially objective and universally valid. The art of political direction of the working class struggle and the building of socialism lies in creative application and development of revolutionary theory in accordance with the specific demands of the times and the circumstances of this or that nation. All of our party's multifaceted work has proven that it possesses this art. In light of historical experience the words of V.I. Lenin are filled with especially profound meaning: "In indoctrinating the workers' party Marxism is indoctrinating the avant garde of the proletariat, capable of assuming power and leading the entire nation toward socialism, directing and organizing the new system, capable of serving as teacher, guide and director of all the workers and the exploited in the task of arranging their public life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie."\*

Along with the development of the new social structure the Communist Party was also growing and gaining strength in the course of the revolutionary transformation of life. Using the extremely rich arsenal of weapons of the class struggle and relying on the profoundly recognized laws of social development and the creativity of the masses it always rose to the tasks facing it.

The 60 years of building socialism and communism in our nation has convincingly demonstrated the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist theory, which provides the only true frame of reference in the struggle for a victory of socialist revolution and in the building of a communist society.

Marxist-Leninist analysis of the processes occurring in public life permit the party to foresee the direction and nature of their development, to work out a scientifically based and most effective political course and to implement it

\*V.I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], Vol. 33, p. 26.



consistently and successfully. "Marxism-Leninism," stressed Comrade L.I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress, "is the only reliable basis for developing proper strategy and tactics."\*

The CPSU bases its theoretical work on the fact that Marxism-Leninism and the theory of scientific communism reflect objective reality and the complexity, progression and development of public life. Careful study of the processes occurring in our society and in the socialist world, as well as in the capitalist world, and the development of theoretical conclusions as applicable to the demands of the times and to the accomplishment of long-range tasks are a characteristic feature of the Leninist party's style of work.

By developing Marxism-Leninism theoretically the CPSU substantiated the extremely important program thesis to the effect that the creation of its material and technical base, the development of communist social relations and the creation of a new, thoroughly developed individual, the builder of the communist society, are of prime importance for the victory of communism. The party advanced and proved the vitality of the important theoretical position that the Soviet people constitute a new historical community. In its documents it has given an analysis of the latest process of international development.

Under contemporary conditions a great deal of attention is devoted to the development of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the party, to the study of the interdependence between its theoretical and organizational-political work and to the study of questions of military-political and military-organizational work of the CPSU. This opens up a broad range of fundamental studies, from the party's military-combat work during the course of three revolutions in Russia to the study of the party's military-theoretical and military-organizational work at the present time. This experience of the CPSU is of enormous importance to the further military organizational development and the further strengthening of our nation's defense capability. It is also important for organizing protection of socialism's conquests in all nations which have taken a socialist path.

The strength of the Leninist party lies in its close contact with the masses, in the fact that the party most completely reflects their interests and makes the workers aware of the policy conducted, striving for their acceptance of it as their own, vital policy. Scientific theory then becomes an effective material force. Therein we see the enormous theoretical and practical value of materials and decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. It demonstrated once more the fact that as it develops the theory of scientific communism, concretizes its tenets and increases its awareness of society's objective laws and processes the party is persistently improving the art of political direction of the masses in accordance with the new circumstances.

The party teaches and indoctrinates the masses, learns from the masses and generalizes their rich experience. Together with the people, constantly taking council with them, it resolves the most important problems pertaining to the building of communism. Developing and implementing its domestic and foreign

\*"Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p. 72.

policy the party relies on the communists working in various labor collectives, in state and public organizations, and on its local organs, most importantly the primary party organizations. It is always sensitive to the labor pulse of the nation, to everything new in production, science, culture and everyday life, to what sustains the people and to their aspirations. This permits the CPSU and its Central Committee to find ways of organizing the masses and the work of state, economic and public institutions, which most fully satisfy the requirements of the times.

The work of the sixth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 9th convocation, was a brilliant demonstration of the strengthened unity of the party and people. The Soviet people unanimously approved the election of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev to the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which is in keeping with the highest interests of the Soviet society's state and will contribute to new successes in the building of communism.

A profound source of our party's power to transform lies in its loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism, which has become the firm conviction not only of the communists but also of the millions of Soviet people of all the nations and ethnic groups inhabiting our nation. And the fact that the party has achieved this situation has resulted to an enormous degree from its uncompromising attitude toward any sort of deviations from Lenin's national policy and from the party's resolute struggle against any sort of digressions.

CPSU policy, aimed at the development of the economy and culture in the USSR as a whole, as well as in each Union republic individually, and at the continued flourishing and meeting of our country's nations and ethnic groups, is imbued with the life-giving spirit of internationalism. The broadest masses of all fraternal republics are becoming even more actively associated with political, state, production and cultural life under the conditions of developed socialism. The Leninist party strives to see that the universal increase in the activeness of the workers increases the total creative potential of the Soviet people.

True to the cause of proletarian internationalism our party forms a fighting detachment of the international communist movement. It constantly endeavors to consolidate the avant garde of anti-imperialist forces and puts forth great effort to strengthen unity in the ranks of the communists.

The CPSU attaches special importance to coordinating the work of communist and workers' parties of nations in the socialist commonwealth. A high level of cooperation has been achieved in recent years among fraternal states in various areas of the economy, science and culture and in the strengthening of our defenses.

The qualitative makeup of party ranks determines the vital force of its policy, its ability to direct the efforts of the millions towards the accomplishment of urgent tasks involved in the building of communism. Created and indoctrinated by V.I. Lenin it was from the very first days of its existence a revolutionary

party of the proletariat "both with respect to its makeup and to its entire, strictly held proletarian point of view."\*

At the present time, the Communist Party, the party of the working class and all Soviet people, unites more than 16 million communists in its ranks. This is a powerful, smoothly functioning, constantly developing social-political organism, headed by the Leninist Central Committee, which is confidently leading the Soviet people toward a single, splendid goal, the building of communism. Although the goals of the working class and its Weltanschauung have now become the goals and Weltanschauung of the entire nation, the working class has and does occupy and will continue to occupy the leading position in society up to the disappearance of class differences. Today, workers account for 58 percent of new party members.

The party element among kolkhoz workers and the intelligentsia is also increasing. Every fourth or fifth agricultural specialist is now a communist. And this is natural in the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution, when competent leadership is demanded of party organizations in the process of resolving scientific-production problems.

Under developed socialism our party deals with classes and social strata, which are losing their significant differences. The process of development of social uniformity of the society is occurring. Under these conditions party authority especially depends on intensifying the influence of Marxist-Leninist theory, the ideology of the working class and its morals on the entire ideological-moral atmosphere in society and on the awareness of all the social groups making up the population.

Ideological conviction, an understanding of the avant garde role of the CPSU in all affairs of society, professional skill and moral maturity, which are inherent in party members, constitute the most important features of the party's qualitative makeup. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union does not force the growth of its ranks but accepts only those who have actually demonstrated their ideological conviction and readiness to work selflessly in the name of communism.

An analysis of data on the influx of fresh forces into party organizations of the army and navy shows that the young communists include those outstanding in combat and political training, those upon whom the combat readiness of units (chasti) and ships primarily depends. More than half of the new party members in recent years have been subunit commanders, engineers and technicians, who are directly in charge of the training and indoctrination of the men and insure the fulfillment of combat and political training tasks.

One of the central problems of our party work continues to be the quality of party reinforcements, the elimination of cases of hasty acceptance of unworthy people into the party. The individual approach will continue to be the basic

\*V.I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol. 14, p. 22.

principle regulating the replenishment of our party ranks with fresh forces.

The 25th CPSU Congress stressed the need to strictly fulfill Lenin's rules on the purity of party ranks, to do everything possible in order to elevate the title of party member even higher.

Communists are active in all sectors of economic and cultural development, in all labor and all military collectives. And the overall success depends on how they perform their duties, what sort of example they set in their work and conduct. "...Every communist," said Comrade L.I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress, "must have high principles and be an active party fighter, a right-flank member of the column of builders of communism."\*

Any collective faces a great many problems with respect to improving the efficiency and quality of the work. The communist's position is primarily demonstrated in his approach to those problems. Whether a worker, scientist, kolkhoz worker or serviceman his primary duty lies in making the maximum personal contribution to the struggle for efficiency and quality in the work and in leading others to do the same.

Growth of social activeness and dynamic development are inherent in a party of creators, a party of fighters such as the CPSU. Throughout the entire history of the Soviet State there has occurred a process of enrichment of the substance of its work and improvement of methods of party guidance. As pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congress, "the growing scales of communist development and our work on the international scene urgently demand continuous improvement of the level of party supervision of the development of the economy and culture and indoctrination of the people and the improvement of organizational and political work among the masses."\*\*

The contemporary period is characterized by continuing intensification of the theoretical, political and organizational work of the CPSU. Of enormous importance is the fruitful, creative work of the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo led by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, outstanding political figure and statesman, a loyal Marxist-Leninist and indefatigable fighter for the cause of communism. A truly Leninist style of work has been established in the party, a scientific and creative style, alien to subjectivism, requiring great demandingness, ruling out willfulness and opposing all manifestations of bureaucratism and formalism.

Everything stated above fully applies to the military area as well. Successful accomplishment of the central task of the Armed Forces at the contemporary stage, that of reliably guarding the creative labor of the people and remaining in a state of constant combat readiness, is only possible by implementing directives

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\*"Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p. 64.

\*\* Ibid, p. 65.

and decisions of the party and its combat staff, the Leninist Central Committee, and by increasing the party's influence on all aspects of army and navy life.

The increasing importance of party guidance in Soviet military organizational development is the result first of all of factors of a political nature. In defining the tasks of Soviet military organizational development the Leninist party thoroughly analyzes the balance of class forces in the world and takes the international situation strictly into account, including those processes in its change and development, which make it necessary to improve the combat readiness of the army and navy.

In recent years the Soviet Union, the other socialist nations and the world's progressive forces have made a decisive contribution to the achievement of a positive turn in international relations away from the "cold war" toward detente. The positive advances made in the world arena, however, clearly do not alarm those representatives of imperialist circles who would like to halt the development of the process of detente at any cost. They have recently rained on the world an unprecedented torrent of militaristic propaganda, attempting to frighten the public with a "growing Soviet military threat." Behind a screen of this slanderous campaign aggressive imperialist forces are whipping up the arms race and building up their military power.

Faced by the military threat created by the imperialists the Soviet State has been forced to improve its defenses. Its policy combines a love of peace and a readiness to properly repel an aggressor. The Soviet Union spends for military purposes whatever is required to provide the army and navy with all types of modern weapons, which the imperialists cannot fail to ignore. The party proceeds from the principle that the Soviet Union's defense capability must be adequate to insure that no one would risk violating our peaceful life.

In the second place, the complexity of problems of a military-technical order in turn require intensification of party leadership of Soviet military organizational development. This makes it possible to use the achievements of the modern scientific and technical revolution and economic capabilities to strengthen the nation's defenses.

Thanks to the party's concern and the people's work our homeland's power is indestructible. The valorous Armed Forces of the USSR measure up to modern requirements with respect to their equipment and the training of the personnel. They are reliably defending the peaceful labor of the builders of communism.

In the third place, the need to strengthen party leadership of military organizational development is created by the importance of the social-political and ideological factors involved in improving the combat strength of the army and navy. The high level of maturity of public relations, the drawing together of classes and social groups, the establishment of communist ideology, socialist

patriotism and internationalism in the masses and a feeling of general national pride in the Soviet people -- all of these processes which are presently developing in our society, are having an immediate effect on the strengthening of the state's defensive might.

The move to universal secondary education and the fulfillment of CPSU decisions in the area of higher, secondary, vocational and technical education are helping to provide the Armed Forces with replacements with a higher level of ideological-political tempering, intellectual and physical development. Practically all of the youth entering the army and navy today have an incomplete secondary, secondary or even a higher education. As a rule, every third draftee receives a military specialty in DOSAAF training organizations.

The more complex and difficult the tasks performed by personnel of the army and navy the higher must be the level of ideological indoctrination of the fighters and the more effective the measures aimed at developing communist conviction in the people and their political awareness. And it is perfectly natural that military councils, commanders, political organs and party organizations are devoting ever increasing attention to problems of ideological work.

At this time, when the training year is ending within the system of political training for the fighters, it is important to concentrate efforts on seeking ways to further improve the effectiveness of ideological work in the forces. Subject and training plans must continue to focus on the main thing, serving the interests of intensifying the study of documents of the 25th party congress, the report by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, "The Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Party's Immediate Tasks in the Area of Foreign and Domestic Policy," and the new Constitution of the USSR.

Commanders and political organs have everything they need to convincingly clarify the wealth of Lenin concepts, congress materials and the tasks of building communism in our nation for every officer, warrant officer (praporshchik, michman) and regular servicemen in the political training process. The fighting men must always be informed of urgent problems pertaining to the international situation and of the need to improve the combat readiness of the army and navy and increase the vigilance of all personnel.

Broad possibilities are also opening up for military historians in their work of increasing the ideological tempering of the fighting men. We might mention the following aspects.

Military history is first of all an important means of developing a communist world outlook in the Soviet people. It provides extremely rich material for understanding wherein lies the strength of the Soviet public and state structure, its invincibility and superiority over the capitalist system and reveals the advantages of the Soviet military organization and military science over the military organization and military science of the bourgeois states.

We cannot ignore the enormous possibilities of military history for communist indoctrination of the workers, especially the youth, and fighting men of the army and navy. Especially important are skillful propaganda of the mass heroism demonstrated by the Soviet people in the defense of the homeland, analysis of the progressive nature of Soviet military art and clear and convincing demonstration of the contribution made by the working class, the peasantry and the working intelligentsia to the defeat of enemies of the Soviet State. Further improvement of the indoctrination of patriotic fighting men requires the development of works on military history in the popular science genre and direct participation by military historians in the propagandizing of information on military history and the revolutionary and combat traditions among the youth. A great deal must also be done in the area of developing more thorough methods of military-patriotic indoctrination.

We must also not fail to stress that task of military-historical science, consisting of conducting a vigorous aggressive struggle against bourgeois ideology and exposing the efforts of the falsifiers of military history. This requires a high level of political vigilance, of vigorous, efficient and convincing propaganda work and the timely repelling of hostile ideological diversion.

The Leninist party is thus resolving the problem of reliably defending the revolutionary conquests of socialism and the building of communism in our nation by strengthening the political, economic, scientific-technical and moral factors and the military factor proper. It takes the international situation, the balance of class forces in the world and the level of development of the Soviet economy and the spiritual strengths of our society, as well as those processes characterizing the development of military affairs, into thorough consideration for defining the tasks of improving the efficiency of organizational and ideological work in the army and navy.

The CPSU, the proven avant garde of the people, is honorably performing the role of political leader of the developed socialist society. Implementing the grand program of creation advanced by the 25th Congress it is leading the Soviet people on a Leninist course, along the path of October toward new successes in the building of communism.

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LT GEN ZHILIN ON DETENTE AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

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[Article by Lt Gen P. Zhilin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "The Great October and Defense of the Socialist Homeland"]

[Text] The historic mission of carrying out the socialist revolution and achieving a true homeland for the workers was accomplished by the Russian proletariat under the direction of the Communist Party created by the great Lenin. The presence in Russia of a revolutionary party based solidly on Marxist principles was a crucial factor in the victory over czarism. The Communist Party aroused the popular masses, including such a support of the monarchy as the army, to fight the exploiters. Czarism and the bourgeoisie could not withstand the onslaught of the revolution.

The working class, allied with the poorest of the peasantry, directed by the Leninist party and with the support of the world proletariat, defended the socialist fatherland, the vanguard of a new social structure, during the extremely difficult trials which followed the Great October Socialist Revolution. In that specific situation, when the proletarian revolution had gained a victory in one nation and when the popular movement against imperialism was expanding, it was necessary not only to create a totally new military organization but also to substantiate ideological and organizational principles for defending the socialist homeland.

V.I. Lenin performed this historic mission. He developed a well-balanced doctrine on the defense of the socialist homeland. V.I. Lenin pointed out that the vitality and strength of a revolution are directly dependent on how well the dominant class, the proletariat, is able to prove this with its military organization.\* The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, created by the party, was just such a military organization of the socialist type. The bourgeoisie was thereby deprived of its monopoly in the area of the military.

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\*V.I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol. 37, p. 122; Vol. 38, p. 139.



The creation of the Soviet Armed Forces following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the definition of the theoretical and organizational principles of their development were of enormous importance for protecting the world's first socialist homeland. V.I. Lenin not only laid the scientific foundation of the new military organization but also substantiated the concept of "protecting the socialist homeland." "The homeland," wrote V.I. Lenin, "that is, a given political, cultural and social environment, is the most powerful factor in the class struggle of the proletariat...".\* This tenet is of fundamental importance for the theoretical and practical work of communist and workers' parties, for the workers of the entire world.

The concept of "defending the homeland," deliberately advanced by the bourgeoisie and supported by the opportunists, is a sham for workers in the bourgeois society, since the capitalists and their toadies are attempting to force them to protect the interests of the dominant class by defending it.

The concept of "defending the homeland" only takes on real substance for the working class and the toiling masses with the establishment of a new social structure, a socialist one.

History developed in such a way that the USSR existed and developed for a long period encircled by hostile capitalist nations, which attempted to destroy the world's first socialist state. The party and people faced two main tasks, the task of building socialism and that of defending it with weapon in hand. Foreseeing a possible military confrontation with the forces of imperialism the party prepared the nation, army and people for it. The social and economic conquests of the prewar five-year plans, the ideological-political unity of the Soviet society and constant strengthening of the nation's military potential are all factors determining the high level of our nation's defense capabilities. They were extremely forcefully demonstrated in the struggle against a treacherous and insidious enemy, Hitlerite fascism, which pursued a goal of destroying socialism and all the conquests of the Great October Socialist Revolution in our nation, eradicating communist ideology and enslaving the peoples of the Soviet Union.

The Great Patriotic War was a severe test of the viability of the socialist state and its military organization.

The Hitlerite army was defeated despite the fact that it was the most powerful army of the capitalist world at the beginning of World War II. The Soviet Armed Forces, which honorably performed their historic mission, played the crucial role: they defeated the aggressors and rescued the peoples of many nations from fascist oppression. Their personnel cloaked themselves in a mantle of unfading glory.

The basis for the courage and heroism, the steadfastness and initiative of Soviet fighting men was formed by the great feeling of patriotism on the part of all the people, their deep ideological conviction that they were

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\*V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol. 17, p. 190.

defending the cause of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the socialist homeland, strongpoint of the world revolutionary process, and their awareness that in fighting for the socialist system they were fighting for socialism throughout the world.

The worldwide historical importance of the victory over the bloc of fascist states lies in the fact that it accelerated the world revolutionary process and created favorable conditions for a victory of socialist revolution in a number of nations and the creation of a world socialist system. "The defeat of fascism and Japanese militarism during World War II and the victory of socialist revolutions in a number of European and Asian nations," the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee, "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," stresses, "accelerated world development. The revolutionary process initiated by the Great October Socialist Revolution had achieved a qualitatively new level: a world system of socialism was developing."\*

The defeat of the assault forces of international reaction, the emergence of socialism beyond the borders of a single nation and the rapid progress of the socialist nations considerably expanded the sphere of influence of communist concepts and became a powerful impetus to the development of the proletariat's class struggle in the capitalist nations and growth of the prestige and influence of the communist parties.

Another historic result of World War II is the fact that new conditions had developed for resolving the most important problem of contemporary times, the preservation of peace on earth. Basically, all of the past agreements concluded at the end of wars (the Vienna Congress of 1814-1815 or the Versailles Treaties, for example) did not measure up to the aspirations of the peoples and contained the germ of new military conflicts. Unlike these and other programs of postwar settlement decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences of the great powers were of a basically different nature. As the result of the Soviet Union's determining role in World War II these decisions constituted a new type of postwar, peaceful adjustments. They opened up for peoples and states a path of progressive social changes, a way of creating a new atmosphere in international relations.

A significant advance was made in favor of socialism within the system of world economic and political relations. As a result of the formation of a world system of socialism defense of the socialist homeland became a common task for all states of the socialist commonwealth, based on the unity of their Marxist-Leninist world outlook and the substance of patriotic and international tasks which took shape under the influence of the concepts of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

It has been proven on both the theoretical and practical levels that one socialist nation cannot be protected without protecting the entire socialist system as a whole. An imperialist threat to one of them means a danger to all.

\*"C 60-y godovshchine Velikoy Oktyabr'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii Postanovleniye TsK KPSS ot 31 yanvarya 1977 goda" [On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution: A Decree Passed by the CPSU Central Committee on 31 January 1977], Moscow, Politizdat, 1977, pp. 15-16.

Consequently, defense of the socialist homeland constitutes a common task for all peoples and all states of the socialist commonwealth.

In the contemporary situation the actual contribution made by the socialist nations to the strengthening of the world socialist system's economic and military power is of enormous historical importance. It is embodied in concrete form in the work of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact Organization. Lenin's concepts of proletarian internationalism and defense of the socialist homeland have been embodied and further developed under the new historical conditions in those organizations.

The enormous economic and military power of nations of the socialist commonwealth is containing imperialism, limiting its possibilities and cutting off the export of counter-revolution. The world system of socialism is providing a great deal of assistance to peoples struggling for their freedom and independence and contributing to the strengthening of peace and international security. The commonwealth of socialist nations is a natural result of the victory of the ideals of the Great October Socialist Revolution. It is the foundation around which all revolutionary and liberation forces are united.

The experience of building socialism in various nations has proven once again that the bourgeoisie is attempting with all its might to divide the socialist states, to kindle distrust and to destroy the close international alliance and fraternity of the workers. V.I. Lenin's instructions on the need to coordinate the efforts of the socialist nations for purposes of defending the conquests of socialism are therefore now especially valid. "...We who are fighting imperialism," V.I. Lenin stressed, "represent an alliance which requires close military solidarity and we regard all attempts to destroy this solidarity as completely intolerable, as a betrayal of the interests of combatting international imperialism."\*

The anti-Soviet, anti-Marxist position of the Chinese leadership, which have taken a course of betrayal of the interests of socialism and progress, constitutes a major obstacle to the accomplishment of the most important task of uniting all forces of the world revolutionary movement. They are attempting to split the united front of socialist states, openly conducting a slanderous, anti-Soviet campaign and complicating the international situation. The 11th Congress of the CCP, held in August 1977, again oriented the Chinese people toward further militarization of the nation. All of this is tied in with broad dissemination of postulations of the "inevitability of war," an imaginary, nonexistent threat to China on the part of the Soviet Union. This orientation of Peking is willingly used by the imperialists in their struggle against socialism and the national liberation movement.

The stability of peace and the security of nations in the contemporary situation depend to an enormous degree on the unity of nations in the socialist commonwealth, which is based on the social-political uniformity of their social

\*V.I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol. 40, pp. 98-99.

and state structures, a common ideology -- Marxist-Leninist doctrine, unity of military doctrines and the common nature of their end goals, the building of a communist society. As pointed out by the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," the historical experience of world socialism has irrefutably demonstrated the universal importance of the basic laws of socialist revolution and the building of a new society, which were revealed by Marxist-Leninist society and were first embodied in the Great October Socialist Revolution. The guiding role of communist and workers' parties constitutes the most important factor for the solidarity and the achievement of unity of action of the socialist nations in the defense of the homeland.

It is an established law of our era that the economic and military power of socialism serves as an important factor for stabilizing the world situation. Socialism, which is the result of deep, all-embracing social changes, which were begun by the Great October Socialist Revolution, insured the victory over the fascist-militarist bloc in World War II and has barred the way to war for more than 30 years now.

Life has shown that it is precisely under the decisive effect of the increased economic and defensive might of the socialist nations and the growing strength of their unity and solidarity and of their loyalty to the principles of socialist internationalism that a firm foundation for peaceful coexistence is created.

The main problem today is one of preventing a new world war. It is therefore very important to reveal the causes of war in good time, or, in the words of V.I. Lenin: "it is necessary to explain to the people the real situation with respect to the extent of the mystery in which war is born...". \*

The causality of major and minor wars still troubles mankind. This is because two devastating world wars, which lasted for a combined total of 10 years and in which 80 million people perished, occurred within a brief period, within the lifetime of a single generation.

The history of past wars has demonstrated that the world's peoples must always be vigilant and united in their struggle against the forces of imperialism, which has been and remains the source of wars and aggression. The experience of the past has shown that imperialism, even after defeat, is capable of building up the material means necessary for conducting war and rebuilding its revanchist forces within a relatively short period.

One of the most important results of World War II was the eradication of militarism and the destruction of fascism. Only three decades have gone by, however, and militarism is already raising up its head in the capitalist nations, fascism and neofascism openly proclaim a program of a new "crusade" against the nation of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Soviet Union, and

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\*V.I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol. 45, p. 318.

other socialist states. All of this cannot be ignored. This is why timely exposure and thwarting of the plans and designs of instigators of new wars is necessary.

This is all the more important today because the word "war" has never before held such fear as it presently does. In the nuclear era, after all, when a large quantity of the deadly weapons has been accumulated, mankind lives under the constant threat of nuclear destruction. The way to reduce military tensions and to preserve peace and the security of nations and peoples is to eliminate this danger, to limit and then totally eliminate the possibility of a nuclear war.

Precisely this historical fact is the focus of the Program for Peace, put forth by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which is a direct continuation and development of Lenin's Decree on Peace, the first state act ratified by the new popular authorities in Russia following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which enunciated a clear and precise program of struggle for a just, democratic, universal peace. The Program for Peace is actively supported by the communist and workers' parties of other nations and by all progressive forces on the planet. Its ideals received broad recognition and support because they reflect the basic, vital interests of all peoples working toward social progress.

In the past, throughout many centuries, when one of the innumerable dynastic, territorial or other conflicts occurred, the class of exploiters knew only one way to resolve it, by means of war. Past history is replete with numerous wars. It has been calculated that there have been almost 15,000 major and minor wars, in which 3,640,000,000 people perished, during the entire period of the class society. The reactionary bourgeoisie has acquired a great deal of experience in conducting predatory, usurpacious wars. Even now it attempts to employ the obsolete strategy of military force when conflict situations arise in international relations. Imperialism relies on the army as the main means of achieving its goals, constantly building up and improving its armed forces.

The socialist nations, however, which develop on principles of freedom and independence, are alien to any sort of aggressive goals. The Soviet Armed Forces like the armies of the socialist nations, were created and are being strengthened not to seize the territory of others but to defend the interests of socialism. Socialism does not need to impose its ideology upon others by military means. The entire history of socialism, from the first days of the Great October Socialist Revolution up to the present time, has convincingly demonstrated the fact that its colors are inscribed with peace not war. This is why the Program for Peace, which reflects the light of the ideals of the Great October Socialist Revolution and is in keeping with the basic interests of the peoples, has acquired such magnetism.

The disarmament issue is a key problem of our times. It is of most direct concern to millions of people. Guided by the Leninist principles of a peaceful foreign policy the CPSU and the Soviet Government work tirelessly to achieve real advances in this area. The Soviet Union calls upon all states, all governments to put an end to the arms race, to begin moving toward the grand goal of universal and total disarmament.

We cannot consider that war has been eliminated from the history of human society once and for all, however, that it has ceased to be a means of aggressive policy, a reactionary strategy, that the threat of war has become an illusory one, relegated to a secondary or even a third position. Imperialism was and remains the cause of wars of aggression. And although it suffered a crushing defeat in the two world wars prepared and unleashed by it there is no guarantee that forces are not to be found within the imperialist camp, which are capable of organizing a new world war in order to achieve their global goals of combatting communism.

In the West some still dream of revenge. They do not want to draw the final line beneath the totals of World War II, to recognize the political and territorial status quo of postwar Europe and are making an enormous effort to impede the spirit of developing mutual trust.

It is a present day reality that alongside the process of political detente the process of militarization is intensifying in the main capitalist nations and enormous amounts are being spent for military purposes. The arms race continues and is even growing. The numerical strength of the armed forces is growing and enormous military-industrial complexes, which embrace the leading branches of industry, are producing large quantities of modern military equipment, new systems of weapons of mass destruction are being developed in scientific laboratories and the populations are being brainwashed in a spirit of anti-Sovietism on enormous scales.

Certain steps taken by the present administration in the U.S.A. are especially alarming. It is well known that the enormous efforts put forth both by the Soviet Union and the United States of America over a period of many years have resulted in the achievement of a real relaxation of international tensions and at the conclusion of a number of important agreements reducing the threat of nuclear missile warfare. And although the danger of such a war was not totally eliminated a foundation was still created for improving relations between the two nations, which had a positive effect on international security. Recently, however, especially since the new administration took office in Washington, many of its foreign policy actions have constituted a movement backwards, away from the progress which was achieved in Soviet-American relations. The most dangerous is the course taken by the U.S.A. toward unprecedented inflation of the nation's military budget, toward the production of more advanced types of weapons of mass destruction, including winged missiles and neutron bombs, and the nudging of the world toward another lap in the arms race.

The propaganda machine of the capitalist nations has launched a broad campaign of lies and slander against the Soviet Union and other socialist nations in order to justify the arms race and to deceive their peoples with respect to the true goals of the imperialists. Bourgeois falsifiers are spreading the myth of a "Soviet threat" and distorting the policy of the Soviet Government, presenting it as a policy of "expansion" and dissemination of socialist revolution throughout the world by military means. This entire intimidating campaign of propaganda pursues specific goals of intensifying international tensions. "The forces of war and reaction," noted L.I. Brezhnev, "have not laid down their arms, by far. The socialist nations cannot close their eyes to the intrigues of the enemies of peace and must not fail to derive the proper conclusions from this."\* This is precisely why the members of the Warsaw Pact Organization are strengthening the defense capabilities of their nations. They are doing this not to blow up tensions but to suppress the aggressive endeavors of imperialism.

The Soviet people have always been for curbing the arms race, banning the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction and halting the testing of nuclear weapons and for an arms reduction which observes the principle of equal security.

Our people and the Communist Party follow the biddings of the great Lenin, who repeatedly reminded us of the need to preserve our military preparedness. "...It is precisely because we are for defending the homeland," stressed V.I. Lenin, "that we demand a serious attitude toward the nation's defense capability and combat preparation."\*\*

These basic Leninist tenets represent the basis of party policy, which combines peace-loving, foreign policy acts of the Soviet State with a readiness to properly repel any aggressor. The struggle for military detente should in no way be taken as refusal to support wars of liberation on the part of communist and workers' parties of the socialist nations. Unquestionably, the Marxist-Leninists attempt to resolve problems of liberating peoples from any sort of oppressors by peaceful means, without bloodshed where possible. In those cases where there is no other way, however, the people have the right to take up weapons and their war is a legal and just one. In the contemporary situation it is important not to permit international reaction to suppress the movement of the freedom fighters and at the same time to prevent possible escalation of the conflicts occurring into a major war.

The nature and peculiarities of our era, which is developing under the influence of the main event of the 20th century, the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, require that we strictly follow the Leninist class principle of taking the balance of power in the world arena into account in protecting the USSR and the socialist states. Certain successes have unquestionably been achieved on the path toward strengthening peace on earth.

\*PRAVDA, 22 July 1974.

\*\*V.I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol. 35, p. 395.

Detente has moved back the immediate threat of a nuclear conflict. This does not insure lasting peace, however, and we are therefore obligated to strengthen the defense capability of our nation and all nations of the socialist commonwealth.

This conclusion is of enormous theoretical and practical significance. In the first place, it demonstrates the fact that at all phases of development of the socialist states, from 1917 to the present time, it has been their vital cause to defend the accomplishments of socialism against encroachment by counter-revolution and world imperialism and, in the second place, it obligates us to take the real situation into account and demonstrate constant concern for the all-around strengthening and improvement of the combat readiness of the USSR Armed Forces and the armies of the Warsaw Pact nations.

Resolving the problems involved in providing the nation with a strong and reliable defense capability in the contemporary situation, on both the theoretical and practical levels, requires great effort, knowledge and skill on the part of the command and political staff and all personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces. Evaluating the present state of military affairs Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense, wrote: "The basic changes which have taken place in the military-technical area and in the nature of war and methods of conducting it have immeasurably increased requirements of combat training, the moral-political qualities and the ideological and psychological stability of personnel of the Armed Forces. We therefore devote prime attention to the training and indoctrination of Soviet fighting men, loyal defenders of the socialist homeland."\*

The guiding role of Marxist-Leninist parties in the defense of the socialist homeland, as in the past, is still manifested in their practical work and in the further creative development of problems of protecting the socialist state. In the USSR this is reflected in the new Constitution, which for the first time contains a special chapter on defense of the socialist homeland and provides for the formation of a National Defense Council. It stresses the fact that the Soviet Armed Forces were created to defend socialist conquests, the peaceful labor of the Soviet Union and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, that they are expected to reliably defend the socialist homeland and be in a constant state of combat readiness to insure the immediate repelling of any aggressor.

L.I. Brezhnev spoke on precisely this subject: "...defending the rights, freedoms and security of 260 million Soviet people... is not only our right but also our sacred duty. It is our duty to a people who 60 years ago set out on a path of building socialism and communism under the direction of Lenin's party. It is our duty to a people who gave 20 million lives to defend the socialist homeland and their right to live as they choose in the great war against the fascist aggressors, precisely for the freedom and rights of peoples, and who will never move away from that path!".\*\*

\*PRAVDA, 9 May 1977.

\*\*PRAVDA, 22 March 1977.



The Soviet people and their fighting men are greeting the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in an atmosphere of great political and labor activity. Under the wise guidance of the CPSU, its Leninist Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo headed by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev the Armed Forces are achieving new successes in combat and political training and are in a constant state of readiness to perform their sacred duty of defending the conquests of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

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## AIR DEFENSE IN LOCAL WARS DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 77 signed to press 29 Sep 77 pp 75-81

[Article\* by Col F. Shesterin, Docent, Candidate of Historical Sciences: "Air Defense in Local Wars"]

[Text] Local wars and military conflicts are the creation of imperialism, one of the forms of its reactionary, aggressive policy. Ruling circles in the imperialist states unleash them or provoke them for purposes of seizing or strengthening economic, political and strategic positions in various nations and areas of the world and in order to suppress the national liberation and revolutionary movement.

Imperialism has unleashed a large number of local wars in various areas of the planet since the end of World War II, in which considerable groupings of all branches of the armed forces, including aviation, participated. Aviation, as the most mobile and effective means, constituted the striking power of the aggressors.

In accordance with this the importance of air defense also increased for those states against which the aggression was directed.

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the role of air defense in local wars, its missions and methods of performing them and the influence of changes made in the air defense of nations subjected to aggression on the nature of combat operations of the enemy aviation, based on the statements and appraisals of foreign military specialists.

1. The Role of Air Defense in Local Wars: In considering the role of air defense in local wars one should bear in mind that the development of means of air attack and air defense has always progressed in the form of continuous competition, in the process of which the means of attack held the advantage,

\*Based on materials published in the foreign press.

as a rule. And this was only natural since any reforms in air defense were only begun after important achievements in the development of the aviation had become a fact. Constantly outstripping rates of improvement of aviation led to a considerable gap between the capabilities of the aviation and those of air defense.

Unlike local wars of the past, however, a totally new trend has now clearly developed. It essentially lies in the fact that a qualitative leap has been achieved in the development of air defense means, which has resulted in further continuous progress in raising the effectiveness of air defense.

We know that the extent to which air defense influences the course of the fighting is directly dependent on the relative strengths of the opposing sides. With respect to local wars the fact must be stressed that the aggressive states created considerable superiority over the enemy in personnel and weapons, especially aviation, prior to and during the course of combat operations. Suffice it to say that for its attack on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea the U.S. command concentrated most of its aviation from the Far East, numbering 1,172 aircraft, in South Korea and adjacent areas.<sup>1</sup> At this time the DPRK had only 150 obsolete fighters. During the course of the war the U.S.A. continued to build up the strength of its air forces and by the end of 1953 had increased it to 2400 planes.<sup>2</sup> They were opposed by approximately 700 fighters of the DPRK.

The difference in relative strengths in Vietnam was equally striking. For example, while there were around 680 fighting and auxiliary aircraft at American air bases and on aircraft carriers in the area of combat operations at the beginning of August 1964, two and a half years later the number had grown to 2,000 aircraft. The number of helicopters increased from 300 to 2,400 during that same period. And in this situation the patriots of South Vietnam had no air force at all and the DRV had only a limited number of fighters. England, France and Israel used around 900 aircraft in the fighting against Egypt in 1956, which Egypt countered with only 128 planes.<sup>3</sup>

The limited quantity of air defense personnel and equipment of the states against whom the aggression was conducted did not make it possible to protect even the more important objectives on the battlefield and in the rear from air strikes and the air defense as a whole represented no major threat to the aggressor's air force (the first and second campaigns of the Korean War, the war in Vietnam and the aggression against Egypt in 1956).

The quantitative growth of personnel and facilities was accompanied by an expansion of air defense capabilities and increased effectiveness. By the end of the war in Korea, for example, the U.S. Air Force had lost thousands of combat aircraft. The successes achieved by the Korean People's Army in that war were made possible by the enormous amount of assistance provided by the USSR, which, motivated by its desire to defend the socialist nations against imperialist aggression, provided the DPRK with a large quantity of weapons and military equipment, including air defense means, and various supplies. The Korean people also received a great deal of assistance from the other socialist nations.

Despite the fact that the quantitative growth of personnel and means of defense raised the role of air defense in local wars the means of attack remained in first place in the competition. The aggressors' aviation continued to perform the missions assigned it almost completely, although under considerably greater pressure and with increased losses. Its activity could only be restrained by further perfecting air defense. Scientific and technical reasoning found the overall solution to the problem by opening up prospects for increasing air defense effectiveness through the use of new weapons.

These weapons were ground-to-air guided missiles (ZUR). When the forces began using these (in the DPRK in 1965) they marked the beginning of a basic change in the competition between means of air attack and air defense means. With the appearance of ground-to-air guided missiles there also occurred a redistribution of importance of the different branches of air defense forces. Unlike the past, when the main role in combatting enemy aircraft went to the fighter aviation (IA) and anti-aircraft artillery (ZA), the anti-aircraft missile troops had now moved to the forefront. Our nation did everything necessary to outfit the Vietnamese People's Army with new combat equipment. The USSR accounted for up to 70 percent of the assistance received by the DPRK during the war in Vietnam. This made it possible to create a powerful air defense system in Vietnam, a reliable shield for the heroic republic, within a brief period.

Events in the Near East in October 1973 provide an idea of the sharply increased air defense capabilities. The various ground-to-air missile complexes, of which the Egyptian Army had a large number, had a major effect not only on the use of the aggressor's air force but also on the development of operations by its ground forces. According to Pentagon data Israel lost 105-107 aircraft within a period of 18 days, 99 percent of which were shot down by air defense weapons.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, three quarters of the losses of aircraft occurred during the first day of the war.<sup>6</sup> In that war, which dispelled the myth of the Israeli Army's invincibility, the successes achieved by Egypt and Syria were made possible by the political, economic and military assistance they received from the socialist nations, primarily the USSR. Suffice it to say that 80 percent of the Israeli aircraft shot down were destroyed by ground-to-air missiles.

An appraisal of the role of air defense in local wars, provided by French General Baufre, is of interest in this connection. In an article discussing events occurring in October 1973 in the Near East he arrives at the following conclusion: "In any case, it is now clear that the air force cannot play the decisive role in a ground engagement, when a powerful anti-aircraft missile cover is provided."<sup>8</sup> Foreign military observers regard the high level of combat readiness as the main reason for the successful Egyptian air defense operations in the local war of 1973.

Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1967, in which the Israeli Air Force was able to complete all of the missions assigned it and insure the success of ground operations, demonstrates the direct dependency between the results of air defense combat activity and the level of its combat readiness. The air defense of the Arab nations at that time were equal to their function both quantitatively and qualitatively and could have offered serious opposition to the aggressor's air force. The air defense system had all of the modern equipment: supersonic, missile-equipped fighter-interceptors, ground-to-air missile complexes, rapid-firing anti-aircraft guns, machine-guns and radar equipment. The combat readiness level of the air defense, however, did not measure up to its technical equipment.

2. Air Defense Missions and Methods of Performing Them in Local Wars: As indicated in the foreign press air defense missions and methods of performing them in local wars depended on the nature of enemy air operations. Air defense forces had the mission of minimizing the effectiveness of enemy air strikes.

Since wars differ greatly with respect to political, physical-geographic and military-economic conditions this is directly reflected in the organization of air defense. The structure of air defense, the allocation of effort and methods of accomplishing its missions have certain specific features for each war and in each nation. At the same time, foreign specialists also single out general principles of organizing and conducting air defense for local wars. These include, for example, the extensive maneuvering of personnel and equipment and the combined use of all branches of troops.<sup>9</sup>

The most expedient methods of performing missions were employed in accordance with the technical equipment of the air defense troops, the availability of personnel and equipment and experience in organizing and conducting combat operations. In the local wars in Korea and Vietnam (prior to 1965), for example, extensive use was made of the same means of countering the aviation as were used in World War I, as the result of which previously acquired experience was passed on, including experience in methods of performing missions.

In the above wars, as in the past, the fighter aviation continued to play the main role in the air defense system. According to well-known American student of the Korean War James Stewart, the fighter aviation was the most mobile and powerful means of opposing the air enemy.

The repelling of massed strikes by large bodies of the aggressor's air force presented special difficulty for the air defense fighters. In such cases air defense also switched to mass operations (the war in Korea). James Stewart points out that several groups were simultaneously designated for various purposes for the performance of their mission: a forward group for intercepting the attack echelons of enemy aviation, breaking up its combat formations and hampering the approach of fresh forces; an assault group for destroying bombers and tactical fighters on their way to defense installations; a group to provide direct cover for one's own main forces, to support operations of the fighter

aviation; and separate small groups of "hunters" to destroy enemy aircraft upon their return to their bases. A strong reserve was simultaneously designated for building up the combat effort and carrying out unexpected missions, as well as for covering the fighters during their withdrawal from the battle and when they were landing at their airfields.<sup>10</sup>

When the forces in such a situation were limited the fighter aviation, as pointed out by foreign observers, operated in small groups and as individual "hunters." The fighters swiftly attacked the enemy and immediately withdrew from the battle at maximum speeds.

Nighttime operations of the fighter aviation were of great importance for the accomplishment of air defense missions. They were conducted in close interaction with anti-aircraft artillery and searchlights in areas illuminated by searchlights (the Korean War).

In the opinion of foreign authors anti-aircraft artillery was the second most important branch of air defense forces in local wars (until ground-to-air guided missiles began to be used). Together with the fighter aviation it covered groupings of forces, airfields, the most important political and economic centers, communications centers and hydraulic engineering works. Interaction between the two was organized either by zones or in a single zone (by targets, lines, axes and altitudes).

The methods employed by the anti-aircraft artillery to perform its missions, as pointed out in the foreign military press, depended greatly on its quantitative and qualitative make-up. When the forces were inadequate it operated in small, mobile groups on the more probable directions of flight of enemy aircraft. These groups would suddenly open fire on enemy aircraft from ambush, create damage and then immediately switch fire positions. Mobile groups also successfully operated at night when the targets were illuminated by searchlights. When forces were adequate the anti-aircraft artillery switched to stationary coverage of the most important objectives on the battlefield and in the nation's rear area.

Radioelectronic equipment for testing enemy aircraft, guidance, tracking and target indication was of inestimable importance for supporting operations of the fighter aviation and anti-aircraft artillery in local wars.

It is considered abroad that the extensive employment of radioelectronic equipment greatly increased the effectiveness of operations of the air defense troops and forced the aggressors to step up their efforts to counter them.

While at the beginning of the local wars in Korea and Vietnam the American command devoted its primary attention to suppression of the fighter aviation and anti-aircraft artillery, an ever increasing quantity of means was subsequently allocated for the warfare against radar stations. It was in Korea and Vietnam that intensive radioelectronic warfare was begun, which assumed unprecedented scope in the wars in the Near East.

At the same time, changes were made in other areas as the result of technical progress. The transition to jet engines changed the performance characteristics of fighters: maximum flight speeds and rates of climb increased considerably, which was very important with respect to increasing capabilities and the probability of intercepting enemy bombers on the distant approaches to the defended target. Furthermore, these new qualities made it possible to concentrate the necessary fighter forces in the threatened area in less time.

Even more important changes occurred in air defense in the local wars in Vietnam and the Near East, resulting mainly from the adoption of ground-to-air guided missiles.

Despite the fact that in those wars (especially the defense of October 1973) anti-aircraft missile troops were used with varying intensity and with varying influence on the process of the warfare and its end results, foreign military observers single out certain general features pertaining to the methods by which air defense performed its missions.

In the first place, ground-to-air guided missiles occupied a leading place in air defense. When the number of anti-aircraft missile complexes was limited, as was the case in Vietnam until the middle of 1966, they were mainly employed from ambush, with extensive maneuvering on the indicated flight routes of enemy aircraft. During that period ground-to-air guided missiles were not used because there were too few even to defend the nation's most important targets. As the number of complexes increased and the aggressor's aviation switched to carrying out massed strikes stationary coverage of the most important targets became the main method of operations by the anti-aircraft missile troops. Now, only part of the anti-aircraft missile troops were used for operating from ambush. A further growth in the number of ground-to-air guided missiles made it possible to switch to the simultaneous defense of a group of extremely important targets spread over a vast area, that is, to the zonal defense principle. At the same time, the importance of defending individual targets in combination with operations by small subunits (podrazdeleniya) from ambush continued to be important.<sup>11</sup>

In the second place, composite groupings of anti-aircraft missile troops began to be created in order to successfully combat enemy aircraft at all altitudes. They employed diverse ground-to-air missile complexes and separated subunits and units (chasti) in such a way that they could provide mutual coverage against air strikes. This considerably raised the survivability of the anti-aircraft missile troops.<sup>12</sup>

In the third place, the fighter aviation, which constituted the mobile air defense means, continued to employ basically the same methods to perform its missions. New elements appeared in its operation, however. The fighters were forced to systematically put in time in stand-by zones and were able to build up their forces rapidly. This led to a situation in which confrontations between small groups usually escalated into battles between large forces.<sup>13</sup>

In the fourth place, anti-aircraft artillery and anti-aircraft machine-guns had an important role in the warfare against air targets at low and medium altitudes and in those cases when radar equipment was jammed.

Foreign specialists thus feel that during the course of local wars important changes occurred in the armament and combat equipment of the air defense troops, basically new means (ground-to-air guide missiles) of countering manned aircraft appeared, the air defense fighter aviation switched to jet aircraft and major advances were also made in anti-aircraft artillery and radiotechnical troops.

3. Continuous Improvements of Air Defense Capabilities: The continuous improvement of air defense combat capabilities was reflected in the operational tactics of the aggressor's air force in local wars.

Experience has convincingly demonstrated the fact that as air defense is perfected the aggressor's aviation is forced to seek ways of overcoming new difficulties and to develop new tactical techniques and methods of accomplishing the missions assigned it. At the same time, achievements in this area were leading to new changes in the formation of air defense and its methods of operation.

The following methods of employing aviation were most typical in cases of limited air defense capabilities and a generally weak air defense: massed strikes at targets by large groups or echeloned operations in close combat formations; in a single operational formation (several echelons) with a total absence of support groups; repeated passes at targets; operations at altitudes of 1500-4000 meters (the maneuvering period of the Korean War and the war in Vietnam until the middle of 1965).

As the air defense fighter aviation and anti-aircraft artillery grew and improved there also occurred changes in the tactics employed by the aggressors' air forces. While retaining the principle of massive strikes by large forces in combination with echeloned operations in close combat formations the air force was forced to increase flight altitudes to 6000-8000 meters, to reduce the amount of time spent over a target and to reduce the size of the strike forces and, because of this, to assign support groups for various purposes (fighter coverage, suppression of anti-aircraft artillery). This was most typical of the Korean War. In that war the American Air Force began to employ active and passive jamming of detection and guidance radar stations, gun-laying radar equipment and radar stations of the fighter control network to safeguard the approach by bombers and fighter-bombers to the targets. In addition, the American command attempted to isolate the areas in which the targets were located, assigning large fighter forces as screens in order to paralyze the operations of the air defense fighter aviation. Flying on a broad front, at various altitudes and echeloned in depth these groups approached the bombing area ahead of time in order to clear it of air defense fighters of the Korean People's Army (the Korean War). The leaders of the armies of the victim nations in turn undertook countermeasures and detailed special fighter groups to break up operations of the screens.



The extensive adoption of ground-to-air guided missiles signaled the beginning of basic changes in the combat capabilities of air defense and led to the birth of fundamentally new tactical procedures in the aviation. The aggressor's air force, for example, immediately went over to echeloned operations by small groups at low and minimum altitudes, in combat orders dispersed in depth. It was forced to increase the number of support groups (fighter cover, suppression of fighter aviation, anti-aircraft artillery and ground-to-air guided missiles), to reduce the size of the striking forces and increase the intensity of active jamming of all types of radioelectronic equipment of the air defense system (Vietnam).

Along with this, the aircraft attempted to bypass zones covered by anti-aircraft missile troops and carried out diversionary maneuvers when they reached the borders of the zones covered by ground-to-air missile complexes.

The competition between means of attack and means of protection against them in local wars did not stop there. Optimal methods of achieving the designated objectives came into being at various stages of the combat operations. For one thing, low altitude flights by aircraft of the attacking side insured an undetected approach to the targets and forced air defense to take a number of steps in the warfare against low-flying air targets.

These measures increased the effectiveness of air defense in combatting enemy aviation. Increased losses by the aggressor's air force from automatic anti-aircraft artillery and anti-aircraft machine-guns forced it to increase flight altitudes again, to switch to massive strikes against targets by small groups, to reinforce the support groups, intensify the radioelectronic warfare, conduct special operations to suppress anti-aircraft missile groupings and make more extensive use of various types of maneuvering in areas within range of ground-to-air missile complexes.

Foreign specialists say that the above methods of combat between the air force and air defense forces, which have been the main methods employed in local wars of recent times, continue to be developed and perfected. During the combat operations in the Near East in October 1973, for example, the role of radioelectronic warfare became even greater. It had a direct effect on the operations of the air force and air defense. As a result even greater importance was attached to the suppression of radioelectronic equipment.

As evidenced by the foreign press the experience of the last war in the Near East demonstrated that in order to approach targets undetected the aggressor's aircraft uses not only low and minimum altitudes but also natural features, mountain ravines and river valleys. This has made it necessary to use visual observation posts in addition to radar stations in the air defense system.

Considerable changes have thus occurred in the course of local wars in the methods used by air defense to combat means of attack, which are a result of profound qualitative transformations occurring in the armament and combat

equipment of air defense troops. Increasing the operational effectiveness of air defense personnel and facilities had a great effect on the nature of employment of the air force, its tactics and methods of accomplishing missions. Accumulated experience in this area is being subjected to critical analysis in the bourgeois military press. Its study and generalization and the lessons derived therefrom are being used by military specialists of the capitalist nations to further perfect the theory and practices of employing the air force and air defense.

Local wars are a graphic confirmation of imperialism's aggressive nature. The aviation is the main striking force in them. This requires that all peoples who could become the victim of imperialist aggression constantly increase their vigilance and the combat readiness of their armed forces, including their air defense troops.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. J. Stewart, "Airpower: The Decisive Force in Korea," Moscow, 1959, p. 30.
2. Ibid, p. 8.
3. "Vooruzhennaya bor'ba narodov Afriki za svobodu i nezavisimost'" [The Armed Struggle of the African Peoples for Freedom and Independence], Moscow, 1974.
5. ALLGEMEINE SCHWEIZERISCHE MILITARZEITSCHRIFT . No. 1, 1974, pp. 8-11.
6. INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, No. 6, December 1973, pp. 699-702.
8. FORCES ARMEES FRANCAISES, No. 18, 1974, pp. 8-15.
9. ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No. 12, 1975, pp. 17-19.
10. James Stewart, op. cit. p. 56.
11. FORCES ARMEES FRANCAISES, No. 30, 1975, pp. 46-51; No. 18, 1974, pp. 8-15.
12. Ibid, No. 18, 1974, pp. 8-15; No. 30, 1975, pp. 46-51; SURVIVAL, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1974, pp. 4-7.
13. FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, November 1973, pp. 879-881.

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## CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING, RELATED ACTIVITIES REPORTED

### Moskovskaya Oblast Civil Defense

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Nov 77 p 2 LD

[M. Ivanov report: "An Aktiv Conference"]

[Text] A conference of the Moskovskaya Oblast Civil Defense Aktiv has taken place. A report was delivered by Maj Gen M. Rakcheyev, civil defense chief of staff for Moskovskaya Oblast. The conference summed up the results of the socialist competition among the cities and rayons of Moskovskaya Oblast in the jubilee year and discussed tasks for the third year of the 10th Five-Year Plan.

V. Konotop, first secretary of the Moskovskiy Obkom; N. Kozlov, chairman of the oblispolkom; V. Lepeshkin, deputy chief of a CPSU Central Committee section; and officials of the Moskovskiy CPSU Obkom, the Moskovskiy Komsomol Obkom, and of the trade union and other public organizations of the oblast participated in the work of the aktiv conference.

### Training in Moldavian SSR

Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 7 Dec 77 p 4 LD

[Article by D. Fanyan: "Practical Training"]

[Text] Civil defense classes have begun in the collectives of enterprises, organizations, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, institutions and educational establishments.

Many years of experience show that collectives are successful when they place the emphasis on practical training and organically combine discussion of the main questions of civil defense with training sessions and competitions on achieving normatives, including those stipulated in the "Civil Defense of the the USSR Complex.

This is exemplified by the organization of civil defense training at the Kishinev Tractor Plant, the Beltsy Lenin Plant, the Tiraspol "40-Letiye Komsomola" Sewn Goods Factory, the Nendery Silk Combine, the "Kaushanskiy" Sovkhoz, the Kirov Kolkhoz in Kriulyanskiy Rayon, the "Rassvet" Sovkhoz Plant in Novoanenskiy Rayon, and GPTU [precise expansion unknown; possibly Urban Vocational and Technical School] No. 36 and Secondary School No. 4 in Ungeny.

Here the civil defense chiefs and their staffs can constantly rely on comprehensive assistance from party organizations and actively involve the komsomol, trade unions, DOSAAF, the Red Cross, the "Znaniye" Society and workers at cultural enlightenment institutions in the solution of defense tasks.

Of course, practical classes depend on the availability of the requisite training material base: a training area, outdoor facilities, training props and modern technical training facilities. It is important to equip this base and improve it on a joint basis. If a person has invested a fraction of his labor in the building of a training area or the equipping of a training center, fallout shelter or civil defense corner and if he has manufactured defense installations, drawn the line diagram for a radiometric instrument or made a model "center of nuclear attack," he will be particularly interested in mastering the practical methods of solving specific civil defense tasks.

Examples are the Kishinev Sovkhoz School of Wine Production and Viticulture; general education schools Nos. 2 and 17 in Kishinev; Nos. 2 and 16 in Tiraspol; Nos. 1.3 and 5 in Bendery; No. 13 in Beltsy; No. 1 in the settlement of Kriulyany, the village of Bulboka in Novoanenskiy Rayon, GPTU's Nos. 2 and 14; SPTU's [precise expansion unknown: possibly Rural Vocation and Technical Schools] Nos. 7, 11, and 13 and others. The good training material base here makes it possible successfully to train people in civil defense signals, teach them how to make collective and individual use of means of combating the effects of modern weapons, give medical first aid to victims and carry out rescue and emergency restoration work.

The most effective form of practical training which makes it possible to solve tasks connected with the vocational and moral and psychological training of peoples for civil defense is comprehensive exercises. Their degree of success is in direct proportion to the extent and quality of the practical training of participants in each part of the training program.

Comprehensive exercises work when a creative approach is adopted toward their preparation and implementation. This has to be mentioned because there are still many instances where these exercises are carried out without good preparation, in a banal and simplified fashion and are of a poor scientific-cognitive and organization-and-method standard.

At mass practical classes, trainees should use gas masks and other individual means of protection, take refuge in defense installations, surmount various obstacles and carry out intensive work "saving people's lives," and giving first aid for "burns," "injuries," "poisoning," "contamination" and so forth.

Interesting comprehensive exercises have been competently conducted at the "Moldavkabel" Plant, the "Stoyanovka" Sovkhoz in Leovskiy Rayon, the "Mayak" Kolkhoz in Komratskiy Rayon, the 50th Anniversary of October Kolkhoz in Orgeyevskiy Rayon, the village of Trusheny in Strashenskiy Rayon and many other national economic sites.

Emphasis on practical training, systematic training sessions, exercises and competition--this is the correct way to give people the knowledge and ability to perform civil defense tasks efficiently.

#### Training in a Belorussian Plant

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Dec 77 p 2 LD

[Article by Reserve Col Ye. Bludilin, Belorussian civil defense assistant chief of staff for propaganda: "Answering the Call of Duty"]

[Excerpt] Looking back over the heroic pages of the past, you can well understand the profound meaning of the provision in the new USSR Constitution on the protection of the socialist fatherland as a matter for the entire people. The active participation of the population in civil defense measures is a graphic manifestation of the patriotism of the soviet people.

I recall an exercise at the Svetlogorsk Artificial Fiber Plant. It began suddenly. There was a simulated instant interruption of the complex production cycle. The civil defense staff led by Reserve Officer N. Smyshlyayev had only a few minutes to determine the nature and zone of a hit and to take steps to eliminate the consequences of a "nuclear" attack. The staff successfully fulfilled the assigned task thanks to rapidly prepared evaluation data and immediate work by reconnoiterers headed by Engineer G. Bistvitskiy.

Using the data, the reconnoiterers and the plant's chief of civil defense quickly appraised the situation and adopted a decision concerning the pace of subsequent work and outlined steps to rescue people and material valuables and resume production work. Almost simultaneously, well-armed and equipped rescue and accident teams, work mechanization units and medical squads went into action.

In brief, the large and complex mechanism of a project's civil defense, which is not seen under normal conditions, was quickly brought into action. The reliable link between various components was demonstrated and the commanders and personnel of the formations showed their high level of training.

What was insured by the success of the exercise? First and foremost, it shows that constant attention is being paid to improving civil defense at the plant. N. Demenko, director of the enterprise; I. Yefanov, secretary of the party committee, and other chiefs regard it as a vital matter. Communist specialists head all the main teams of nonmilitarized formations. Most workers, officials and engineering and technical personnel have completed a special training program and have reached the corresponding standard in civil defense. It is characteristic that studies and training exercises are organized in close unity with production needs and the demands of security techniques. Questions of civil defense are discussed regularly at party committee sessions.

That is also the case at many other enterprises, sovkhoses and kolkhoses.

Civil defense days are held and lecture cycles and television and radio programs are organized on a regular basis in the republic. Leading experience of civil defense is publicized in newspapers and journals.

The working people of Belorussia sacredly cherish and are adding to the heroic traditions born in combat and well remember the lessons of the last war, which teach vigilance and provide a reminder of the need to be ready for any surprises. All this creates a favorable basis for further improving civil defense and the military-patriotic education of the Soviet people.

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## STATUS OF ESTONIAN CIVIL DEFENSE WORK REVIEWED

Tallin SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 29 Nov 77 p 3 LD

[Article by A. Sutankin, Estonian defense assistant chief of staff for propaganda: "Training Behind, Training Ahead"--passages between slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] Another academic year in the training of the population in civil defense measures has ended. It was notable for having taken place under conditions of the Soviet people's great political and labor enthusiasm engendered by the preparation for the 60th anniversary of Great October and the nationwide discussion and adoption of the new USSR Constitution.

/In the jubilee year considerable gains were achieved in Estonia in reinforcing and improving civil defense. The plan targets for training formation personnel and the population were fulfilled everywhere. City, rayon and workplace exercises have been held to a higher standard. Rayon-, city- and republic-level competition between formation were held at a higher organizational standard.

/The civil defense measures during the "Orlenok" Pioneer Game and the "Zarnitja" Kosomol-Youth Game were full of interest./

Civil defense propaganda assisting the moral-political and mental preparation of the population and the raising of its consciousness and activeness in performing civil defense measures was carried out actively in the cities, rayons, educational establishments and at enterprises. Propaganda forms such as lectures and reports, seminars, thematic evenings, question-and-answer evenings, quizzes and meetings with veterans and "excellent"-rated civil defense personnel have been widely disseminated. For several years running now the civil defense headquarters of Tartu City has organized, through the city newspaper EDAZI, civil defense quiz competitions in which tens of thousands of working people take part.

Civil defense days, weeks and months have given a good account of themselves. They are held meaningfully and with interest in the cities of Narva and Kokhtla-Yarve and Pyarnuskiy and Pylvaskiy rayons. It is important that they are held directly at enterprises, on kolkhozes and in secondary schools,

vocational and technical colleges and other technical colleges. During these events mass demonstrations by the defense aktiv are organized for the population. The in-house radio stations are particularly busy during this period. Book exhibitions are organized and stands, window displays of photographs and other visual agitation displays are arranged.

/Thus in Tallin's No. 1 Public Catering Trust, 80 percent of enterprise workers and employees took part in the civil defense work preceding an exercise. In this period 6 quizzes and 3 question-and-answer evenings were organized and held, 10 wall newspapers were produced, and 8 stands devoted to the best civil defense members and their patriotic deeds were erected. All this is of great benefit in improving civil defense and promotes the growth of the working people's initiative and activeness in fulfilling the defense tasks imposed on them. It is, therefore, no accident that the trust, where the civil defense staff chief is A. Valshonok, is one of the best in terms of civil defense matters in the system of Tallin's trade organizations and public catering enterprises./

The good initiative of the civil defense headquarters of Tallin's Morskoy and Leninskiy rayons--the holding of civil defense propaganda months--deserves approval and every sort of dissemination.

During the months a large amount of organizational and propaganda work on mobilizing the population for the successful completion of the training year has been done at enterprises and in educational establishments and cultural institutions. Among the many measures held during this period we should highlight the organization of civil defense exhibitions in Tallin City's "Ekha" and "Kosmos" movie theaters. Stands displayed materials reflecting civil defense history and combat traditions, showed present-day military-patriotic work at enterprises and in schools and published the deeds and people of civil defense. Here it is also important that these exhibitions were supplemented by movies within the framework of movie festivals and by talks before each session by rayon civil defense staff workers.

/The exhibition arranged by the civil defense staff workers of Tallin's "Dvigatel" Plant in the "Mayak" Club engendered great interest among the youth. Over 8,000 workers, employees and students visited the exhibition. Means of protection against weapons of mass destruction, instruments and various apparatus were well represented at the exhibition./

During the civil defense propaganda month in Morskoy Rayon, 252 movie sessions were held, 235 lectures, reports and talks were given; 15 quizzes were held; there were 33 broadcasts on in-house radio systems, and over 100 wall newspapers and action leaflets were produced. All this left a noticeable impression on people's awareness and in their understanding of the tasks of civil defense and their confidence in the reliability of the means of protection against weapons of mass destruction if the need to use them should arise.



Existing experience thus makes it possible to conclude that the main thing in civil defense propaganda is its ideological orientation and close link with the topical problems of the country's international and domestic policy, with the life of the labor collectives and with the tasks which are being resolved by civil defense.

/At the same time cases are still encountered where the necessary attention is not paid to civil defense and its propaganda. The leaders of some enterprises do not even know the basic documents for conducting propaganda, do not investigate deeply the increased tasks of civil defense at the present stage and do little to train the population in civil defense measures. For instance, we recently encountered such cases in the Vilyandiskiy Repair and Construction Office./

It is necessary to reveal convincingly the humane nature of the aims and tasks of civil defense and to seek to insure that propaganda is effective and of good quality and promotes the formation in each person of an active stance on questions of the defense of the motherland as the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR.

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## BRIEFS

CD PUBLICITY SECTION--Novograd-Volynskiy, Zhitomirskaya Oblast--A section for dissemination of civil defense information among the public has been established under the auspices of the rayon department of the Znaniye Society. Active section members include DOSAAF members and civil defense staff personnel I. Yeremin, A. Frolov, P. Khil'chenko, N. Smolin and others. They frequently speak at enterprises, on kolkhozes, sovkhoses, and at schools. [Text] [Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 16 Oct 77 p 3] 3024

INSTITUTE DOSAAF TRAINING--Leningrad--Almost all the students at our institute [Leningrad State Institute of Theater, Music and Cinematography] are members of DOSAAF. While still in secondary school they acquired elementary civil defense knowledge and took part in competitions. The higher school program is unquestionably more complex. Here too time and effort are needed in order to master the material and practical skills. But the students are actively pitching in. First year theatrical production technologist majors have even suggested organizing a student civil defense scientific society. Its first chairman is Yu. Topor. Now student DOSAAF members are preparing a number of interesting reports on DOSAAF to present at a city conference, and they are working on refurbishing teaching aids in the civil defense classroom. Future stage production artist L. Bobyleva, for example, worked hard on putting together documents for the civil defense schedule. S. Efros and V. Vanin completed several large diagrams. In the course of training, the students are working on civil defense teaching methods, for upon graduating from the institute many of them will be civil defense instructors at theaters, and therefore they are already trying out their abilities. In the dramatic actors group a fine job of presenting lessons was done by K. Gershov and Ye. Ganelin. R. Benkite and others handled their assignment successfully. Students are also doing a good job in the role of members of reconnaissance and rescue teams performing at exercises. The training group of Docent A. Katsman, for example, demonstrated excellent performance solidarity and the ability to operate with confidence in a "stricken area." It won the challenge cup "Best Nonmilitary Unit." The individual champion is also one of our students, DOSAAF member Vyacheslav Poltavets, enrolled in the directors faculty, who won the title "Best Civil Defense Facility Performer." [Text] [Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 16 Oct 77 p 3] 3024

SOCIALIST COMPETITION WINNER--For 3 years in a row the Pervomayskiy Rayon DOSAAF Organization in the city of Vitebsk has won first place in socialist competition. This year it was given permanent custody of the challenge banner of the oblast trade union and DOSAAF committees. It was awarded the "For Active Work" badge and a USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Certificate of Merit. The rayon DOSAAF organization is headed by an old member of Osoaviakhim and a war veteran, former military pilot V. Kaznodi. This lieutenant colonel in the reserve has accomplished much. Close contacts have been established with rayon civil defense headquarters. DOSAAF activists take part in holding enterprise and command-staff exercises and disseminate civil defense information among the public. DOSAAF and civil defense days have become one of the most mass forms of teaching methods of protection against mass destruction weapons in this rayon. To kick off the holiday celebration, DOSAAF organizations and civil defense headquarters held an exhibit of sports cars, motorcycles, go-carts, parachutes, scuba gear, model airplanes and boats, civil defense unit equipment, and individual protective gear. The exhibit was heavily visited by the people of this rayon, particularly youth. The holiday parade was led by DOSAAF motorcyclists, followed by nonmilitary civil defense units. This was followed by civil defense demonstrations. Fine skills were demonstrated by communications specialists, reconnaissance personnel, rescue teams, and medical aid teams, for the most part consisting of DOSAAF members. An excellent job was also done on this day by the model airplane builders, go-cart drivers, motorcycle racers and race car drivers. Civil defense and DOSAAF Day has become a review of the manpower of nonmilitary civil defense units and DOSAAF organizations. It has fostered further activation of mass defense work in this rayon. [Text] [Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 16 Nov 77 p 3] 3024

CIVIL DEFENSE TV PROGRAM--Kandalaksha, Murmanskaya Oblast--The Murmansk Television Studio regularly broadcasts a program entitled "To the Public on Civil Defense." Interesting in format and content, they always draw a great many viewers on the Kola Peninsula. One program dealt with city combined civil defense exercises in the town of Kandalaksha. A. Dubrovin, First Secretary of the Kandalaksha City Party Committee, told TV viewers about the work which preceded these activities. T. Shvyryayeva, chief physician at the city polyclinic, discussed the training of medical aid teams. N. Zykov told of the combat training of nonmilitary unit personnel at the Avtospetsoborudovaniye Plant. These reports were illustrated by excerpts from a film made by TV reporters at the city combined exercise. [Text] [Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 16 Nov 77 p 3] 3024

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